A similar situation appears to have played out in the invasion of Ukraine, where the MoD initially relied on mercenaries from the PMC Redut and other MoD-controlled contractors, before requesting help from Prigozhin and Wagner after the Russian army suffered a critical shortage of personnel in the wake of the failure of the initial strike in February 2022.²⁵

Wagner’s flexibility also included its diplomatic impact. The group offered a low-cost vessel for Moscow to respond rapidly when opportunities arose to compete with the West. This was not a carefully planned strategy, and at times both the Russian state and Wagner have been highly opportunistic. Perhaps the best characterization of the relationship is that the sides shared the belief that profit-seeking business and foreign policymaking are not merely compatible but also naturally synergistic. In fact, both sides were, at least for a time, operating like venture capitalists: taking and exploiting chances to make gains, diplomatic and financial.

In case after case, Wagner was able to respond quickly to fill a security vacuum left by others. In the CAR, a Wagner force arrived in mid-2018 to bolster the Touadéra regime against rebels after France withdrew its troops in October 2016.²⁶ In Libya, Wagner forces deployed to support the rebel Libyan National Army (LNA) of Khalifa Haftar against the Tripoli government, also in the context of a lack of international engagement in the Libyan civil war.²⁷ In Sudan, the pariah status of President Omar al-Bashir allowed a Prigozhin-backed company, Meroe Gold, to set up operations in the country in 2017 on very privileged terms.²⁸

In the case of Mali, it was arguably Bamako’s own miscalculation that led to the sudden de cision of President Emmanuel Macron to pull French forces out of the country, followed by the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MI NUSMA). According to a Malian official, the Malian junta’s intent does not appear to have been to replace the French with Wagner. Indeed, if they had wanted the French to leave, they had not shown it and later complained loudly about the French abandoning them. Rather, they sought to renegotiate terms and get more options.²⁹ When the French contingent was deployed, Malian elites never seriously considered measures either to strategically defeat the jihadist insurgency or to reach any compromise; their concern was protecting the capital and the regime. They appear to have assumed that a military solution would eventually be possible, once they expanded their arsenal.^{30 31} The Russians and Wagner were quick to exploit this unexpected opportunity.

This profit-seeking and business-oriented approach soon showed its drawbacks, however. Wag ner was not always prepared to tough it out when the costs were deemed too high. Take the above mentioned Wagner deployment to Mozambique in 2019 to carry out counterinsurgency operations in the north of the country: When Prigozhin decided to bail out after Wagner took unexpectedly high casualties in the jungles of Cabo Delgado, Shoigu was “not happy,” according to a Wagner source, suggesting that the premature withdrawal was incongruous with broader Russian plans for deeper ties with Mozambique. Note that while Wagner Group has a track record of not being casualty averse, this situation required additional risk that the reward from the relatively small Mozambican contract did not justify in pure business terms.³²

3. The Pros and Cons of Contracting out State Operations

3.1 Wagner Group as a handler of proxies

Even after the 2023 mutiny, the Russian authorities assessed Wagner Group’s impact positively when it came to roles that the Russian army and the GRU found difficult to handle. Even in Syria, where Wagner Group came under heavy pressure from both the Russian MoD and Syrian government, ³³ Wagner was viewed as an asset because of its ability to manage militias and other proxy forces. Initially, the Russians were divided as to whether to push for a reform of the Syrian army or invest in militias, with the Russian security services and Wagner Group promoting the latter option.³⁴ The Russian military had a very low opinion of the Syrian army, not least because “The Syrian government promoted a lot of useless people,” against Russian advice, according to one Russian military advisor. A Russian diplomat expressed resentment at Assad’s efforts to remove Syrian officers whose loyalty to the regime was uncertain, including those close to Russia.³⁵

Although the Russian attitude toward relying on militias in place of the Syrian regular army fluctuated over time, after 2017 even the Russian MoD increasingly became convinced that there might be no alternative to militias.³⁶ Wagner Group built a reputation for managing them relatively effectively, training and fighting alongside them. It is credited with having turned one Syrian militia, the ISIS Hunters, into a relatively effective fighting force.³⁷ In January 2024, a Russian diplomat noted that “the private military companies […] changed the Russian plan for training the militias...”³⁸

This was not new. The use of loyal proxies and militias had been central to Russia’s inter vention in eastern Ukraine in 2014, where Russian-backed Donbas militias, along with Wagner and various other PMCs, provided Russia with the opportunity to secure physical control of parts of the Donbas while the political status of these territories remained disputed.³⁹ Wagner gained additional experience in training proxy forces and leading them on the battlefield in Syria, be fore extending this model of proxy warfare to other conflict zones, first to Libya, where the PMC trained and supported Haftar’s LNA, and then to the CAR and Mali, where local forces trained by Wagner played a central role in counterinsurgency warfare.

