Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of Wagner’s mutiny in June 2023 and even more so after Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death two months later in August, plenty of speculation was offered concerning the fate of the group. Wagner’s role in Ukraine effectively ended with the mutiny, but its large-scale operations in Syria, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), alongside several smaller-scale ones, mostly in other African countries, had come to represent one of the most visible faces of Russian foreign policy. Since 2023, the Russian state has struggled to replace Wagner while retaining the flexibility and effectiveness of its operations on the ground. In this paper, we examine the shifts in Russian policy in Syria, Mali and the CAR, based on a series of interviews with Wagner personnel and other informed interlocutors. In total, for this report we utilized 22 interviews with current and former Wagner Group staff (9), Russian diplomats and military officers (2), Syrian, Malian and Central African government officials, military officers, businessmen and local community elders (8), as well as experts and analysts working on Wagner Group in various European and North American countries (3). Some interviewees spoke in their official capacity or as external observers, but the majority of the sources spoke off the record.

There are clear limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research by necessity limited to oral sources, although with considerable support from news reports and reports produced by other researchers. There is very little access to primary written sources, such as the Wager’s and Russian government records. Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises given that conducting primary research in conflict-affected countries is difficult. However, the research team, which included several interviewers due to the need to use several languages including Russian, English, French, Arabic) benefited from the aftermath of Wagner’s mutiny in 2023, when many staff members left Wagner. This facilitated finding individuals willing to concede interviews. Still, the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete and follow up on specific themes was often not possible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this. Moreover, the three research teams were led by individuals with extensive experience and contacts in the field. Overall, obtaining access was not a major problem. The authors are aware that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organisations.
We build on the extensive literature that has emerged analyzing Prigozhin’s legacy and Wagner’s future, and what it might all mean for Russia at home and abroad.

Background

Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) founded the paramilitary group known as Wagner in 2014 during the conflict in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. Although Yevgeny Prigozhin, a restaurant owner and caterer from St Petersburg, became its manager, its real founder was Dmitry Utkin, a GRU officer who would ultimately die alongside Prigozhin when a bomb blew up the plane on which they were flying in August 2023. It was Prigozhin, however, who took the basic idea of a state-linked Private Military Company (PMC) and turned it into a much bigger operation that combined highly trained mercenary forces with illicit business networks, a global media operation and a political advisory function to form a holistic support package for fragile regimes in the Middle East and Africa.¹

Within a few years, Prigozhin had built an ersatz multinational corporation across three continents. It included thousands of mercenaries fighting in half a dozen wars, a media network comprising hundreds of websites and influencers, a political interference project that sparked a crisis in US democracy, and a host of commercial deals, from providing school meals in Russia to gold mining in Africa.² This business was structured through myriad private companies, but it was always closely linked to the Russian military and the Russian state.³

At the heart of his empire was a prosaic catering business. Through his political contacts he won catering contracts for the Ministry of Defense (MoD), followed later by deals for maintenance, heating and other services on military bases – quite lucrative considering Russia’s sprawling military estate.⁴ After the mutiny, President Putin claimed that Prigozhin’s companies had earned some $1 billion from contracts to feed the army between May 2022 and May 2023.⁵

These generous contracts with the MoD included a quid pro quo. Prigozhin was encouraged to spend some of the profits on expanding Russian influence overseas. Prigozhin himself claimed in June 2023 that he had spent RUB 147 billion ($1.7 billion) of earnings from his MoD contracts to fund his various missions in Syria and Africa, to promote, as he put it, the “interests of the Russian Federation.”⁶

From 2017 onward, Prigozhin crisscrossed Africa and the Middle East looking for potential contracts for a mercenary force – one backed logistically and often financially by the Russian MoD. Wagner forces cropped up in Syria, Libya, the CAR and Sudan, and more recently turned up in Mali and the Sahel. As of early 2023, around 5,000 or so Wagner personnel were thought to be deployed in Africa, mainly in Libya, the CAR and Mali, with at least several hundreds more in Syria.⁷

Wagner was far from the first PMC to operate in Africa; indeed, it had reportedly been inspired by the example of South Africa’s Executive Outcomes PMC. Yet Wagner’s offering was unique – trained soldiers willing to pursue counterinsurgency warfare with few constraints.⁸ But Prigozhin also offered a political package, including media management, influence operations and political consultancy, to enable political leaders to defeat their opponents. All this came at a low up-front price, as Prigozhin was willing to offer regime security in exchange for business deals, usually denominated in gold, diamonds and/or high-value goods that were easy to sell.⁹

Prigozhin’s ambition was his undoing. He became a major player in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with his forces, bolstered by convicts, playing a key role in seizing the town of Bakhmut. But his frustration with the MoD, together with his efforts to expand his business back in Russia and in Africa, ultimately led to his quixotic march on Moscow in June 2023 and his death in what appears to have been an assassination by the Russian authorities.

Unravelling Wagner

Immediately after Prigozhin’s mutiny in June 2023, the authorities began to pick apart his vast network of companies. Some of his contracts with the MoD were snapped up by rivals, although his son Pavel Prigozhin reportedly retained control of many of his father’s businesses inside Russia.¹⁰ Abroad, however, the situation was more complex. Wagner’s presence had become crucial to Russia’s relations with African countries. Unpicking these deals while retaining Russian influence would require deft diplomacy.

His media empire (Media Patriot) was quickly dissolved, although popular war-time Telegram channels linked to Wagner kept going, including Grey Zone (more than 500,000 subscribers) and Wagner Orchestra (nearly 1 million subscribers).¹¹ In Africa, some of Prigozhin’s employees joined new Russian media platforms. The US Department of State’s Global Engagement Center reported on the activities of the so-called “African Initiative,” a media network that has recruited African journalists and bloggers to carry out anti-Western and pro-Russian information campaigns.¹² According to Maxime Audinet, who provided the information in August 2024, it is run by FSB’s 5th Service member Artyom Kureev. AI opened local offices in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Bamako (Mali).¹³ This transition to new media projects, together with the absorption of some of Prigozhin’s media operations, appears to have been rather painless, partly because Russian media outlets and Russian intelligence agencies were already operating in Africa.

Dealing with Wagner’s military forces proved a bigger challenge, however. Soon after the July 2023 mutiny, Russia’s Foreign Ministry reassured governments in the CAR and Mali that there would be no interruption in Russia’s support.¹⁴ But behind the scenes, the entire network was thrown into uncertainty. One interviewee in Mali told us:

The Russian authorities froze Wagner’s accounts, causing massive disruption for a period, with salaries not being paid and logistics interrupted.¹⁶ In the CAR, the initial paralysis lasted two months, during which time Wagner was unable to pay salaries and the Russian MoD stopped all logistical support.¹⁷ Similarly, Wagner in Mali struggled to process payments and operated with reduced logistical support.¹⁸

With Prigozhin’s death in August 2023, the road forward became clearer in some ways, though the same issues remained. Despite the shock and acrimony generated by Wagner Group’s mutiny in June 2023, at no time had the Russian authorities considered abandoning the African deployments.¹⁹ Their priority after Prigozhin’s death was crisis management, which meant preventing any further disruption to operations while also preempting any further threat from Wagner. Moscow wanted to shut down Wagner, but it did not want to lose its influence in Africa. As a result, the Russian government tried to maintain the existing footprint in Africa as much as possible while asserting control over Wagner structures.²⁰ What followed was a balancing act between these two imperatives.

Initially, it was not clear who was running Wagner after Prigozhin’s death. Different high-ranking figures competed for control. Clients, meanwhile, were losing trust.²¹ Prigozhin’s son, Pavel, tried to retain parts of his father’s business, including those in the Concord Group, which operated inside Russia.²² He also took over as head of Wagner on September 16, 2023. Inside Wagner, the authorities sought to purge senior personnel deemed too close to Prigozhin or Utkin, such as Vitaly Perfilev in the CAR, while others remained in their posts.²³ In September 2023, President Putin met with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, as well as Andrei Troshev, one of Wagner’s top commanders. According to a BBC report, Troshev became the Kremlin’s main “overseer” of Wagner.²⁴ Besides these internal problems, Wagner had lost the official support of the MoD, which now sought to take over the group’s contracts in the Middle East and Africa, using its own PMC-type proxies. Deputy Defense Minister Yevkurov was dispatched to Syria and Africa to persuade Wagner fighters to join structures under MoD control. Reportedly, he had always been a major opponent of Wagner.²⁵ Wagner had to start paying for using MoD weapons and equipment. As of December 2023, according to one of our sources, Wagner and the MoD were not cooperating at all.²⁶ For instance, the MoD had supplied trainers prior to Prigozhin’s death, after which that practice was stopped. Wagner even had to rent planes to fly to Africa, except when working under MoD control.²⁷

Russia’s post-Wagner plans

The ‘Africa Corps’, Redut and the PMC department

The Russian government’s plan was clear: try to keep the flexibility and expertise of Wagner while ensuring tighter control of its structures and activities through the MoD. First, it set out to bring existing contracts and operations under its direct control and replace Wagner contracts with new ones with the MoD.²⁸ By far the most widely advertised post-Prigozhin plan by the Russian government was the so-called “Africa Corps,” which, according to its own Telegram channel, was set up in the summer of 2024, after the Russia–African summit in St Petersburg in July, “to expand Russia’s military presence on the African continent and in the Middle East.”²⁹

The Africa Corps Telegram channel was launched in December 2023, openly claiming to be directly affiliated with the Russian armed forces. It sought to recruit volunteers for deployment to Africa, with tasks such as “régime protection, counter terrorism” and “building infrastructure and providing humanitarian support.” Africa Corps’ recruitment pitch described the US and NATO as the main opponents in Africa, whose influence it sought to reduce by providing full-scale military operations to help countries looking to emancipate themselves from “neocolonialism” and gain full sovereignty. Among the potential gains for Russia it cited “free leases” of bases, airfields and ports, as well as “control” of deposits of “gold, platinum, cobalt, uranium, diamonds, oil, rare earth elements and their development on mutually beneficial terms with African partners.”³⁰ Commentators willing to take such claims at face value concluded that the ultimate aim of Africa Corps was to “expand the Kremlin’s military, political and economic footprint.”³¹

In reality, Africa Corps appears to be a recruitment brand used by a structure affiliated with the Russian MoD and intended to subsume Wagner operations.³² A former Wagnerite, now in the Redut PMC, described Africa Corps in April 2024 as “not real… just a campaign.”³³ The underlying structure was repeatedly referred to by sources as the “PMC department” of the MoD. A Russian source said it is “a paramilitary structure, a division of the Russian armed forces, falling under the MoD. Military personnel serving under the ‘PMC department’ sign a contract with the MoD.” The structure operates as an auxiliary structure under a separate chain of command from the Russian armed forces while still being MoD-controlled and seemingly operating under a distinct regulatory framework.