3.2 Wagner’s warriors for hire

The use of proxies and PMCs gave Russian diplomats a useful layer of “plausible deniability.” The phrase “they are not there” (“ikh tam net”) became a popular slogan for Wagner, part of a wider myth of the group as a deniable, covert force that dated back to the deployment in Ukraine in 2014. This also reduced any domestic pressure on the Russian government because of casualties in overseas military operations. According to investigative journalism sources, 73-101 private contractors had died in Syria as of December 2017, versus 41 Russian servicemen.⁴⁰

Although it worked with proxy forces, Wagner was also a fighting force in its own right – in contrast to some other PMCs, which acted more in training or advisory roles. Privately, many Russian officials have admitted that Wagner played a key role in Syria, even if publicly the MoD has downplayed its contribution. A Russian diplomat said that the Wagner Group had done “a lot since they arrived in Syria; they did what was impossible for Syrian security forces; they helped the Russian army take a lot of territory from terrorists in Syria.”⁴¹ Perhaps surprisingly, such views persisted in 2024. In April, a Russian military adviser in Syria said:

In the CAR, Wagner played a proportionally much bigger role than in Syria, crushing the opposition forces. That said, the challenges faced by the PMC in the CAR were modest in com parison to Mali and even more so to Syria. As one veteran commented, “… in 2021 […] we were fighting Séléka. And they were a lot weaker than the Syrians. The rebels only had a few beaten-up RPGs maybe some ‘Kalashes,’ or AK-47s.”⁴³ Nevertheless, it was a military success, even though, from the Russian government’s perspective, the CAR was of limited geopolitical interest. Moscow even appears to have been ready to shut down all Wagner operations there, and only intervention by CAR President Touadera prevented that from happening.⁴⁴ Owing to Wagner’s and Russia’s presence in Libya and the much greater geopolitical relevance of the Sahel, the Russian authorities were much more interested in Mali.⁴⁵

Wagner’s performance in the CAR served as an advertisement of its potential for armed – and very brutal – counterinsurgency operations, something that contributed to their expansion into the Sahel. Initially, Russian officials supported Wagner’s deployment and its November 2023 Kidal offensive, which kickstarted the effort to reclaim the north of Mali.⁴⁶This suggests that Moscow had no objections to Wagner’s operations per se and that efforts to replace Wagner were entirely due to Prigozhin’s mutiny.⁴⁷ How the Russian government assesses nowadays the role of Wagner Group in Mali remains unclear, after a disastrous foray into the north (that ended in an ambush in July in which numerous Wagner fighters were killed)⁴⁸ highlighted the risk of the Malian government getting trapped in a conflict on three fronts, with no real prospect of victory.

Wagner’s uniqueness was that it offered something that nobody else could offer. Other Rus sian PMCs, such as Redut and Convoy, had only experimented with combat operations: Redut originally worked as the security outfit of Gennady Timchenko’s Stroytransgaz in Syria, while in Ukraine Redut, working with General Vladimir Alekseev of the GRU, delivered fighters to the front line. Convoy did the same, contributing a volunteer battalion in Ukraine, allegedly spon sored by Arkady Rotenberg and Crimean separatist leader Sergey Aksenov.⁴⁹ Redut reportedly performed poorly in Ukraine, suffering huge losses of personnel in the first weeks of the war.⁵⁰ Overall, there is too little information to assess fully the performance of Redut and Convoy as sur rogates of Wagner in Syria and Ukraine, yet it is a fact that neither Redut nor Convoy had appeared in Africa as of mid-2024, and there is likely a good reason for that.⁵¹ The military services con tracts taken from Wagner after the mutiny were transferred directly to the Russian MoD’s PMC department, to forces operating under the “Africa Corps” label.⁵² As of mid-2024, the latter were reportedly operating in Libya, Niger and Burkina Faso.

It is not just Russian PMCs that are unwilling or unable to provide combat capabilities for cash. As noted by Francisco José Matías Bueno, “After the bad experience of Blackwater Security Company, in this sector those jobs more linked to mercenary or high risk have been avoided. While Western companies have evolved into lower-risk services.” Here, Wagner found a niche for itself. “Many fragile states find themselves in a situation that is not too far from what Assad experienced a few years ago,” Bueno adds.⁵³ Whereas Wagner Group was out of its depth in jungle fighting (where South African PMCs might well have had an advantage), in more open environments, even where highly capable enemies were present and, significant casualties were to be expected, Wagner – with its Spetsnaz heritage – had few, if any, rivals. The closest match is Turkey’s SADAT PMC, whose Syrian mercenaries were involved in intense fighting in Libya and took significant casualties.⁵⁴

3.3 Wagner’s disinformation campaigns

Wagner’s other major contribution to Russian foreign policy came in the media realm. The Russian state has been keen to promote its narratives through outlets such as Sputnik and RT, which, in turn, have expanded their coverage in the Middle East and Africa rapidly over the past decade. Wagner added a new, more assertive and often creative strand to this media campaign, using social media, feature films, video clips and memes to both promote Wagner and transmit the broader Russian message.⁵⁵ Prigozhin’s media teams were particularly adept at using local media outlets and African influencers to package this as part of wider Pan-Africanist and anti-colonial narratives.⁵⁶ In Africa and parts of the Arab world, local social media influencers have promoted the Russian narrative on the Ukraine war.⁵⁷ Prigozhin once described Wagner troops as “heroes [defending] destitute Africans and Latin Americans,” and this anti-colonial message is widely used to reach foreign audiences.58 After Prigozhin’s death, there was some reorganization of these media projects, with a new platform, African Initiative, seeming to have taken over some of them.⁵⁹

Afrique Media TV (AM TV) is an example of this engagement with local media outlets. A media entity based in Cameroon, it commands a substantial audience across the continent. It was funded by Prigozhin at least until 2022, when that ended for unknown reasons.⁶⁰ It also had an agreement with RT, which probably included funding that was continued after 2022.⁶¹Many of the influencers supported by Wagner’s information operations team appear regularly on AM TV.⁶² Leveraging its extensive digital infrastructure, it has successfully amassed a following of over a million people. As of March 2024, this includes approximately 1,000,000 followers on Facebook and 955,000 subscribers on YouTube, giving it considerable reach.⁶³ Kémi Séba, a popular Pan-Africanist who in 2018-19 appears to have had close ties to Prigozhin⁶⁴, has over 302,000 followers on Instagram, 255,000 on X (formerly Twitter), 1,300,000 on Face book, 280,000 on TikTok and 220,000 on YouTube. Although he later cut ties with Prigozhin, Seba has retained ties to figures such as nationalist polemicist Alexander Dugin in Moscow, judg ing by Dugin’s effusive X commentary about him. Another popular figure with ties to Prigozhin, Nathalie Yamb, has over 84,500 followers on Instagram, 410,000 on X, 84,000 on Facebook, 176,000 on TikTok, and 379,000 subscribers on YouTube. Drissa Meminta, a legal advisor and one of Mali’s best-known Pan-African activists, has 189,000 subscribers on Facebook. While these numbers do not necessarily mean impact, they at least show that many Africans receive their typically pro-Russian and anti-Western messages⁶⁵.

Russian information campaigns appear to be effective in parts of Africa, especially but not only in Mali and the CAR, where they have been focused. In Mali, Sputnik France ranks between RFI and France 24, on the one hand, and French BBC, on the other. Surveys of public opinion in Mali have shown high levels of support for Russia and for Mali-Russia cooperation (98% ac cording to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Mali-Metre).⁶⁶ In 2024, Gallup found that across Africa, 42% approved of Russia’s leadership, up from 34% in 2022.⁶⁷ It is hard to prove a causal link be tween the growing popularity of the Russian government and the information operations set up by Wagner, but it appears likely that the latter played a role in promoting Russia’s “brand” in Africa. While the information operations may have indeed been deemed successful, it remains unclear whether Moscow thinks that Wagner Group’s media role is as essential as its “warrior for hire” function: Prigozhin was often an innovator in media operations, yet Russian officials might now believe that they have become adept at manipulating the media, partly thanks to Prigozhin’s work. However, the Russian authorities seemed to be warming up to resuming cooperation with Wag ner’s information operations team in 2024, which suggests that they might have found its work, to some extent, irreplaceable.⁶⁸

3.4 Wagner’s geopolitical impact

After 2012, Russia had begun to view Africa as a key area for restoring Russian influence (which had collapsed along with the Soviet Union). Soviet influence-building in Africa had been expen sive, and the Soviet Union collapsed before it could reap any benefits, although Moscow continued to leverage the memory of its support for anti-colonial movements such as South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) to bolster support among some African states.