The PMC department, which is said to run the Africa Corps and other state-controlled auxiliary forces, is funded from the Russian defense budget and headed as of mid-2024 by Colonel General Yunus-bek Yevkurov (still deputy minister of defense). The entire point of the structure is to retain control of any parastate forces while avoiding the constraints of standard MoD regulations, bureaucracy and culture to better work with the “specialized expert groups, working groups and other structures […] expected to accompany its activities.”³⁴

The Africa Corps has often been described as a camouflaged Wagner Group, but as a Russian source explains (and multiple Wagner sources confirm), “there is no direct continuity between Wagner Group and the Africa Corps, other than… the preservation of certain traditions, symbols and the recognition of past awards.”³⁵ Facilitating this is the fact that the PMC department coopted much Wagner Group staff and took over some Wagner operations. It also stands to note, as explained below, that Wagner Group itself ended up being contracted by the new PMC department. At the same time, the PMC department/Africa Corps appears to have acquired other organizations, such as Redut, and immediately started recruiting new staff, so that the administrative and support layers of the structure would be staffed by MoD personnel.

According to internal sources, the MoD made the decision to form the PMC department already in April or May 2023, formalizing what had been the informal management of Wagner and PMCs by the GRU and other entities.³⁶ The role that Prigozhin was supposed to have in that early version of the department is unclear. Some MoD sources even alleged that he was supposed to head it, even though at that time he was publicly sparring with Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov over the allocation of shells to Wagner in Bakhmut. In this version of events, Prigozhin had already accepted that Wagner would no longer operate as a standalone entity.³⁷ That there was initially a connection between the PMC department and Prigozhin is also confirmed by a Wagner source.³⁸ The mutiny, followed by Prigozhin’s death, set things on a new path.

Russian media have highlighted plans for the Africa Corps to operate in five African countries: Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, the CAR and Niger.³⁹ In practice, as we explain below, the rollout has been more complicated and partial than expected.

The other main auxiliary force used by the Russian MoD is Redut. Described as a creation of “former employees of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Russian Special Forces,” Redut existed alongside Wagner for years but never enjoyed the same autonomy. It is reportedly overseen by GRU General Vladimir Alekseev.⁴⁰ After Prigozhin’s death, the MoD tried to have Redut take over much of Wagner’s PMC business, seemingly intending to completely replace Wagner with a mix of mercenaries directly contracted by the PMC department and subcontractors such as Redut and similar entities.⁴¹ One of the tools the MoD used to undermine Wagner was to charge it for military equipment and transport services while offering them for free to auxiliary forces willing to work under the MoD’s control.⁴²

It was a determined push, and as late as December 2023 fear persisted within Wagner that all the old contracts would be lost. Interestingly, at that time Redut was seen as the main threat, perhaps because the PMC department was unable to implement projects directly yet.⁴³ The MoD managed to convince (or force) many Wagnerites to join Redut; the uncertainty surrounding their jobs was a decisive factor in a place like Syria, where Wagner was ordered to leave and both the MoD and the Syrian government were hostile. However, there were also disincentives: Redut paid less, imposed stricter discipline, had a more rigid environment, was under complete MoD control and reportedly discriminated against former Wagner staff. Wagner had also offered a more adventurous lifestyle and freedom than the suffocating discipline of the Russian armed forces, whose style Redut tended to follow.⁴⁴

Business takeovers and foreign aid

While the MoD’s PMC department and its contractors such as Redut would take over Wagner’s military operations, they were not equipped to take over Wagner-linked businesses in Africa. The initial instinct of the Russian government post-mutiny was to deprive Wagner Group of all its civilian businesses in Africa and Middle East and replace Prigozhin’s business structures with other Russian-government-linked groups.⁴⁵

Wagner’s ability to work almost seamlessly with Prigozhin’s companies was a key asset. In the CAR, Wagner’s fighting force worked alongside the company Lobaye Invest, which managed gold mines, controlled diamond exports and ran a timber company, as well as various smaller companies, including one producing vodka, as well as being active in the political influencing sphere. There was no ready replacement to run these operations. It was difficult to replace Prigozhin’s ability to “[latch] onto informal local state structures and tie their elites to Russian interests,” which is usually highlighted as crucial to his success.⁴⁶ As John Lechner noted, "replacing Wagner personnel in Africa would require finding new personnel who have the networks and experience that keep operations going.”⁴⁷

The CAR model appeared to be the most difficult to replicate by the Russian state, owing to the needed “flexibility to navigate highly informal political settings and to fuse military and nonmilitary tools in order to create Russo-African links at the level of local elites,” while the model of Mali and Libya appears relatively easier to manage given the purer security, PMC focus.⁴⁸ Even in Mali, however, Prigozhin was appreciated as a “Big Man,” somebody who could make major deals happen quickly and smoothly.⁴⁹ According to Maxim Shugalei, who was involved in several Wagner operations in Africa, Wagner’s effectiveness came down to acting quickly and adapting flexibly. He argued that any attempt to replace this with a centralized structure would not work.⁵⁰ Because of these issues, the MoD sometimes resorted to coopting old Wagnerites, such as Dmitry Sytyi, who after Prigozhin’s death positioned himself as the main representative of Russia’s “economic interests” in the CAR.⁵¹

Moscow seemed to be moving toward a more conventional approach in handling Wagner’s business contracts in Syria, presumably at the price of giving up the big profits guaranteed by Prigozhin’s “system.”⁵² One option was to bring in other Kremlin oligarchs to take over the networks. There was talk that Gennady Timchenko, a businessman close to the Kremlin, also active in Syria, could absorb Prigozhin’s economic projects in the Syrian province of Homs and elsewhere.⁵³ As of mid-2024, it was not clear that this scheme had moved forward. Other initiatives, involving, among others, oligarch Arkady Rotenberg, also proved problematic. One source told us:

Konstantin Pikalov was a Wagner leader who had helped set up another PMC, Konvoi, and been on several visits to Africa previously.⁵⁵ Konstantin Mirzayants, a former Russian paratrooper, is reported to head Redut. These figures, from the paramilitary world but considered loyal to the Kremlin, appear to have been unable to take control of the businesses in more challenging environments, such as the CAR. Arguably, Moscow still needed the entrepreneurial nature and flexibility of the Wagner business empire. Neither MoD representatives, such as Mirzayants, nor loyal businesspeople, such as Rotenberg, seem to have been able to replicate Prigozhin’s model.

A change of direction? The Africa Alliance

In any case, another new initiative of the Kremlin seemed to be going in a different direction. According to multiple current and former Wagner sources, the Russian authorities decided to set up a dedicated structure to implement a new approach toward economic engagement in Africa. Described as “a structured interface for Russian businesses to work in Africa,” the Africa Alliance (AA) is meant to carry out “political technology projects” in particular and “soft power” in general, with the aim of “increasing the political influence of the Russian Federation and creating favorable conditions for the participation of the Russian Federation in state infrastructure projects.” Among its reported tasks is the “implementation of diverse humanitarian projects aimed at fostering a positive image of the Russian Federation while simultaneously strengthening its position in civil society and developing networks that include agents of influence.”⁵⁶ Thus, the AA appears to be a hybrid between the development departments and ministries of Western countries and Soviet development aid. Our source acknowledges that ultimately the aim is to gain “higher priority access to infrastructure projects.” What is innovative, however, is the linkage to Africa Corps and the PMC/PSC department of the MoD: the idea is to bring stability and development to Africa.⁵⁷ The new structure was still being developed as of January 2024, but it brought together former specialists from Prigozhin’s networks and structures associated with government agencies in the areas of culture, education, mass information and public medicine. There was no indication at the start that a fixed, centralized, vertical structure was the goal, though groups had already been set up to work on different projects.⁵⁸ Lacking an overall strategic goal, the AA responds to immediate tasks at hand. There are multiple, sometimes duplicative, groups. On the other hand, such features may make AA more adaptable and flexible down the road. But such features also make financing more complicated, as any one structure will have to be funded from multiple budget sources.⁵⁹

The AA might have been in incubation for years. In 2021 the High College of the Economy in Moscow published a report in cooperation with the Russian ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Duma’s Committee for International Affairs and the Council for Foreign Policy and Defence.⁶⁰ The report criticised the lack of a real Russian strategy in Africa and criticised reliance on hybrid actors and “political adventurers” acting under the Russian flag, seemingly referring to Wagner. The report noted that this erratic approach resulted in these actors benefiting from the state budget, operating with precarious means, attracting a disproportionate attention on Western media and hurting Russia’s image.⁶¹

At the time of this writing, the Russian authorities had not gone public with the AA initiative yet and the structure was only being mentioned by current and former Wagnerites. As portrayed by these sources, the AA could represent a long-term strategy that differs significantly from Wagner’s own original plans.⁶² Yet it is likely that any such state-led initiative will struggle to make headway. Russia has no resources to fund significant development aid, while it is keen not to repeat the Cold War experience of providing billions of dollars in aid to African countries for limited political gain. Although it has forgiven more than $20 billion of Soviet-era loans, its direct development aid to Africa is tiny, amounting to no more than $27 million in annual spending in the period 2012-17. Moreover, Russia makes minimal contributions to UN programs. Moscow does not even have a dedicated development agency, with most aid comprising ad hoc contributions on a bilateral basis.⁶³

Russian investment in Africa is also small – less than 1% of total foreign direct investment goes to Africa – and Russian-African trade amounts to less than $20 billion. Russia has tried to boost economic engagement through new initiatives. In 2019, Russian conservative ideologue and businessman Konstantin Malofeev announced the creation of the International Agency of Sovereign Development (IASD), designed to be a new Russian investment platform that would broker deals between Russian companies and African governments. It was reported to have agreed to finance $2.5 billion of infrastructure deals in several African countries, including Niger, DR Congo and Guinea.⁶⁴ But after an initial flurry of publicity, the IASD disappeared from the news.

Smooth transition away from Wagner in Syria and Libya

In Syria, Wagner was quickly ousted from both military roles and civilian business. Its forces were told either to sign contracts with the Russian MoD or leave.⁶⁵ Its companies were seized in exchange for a commitment by the Syrian government to pay back an undisclosed sum to Wagner Group.⁶⁶ Wagner accused then-Defense Minister Shoigu “and some of his close friends” of having taken over the companies, although at the same time a plan, supported by Putin himself, to inject $2 billion into these industries was mentioned.⁶⁷ The plan suggests something more than a mere redistribution of assets between shadowy economic actors. Reportedly, the Russian government was working with the Syrian government to bring the different companies working in the oil and gas sector under one “corporate umbrella,” with the Syrian government being the driving force in this effort.⁶⁸ Even in Syria, however, simply replacing Wagner Group like this soon appeared unlikely to be a viable option. The Syrian authorities seemed dissatisfied, aiming instead at reclaiming some of the oil and gas business for themselves.⁶⁹

As for the military and security dimensions of Wagner’s operation in Syria, Redut took over many them, including guarding Russian investments, carrying out special operations and even recruiting for the Syrian government.⁷⁰ The fact that the Russian armed forces had a significant presence and that Redut was already on the ground made it easier to replace Wagner.⁷¹ Still, though the Russian authorities and Russian companies were pushing for Redut to take over Wagner’s role in Syria entirely, the Syrian government resisted, no longer keen on having foreign PMCs on its soil at all.⁷²

The passing of the torch went relatively smoothly in Libya too. Early after the mutiny, a Russian envoy rushed to Libya to reassure Khalifa Haftar that some 2,000 Russian fighters, technicians, political operatives and administrators deployed by Wagner in the country would stay, notwithstanding some “changes at the top,” according to a Libyan source recounting a meeting with a Russian envoy. Everything else would stay the same, including "the people on the ground, the money men in Dubai, the contacts and the resources committed to Libya.”⁷³ As in Syria, Redut obtained the contract for training local, Libyan National Army forces, supporting them militarily, gathering intelligence and protecting oil and gas sites.⁷⁴ But in other areas, the Wagner operation was taken over by 1,000-1,500 troops reportedly badged as the Africa Corps.⁷⁵ In Libya, the ongoing ceasefire made the transition to PMC department control rather straightforward.⁷⁶

Compromise in Mali

Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov was quick to reassure the Malian government in the summer of 2023 that Russia remained committed to its mission in the country.⁷⁷ In Mali, Wagner’s typical business of bartering security for gold mines had been slow to get off the ground. Instead, the Malian government was paying cash to Wagner for its military presence, as much as $200 million between late 2021 and mid-2023, according to US sources.⁷⁸ Unlike Libya and Syria, the Russian authorities appear to have been forced to let Wagner keep operating in Mali, perhaps partly because it feared that other actors closer to the MoD would get dragged into a potentially risky situation.

There was also a lack of enthusiasm for MoD contracts, whether directly with the PMC department or Redut. The Malian government resisted too.⁷⁹ In Mali, Wagner’s position was strengthened by the offensives that it successfully led in autumn 2023 in the north of the country, capturing Ber, Anefif, Tessalit and Kidal from the militias of the “Cadre stratégique permanent,” which has been at war with the Malian government since August 2023.⁸⁰

Lengthy talks ensued between the Malian president, the Malian minister of defense, and the main Russian interlocutor, Andrei Averyanov, the GRU General running among other things the MoD PMC department, as well as Konstantin Pikalov from Wagner and Konstantin Mirzayants from Redut. The Russians advocated the wholesale transfer of Wagner staff in Mali to Redut, a proposition still being pursued in early February 2024.⁸¹ A meeting with Defense Minister Colonel Sadio Camara and Air Force Chief of Staff Colonel Alou Boi Diarra eventually led to a settlement, it was reported. The Russian MoD agreed to keep Wagner in Mali, but the latter agreed to operate under some degree of MoD control. The MoD in particular insisted on having a role in choosing the commanders without taking into account the opinions of the units themselves, as it used to be under Prigozhin.⁸² In other words, Wagner’s mercenary status in Mali has not changed, but the administrative procedures governing the contingent have.⁸³

One source within Wagner quantified the terms of the deal as the Russian MoD gaining direct control over 20% of the contract and Wagner retaining 80% of it.⁸⁴ In 2020-23, Wagner in Mali was renting heavy weaponry from the MoD, but after the settlement was reached the MoD started providing it, along with ammunition, for free. This contributed to the MoD gaining more say. As of late February 2024, Wagner Group was coordinating with Russian military officers, even if

A Malian foreign ministry official confirmed that his government insisted on Wagner remaining in Mali.⁸⁶ The Malian preference for Wagner does not mean, however, that the local government had no grudges – it appears to have used the opportunity offered by the post-Prigozhin transition to delink it from local militias, which it had sought to do for some time.⁸⁷

Reportedly, Wagner-MoD cooperation gradually improved after the first difficult months.⁸⁸ Still, Wagner Group deeply resented being under MoD control:

The reluctance was not just on Wagner’s side – as late as April 2024, Redut negotiators were still trying to convince the Malians to completely replace Wagner with Redut.⁹⁰

Wagner has not had it easy after signing the new contract, however. The Malian regime appeared to be struggling to maintain a base of support in 2024, having had to ban all political parties and cancelling discussions to end the “transition” back to an elected civilian government. Well-known figures like Mahmoud Dicko, a charismatic imam, started criticizing the junta. The junta’s undermining of local peace agreements with insurgents risked escalating the violence, as did the reliance of the regime on violent methods against communities suspected of supporting the jihadists, which Wagner was happy to endorse and even enforce.⁹¹ As one analyst commented,

Russia’s reputation would be at stake if it did not deliver the same benefits to host governments as Wagner did.⁹³ The Russian MoD might therefore have reasoned that in Mali, where the security situation looked the most complicated among all of Wagner’s deployments, keeping the Wagner brand would after all be beneficial should things not go well. This risk was highlighted by an attack on Wagner and government forces in northern Mali in July 2024 in which several Wagner personnel were killed and which received considerable media attention.⁹⁴

The commercial side of the Malian operation never got so far in the first place. The group is thought to have struggled to make significant profits since deploying in December 2021. Diplomatic sources told the Guardian that Wagner had had trouble gaining access to the goldmines they were allowed to exploit under the deal struck with the regime of military ruler Assimi Goïta, even if the military regime was paying the bills regardless.⁹⁵

In this regard, some observers suggest the emergence of a new (long-term) Russian policy of helping countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso to set up larger gold refineries in exchange for a share of the profits. For this policy to make sense in Mali at least, it implies a crackdown on smugglers and the informal mining sector by the Malian state.⁹⁶ There are indeed allegations that the Kidal operation in November 2023 was motivated by the need to seize control of “around 100 points of manual/small-scale gold mining in the Kidal and Tessalite areas” exploited by local actors – not just insurgents but even former rebels-turned-Bamako allies such as GATIA (Groupe d’Autodéfense Tuareg Imghad et Alliés). In October 2023 and March 2024, Russia-Mali talks were held about the future of mining in the country.⁹⁷

Wagner retains its core business in the Central African Republic

The same dynamics applied to the CAR, where at one point Wagner Group’s predicament looked as bad as anywhere else. Deputy Minister of Defense Yevkurov, Andrei Averyanov of the GRU, PMC Konvoi leader Pikalov and PMC Redut leader Mirzayants reportedly had meetings with the CAR authorities. They told them that Wagner was no longer supported by the Russian government and Wagner Group was to be informed that it should solve its problems with the Russians before continuing gold mining operations. The Russian government was thus trying to cut off all financing for Wagner and put it under the control of the PMC department.⁹⁸ According to one source, the Russian defense minister personally communicated to officials in the CAR that the Wagner Group’s economic activities should be curtailed, with it only permitted to participate in official security and training local forces.⁹⁹ During the planned transition to Redut, the latter was also expected to get involved in running businesses in the extractive sector.¹⁰⁰

In fact, Wagner came out of the post-Prigozhin crisis in better shape in the CAR than Mali. First, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra intervened with the Russian authorities and asked them to keep supporting Wagner logistically, at least for some time.¹⁰¹ The Russian authorities had to give way. There was no resigning of contracts with the MoD PMC structure and changes were slight.¹⁰² Redut did take over some of the old Wagner contracts, in the extractive sector, training and security provision for elites. Importantly, however, Wagner retained control over the Ndassima gold mine and of most of the diamond trade.¹⁰³ According to a Russian source,

Observers on the ground did not notice major changes. A Western expert concurred that “not much has changed with the death of Prigozhin in the CAR… Operations are still conducted in the countryside, albeit on a smaller scale.”¹⁰⁵ A CAR paramilitary leader stated:

A CAR regime source also stressed the continuity.¹⁰⁷ Reportedly, Denis Pavlov, ostensibly a Russian diplomat, supervises everything from the Russian embassy.¹⁰⁸ The matter might not be completely closed, as the Russian authorities have reportedly sent inspectors to assess Wagner’s economic activities.¹⁰⁹

Wagner, in this case, was helped by the fact that the MoD struggled to understand how all the disparate economic enterprises of Prigozhin’s mini empire in the CAR fit together. At the same time, the military threat represented by the rebel groups was minimal as of end 2023-early 2024. This, and the perception of the CAR as being of limited strategic importance, allowed a certain status quo to be sustained there – a decision has been made to avoid rocking the boat. Despite a cut in personnel numbers, the stable situation has even allowed Wagner to reach Central African towns where they had not had a presence before. As of May 2024, Wagner was working in Obo and Zemio in southeast CAR, recruiting from Azande self-defense forces to head off a future Azande rebellion.¹¹⁰

One Wagner administrative worker attributed Wagner’s resilience in Mali and CAR to the fact that

The issue was not that African governments favored dealing with Wagner as such. One Russian expert noted that some African regimes prefer direct deals with Moscow rather than with Wagner.¹¹² Rather, the problem appears to have been that these government wanted the type of “services” Wagner was providing – such as direct involvement in combat operations and placing themselves at the complete disposal of the ruling elite – while the other organizations could not deliver them.

The first agreement after the mutiny: Burkina Faso

Whereas in most African countries the Russian MoD sought to take over an existing Wagner mission, in Burkina Faso Wagner had never established a presence. An analyst familiar with the Russian MoD and the African country noted that there had been long and rather unsuccessful negotiations with Prigozhin in the months preceding his death. It was only afterward that a contingent of 400-500 personnel was deployed. The initial hesitancy of the Burkinabe was due, in part, to their keenness to avoid the types of economic penetration they saw in the CAR. The government of Burkina Faso appears to have decided that a partnership with the Russian MoD would come with less baggage than that with Prigozhin’s networks. The Russians promised to implement humanitarian projects and other programs to create a positive image of Russia and Russian influence in the country.¹¹³

A brigade of special forces, dubbed the “Bears,” and reportedly based in the capital Ouagadougou, is likely part of Redut.¹¹⁴

Elsewhere, however, efforts at signing direct contracts with the PMC department or bringing in Redut have not made much progress. A source in Redut claimed that, as of April 2024, the group was negotiating new deals in Venezuela, Kenya, the CAR, Sudan and Congo.¹¹⁵ These were mostly either minor or unlikely contracts. Even in Sudan, for example, there were conflicting accounts about Wagner’s role after the start of the civil war there: though claims of Wagner’s involvement on Hemetti’s side exist,¹¹⁶ one analyst claims that its activities appear to have been largely halted during the conflict. Though the same analyst thought that there are likely various Russian operatives still in the country, he believes that as of May 2024 Wagner did not appear to have a force in Sudan. Hence, any transition to the MoD PMC/Africa Corps or Redut would not have amounted to much.¹¹⁷

Outlook
Is Wagner irreplaceable?

It remains unclear whether these state-linked groups can replace Wagner in terms of their effectiveness. What Wagner Group specifically brought to the table – the expertise that it developed in 2014-23 – was the willingness to engage in actual combat extensively, for which neither the Russian military nor Redut seemed to have any appetite in Mali, according to a Russian source.¹¹⁸ Because other so-called PMCs are only able/willing to secure facilities and provide training or support, Wagner might remain indispensable.¹¹⁹ As one source noted: "other Russian PMCs have historically undertaken more low-risk tasks than Wagner, and until recently, were less involved in direct combat operations. None approach the scale of personnel, arms and mission that has characterized Wagner."¹²⁰

The cases of the CAR and Mali show that at least four other issues, all supporting some future role for Wagner Group, can be identified:

• Redut’s expansion has been limited by a shortage of personnel;¹²¹
• Moscow has been unable to replace Wagner’s “special” expertise in delivering shadowy deals and possibly also to replace it in information operations;
• Moscow is fearful of getting trapped in unmanageable conflicts, like the Soviet Union did in the 1980s;
• client governments in some cases have insisted on keeping Wagner.

While Russia benefited from Wagner’s adventures in Africa in several ways, there are also risks and downsides. Relations with the new generation of radical Pan-Africanists has allowed Russian influence to spread fast,¹²² but, as Sergey Eledinov and John Lechner point out, at the risk of Russia being dragged into more troublesome contexts than it can afford or manage. In Niger, the Russians appear to have hesitated to commit, despite local groups appealing to them, and initially even condemned the July 2023 coup. Eventually, however, Russia’s credibility as an alternative security partner in Africa demanded that it respond positively to the Nigerien approaches.¹²³

Western commentators sometimes argue that “Wagner’s African hosts regret letting them in.”¹²⁴ That has been argued particularly strongly in the case of Libya, but even assuming that is true, there is little sign of it in the Sahel or Central Africa. This is due at least in part to the lack of viable alternatives, at least from the perspective of the ruling elites there.¹²⁵ The “regime survival package” that Wagner offers “supersedes any other potential gains from traditional cooperation agreements advanced by Western partners, which are usually based on institutional capacity building instead of securing the authorities themselves.”¹²⁶ Given the reluctance to let Wagner go on the part of its African clients, combined with the unwillingness of its competitors to do everything Wagner does, compromises have had to be made.

Unstable arrangements?

As discussed above, whereas the original ambition appears to have been to completely integrate Wagner’s assets into Russian state structures, in a number of cases the end result has been a public-private approach, combining some characteristics of the Wagner model with stronger state control.^{127 128} The fact that the Russian army was, of course, busy fighting in Ukraine is likely to have been a factor favoring compromise, as well.¹²⁹

Though Moscow has demonstrated some skills in making virtue out of necessity, the new arrangements worked out with the Malian and CAR governments are not necessarily stable. The Malian authorities miss the assertive and self-confident Prigozhin-era Wagner and would like the group to help build a strong air force and/or deliver direct close air support.¹³⁰

The Russian MoD’s uncertain attitude and reluctance to give Wagner forces the green light for operations is seen by the Malians as a major problem.¹³² Another potential element of instability in the relationship was the Malians’ desire for more than what Wagner was still doing in 2024 (guarding the country’s leadership, training “some of the special forces” and supporting special operations against insurgents) – they want a better air force, especially helicopters, and more and better training, neither of which Wagner was able to deliver as of early 2024.¹³³ A third potential instability driver was Wagner’s continuing interest in the mining sector.

A Wagner source noted that as of 2024 there were still plans to expand Wagner mining operations and enter other industries.¹³⁴

In the CAR, the arrangements seem more stable, as not so much has changed following Prigozhin’s demise. Wagner believes the CAR government nonetheless wishes for even greater engagement by the group, in securing the regime but also in the extractive sector. There is no perception of divided views over Wagner within the CAR.¹³⁵

Pavel Prigozhin attempts a relaunch

A source in Wagner involved in negotiating new contracts said in May 2024 that, after some difficult months in the immediate aftermath of Prigozhin’s death, things were getting better. His son Pavel reportedly invested some of his resources, while flows of funds resumed from some clients, which the source cited as Libya, Sudan, Kenya, Madagascar, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Mali. According to the same source, Wagner still retained several important contracts, including one for gold mining in Sudan, several in the CAR, one in Madagascar for mining gold and another for oil extraction, and one in Mozambique for natural gas (investigative reporters were unable to confirm the Mozambique contract, nor those in Madagascar, though there were reportedly discussions concerning Wagner’s involvement dating to 2018).¹³⁷ New contracts were reportedly being negotiated with Venezuela, Chad, Gabon, Niger, South Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria (for coal, gold and limestone) and even Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, not to mention talks with the Chinese to secure projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These new clients were requesting different types of services, such as military bases, security support, logistical assistance, mechanical assistance and training, investment and mining, as well as fighting and training and supporting military forces.¹³⁸

However, the Russian authorities were unsupportive and in fact seemed to be trying to create obstacles.¹³⁹ Despite strong reservations about working with the Russian MoD, therefore, Wagner considered the agreement on the Mali mission in February 2024 (see above) as an achievement. Not only was Redut seen by the Malians as an inadequate substitute for Wagner for most of the functions it performs, but Wagner negotiators believed they had succeeded in convincing the Malian government that it would be unwise to rely too much on the Russian MoD at a time when it was very busy in Ukraine.¹⁴⁰ The pragmatic approach grudgingly adopted in Mali seemed to be paying off. Indeed, one strategy Wagner was considering as of April 2024 was to join hands with Redut to quell MoD concerns.¹⁴¹ As a Russian newspaper noted, "even just protecting assets from hostile takeovers in the local market is extremely difficult without official status, support from the Russian Foreign Ministry and the whole authority of Russia."¹⁴² These hybrid arrangements suited many of Wagner’s old clients. Even a source in Wagner acknowledged that African governments were happy to have the Russian government involved in the contracts with Wagner, as it made them feel more secure.¹⁴³

Wagner seeks to regain autonomy

While Wagner rejoiced at having managed to carve out a short-term niche for itself within Russia’s new strategy, its longer-term prospects remained more ambitious. Even after the mutiny, Prigozhin surely not only looked at his Africa business as viable but also tried to set it up on a more autonomous footing, likely cutting out the Russian state whenever possible. For example, Wagner started using UAE-based Kratol Aviation instead of Russian military aircraft, even if it is unclear whether it was Wagner that rejected MoD support or vice versa.¹⁴⁴

Despite many departures, of February 2024 Wagner had 5,000 men and 600 contractors deployed.¹⁴⁵ Pavel Prigozhin saw further potential for interventions outside the MoD framework, especially in areas that would be viewed as noncore in Africa. There were rumors of a possible contract in Equatorial Guinea, for example.¹⁴⁶ Opportunities might abound even in more geopolitically relevant areas. For example, according to a source in Wagner, the Malian government was asking Wagner in spring 2024 to fully train the Malian armed forces, which would require an expansion of Wagner’s presence.¹⁴⁷ Here, however, Wagner would likely face an MoD veto.

A major issue, however, was the fact that for any operations outside the MoD framework, Wagner could not count on MoD support, logistical or otherwise. To get around this, at least partially, in early 2024 Wagner was discussing with different countries the possibility of purchasing equipment there, especially helicopters. One such country was Pakistan, which has a number of Russian made helicopters in its inventory.¹⁴⁸ Overall, Wagner seemed to be trying to become more autonomous from the MoD; one source mentioned Wagner now being able “to purchase drones, rent planes, and purchase weapons.”¹⁴⁹ How much equipment Wagner Group could mobilize without MoD support remains debatable, however. In July 2024, a source within Wagner noted how the relationship with the MoD was “getting better day by day” and noted with evident relief that the MoD had just “provided two conflict choppers, weapons and ammo, and besides that, the Russian defense minister promised that they would provide a cargo plane if needed to transport Wagner fighters and logistics.”¹⁵⁰

Wagner learning lessons?

Wagner nowadays accepts that it made mistakes in its operations in Africa and Middle East. The Syrian experience, for example, where local powerbrokers felt undercut by Wagner, taught Wagner to use subcontractors such as laborers, miners, guards and fighters more extensively in the CAR. Wagner now sees value in working more extensively with subcontractors because that translates into influence:¹⁵¹

In general, there was a feeling that Wagner Group should become more competitive. That could also mean working with non-Russian partners. As discussed above, after the death of Prigozhin, the Russian MoD took control of most of the companies linked to the group in Syria and cancelled all the standing agreements with the Syrian government. Wagner tried to fight back by opening talks with the Syrian government in alliance with Chinese firms, offering to run the same contracts with a 10% share of the revenue, as opposed to the previous 25%.¹⁵³ The idea of working with China also surfaced during talks on taking over the security for various Chinese projects in Pakistan.¹⁵⁴

Conclusion

Prigozhin’s mutiny and demise last year had a major impact on both Wagner itself and the Russian government’s plans for it. Issues and doubts were already emerging before June 2023, however. While one can only speculate about what would have happened without those two fateful events, they clearly accelerated the Russian authorities reckoning with the negative implications of relying on Prigozhin’s “venture capitalism” model to conduct foreign policy.

The dilemma faced by Moscow was that Wagner Group quickly developed capabilities in areas where the Russian MoD and other state agencies were lacking, but at the price of much-reduced control and reliability. Without Wagner, Moscow would not have made major inroads in Africa.

Wagner dared to go places where Moscow was (at the time) very cautious and conservative. It also bypassed the bureaucratic and organizational limitations of Russian state agencies. In these regards, Wagner was an asset. At the same time, it was essentially driven by profit and the personal ambitions of those involved, with the Russian state lacking effective means to supervise and control it. Things were bound to go astray, and they did. The mutiny was an egregious case of Wagner derailing, but there were growing problems elsewhere, first and foremost in Syria, where the Assad regime was growing more and more skeptical.¹⁵⁵

This dilemma took a new shape after Prigozhin’s demise. At that point, Moscow had a golden opportunity to dissolve Wagner and either take over or hand over its projects to other nonstate or semi-state actors as it pleased. But the unique or at least particular skills that Wagner demonstrated remained as precious as ever. Though replacing Wagner in some roles proved feasible, there was no appetite for taking over Wagner’s combat role in complex environments like Mali. The mutiny also paradoxically restored some factor of plausible deniability around Wagner, incentivizing the MoD to keep using it in the most troublesome contexts. Thus, after some months attempting to figure out how to move on from Wagner, even the MoD ended up accepting that there was no real alternative to Wagner in Mali and the CAR and that having Wagner take on the most controversial jobs might continue to serve Moscow’s interests. Pavel Prigozhin appears to have been exploring options for operating independently of the MoD, but in the end Wagner group might not need to separate from the MoD completely. As for Wagner’s business empire, as of mid-2024 Moscow was still exploring options for turning it into something looking less like a Russian version of the East India Company.¹⁵⁶ Plans were emerging, but none had really been tested by the time of this writing. It seems clear, however, that Moscow would struggle with implementation, both on the ground and internally. They look too much like Soviet development aid not to arouse opposition and suspicion in Russia, especially at a time when resources are especially scarce due to the war in Ukraine.