Russia’s revived Africa policy was strong on rhetoric about sovereignty, anti-colonialism and multipolarity, but short on specific proposals that would attract support in Africa. President Putin criticized Western countries, which he claimed were “… resorting to pressure, intimidation and blackmail of sovereign African governments” but had little to offer in terms of economic aid or trade.⁶⁹ Wagner’s mix of customized security provision and illicit dealings in minerals appeared as an ideal instrument for an economically weak Russia that wanted to compete with the West in Africa and the Middle East. Moscow viewed these regions as sites for proxy conflicts with Western powers – especially France in West Africa – and temporary alignments with Gulf powers, such as the UAE in Libya and Sudan. This represented both a geopolitical challenge to the West and an attempt to gain support among African states as new trading partners and potential votes at the UN.

One of Moscow’s initial intentions in sponsoring Wagner interventions in Africa was to show that Russia was hardly “isolated” after 2014. Prigozhin was present at the inaugural Russia-Africa Summit – held in Sochi on October 23-24, 2019, and attended by 43 African leaders – and his security and commercial projects gave substance to Russian diplomacy. Even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, when abstentions in the UN became an important diplomatic goal for Russia, Africa and the Middle East offered potential partnerships for Russia at a time when its relations with the West were already in sharp decline. Meanwhile, as mentioned, Russia’s influence in Africa has long roots.⁷⁰ A major part of Russian diplomacy aimed to leverage the history of Moscow’s support for Cold-War-era anti-colonial movements, such as the ANC, to bolster current ties. However, one of the fixtures of Russian foreign policy has been the refusal to “waste” much needed resources on ideological causes abroad, which is how Soviet support for movements and states in Africa has been described. Although the debate has now reopened⁷¹, for years, it was deemed financially irrational for Russia to resume a Soviet-style influence policy in Africa, when Moscow funneled billions of dollars to local proxies with little lasting effect. Modern Russia no longer had the economic resources for any economic largesse, it was argued.⁷²

Economic ties were thus limited by Russia’s own limited resources: Major Russian energy and mining corporations had limited success in Africa, where they faced competition from both Chinese and Western investors.⁷³ For a Russia without plush resources but with few scruples and big global ambitions, the Wagner model proved to be an important innovation. It offered close military and commercial engagement with elites in a small number of countries, from which Russia derived some geopolitical benefits. It was geopolitical influence on the cheap, with troop deployments covered directly by host governments or indirectly through mining and other business concessions.⁷⁴

The most obvious successes of the partnership between the Russian government and Wagner came in Africa. Yet even there the Wagner model did not work everywhere. It was best suited to smaller, poorer, conflict-affected countries where Wagner’s military resources and commercial deals could be attractive for a local political elite and where Western states had few core interests; however, it was not attractive in larger, richer states, such as Nigeria. Moreover, Wagner Group and its less than polished delivery also caused major friction with some larger African countries. For example, Nigeria was concerned by Russia’s role in promoting divisions in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and supporting the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States.⁷⁵

In addition, Wagner’s operations succeeded where they aligned with the anti-French positions of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries like Mali and the CAR sought Russia’s aid in counterbalancing or replacing neocolonial powers, eventually resulting in complete French with drawal, a major Russian success.⁷⁶ Moscow’s growing influence in the Sahel, together with waning Western influence, would have been unlikely had it not been for the Wagner model. For example, nationalist feelings in the Malian army were exacerbated after 2021, when it felt humiliated by the way the French had seemingly turned from rescuers into occupiers.⁷⁷ The Russians, through Wagner, positioned themselves to take advantage of this opportunity.

Wagner and Russia are not immune from the risk of a souring of moods, however. Wagner’s advisers, whom some described as “foreigners who know nothing of the country” and who “are trying to take control of operations,” soon started making some Malian officers nervous again.⁷⁸ This raises the question of how sustainable Russia’s gains through Wagner Group are. Regime change in Mali or the CAR could have disastrous consequences for Russia, but so could any major Wagner failure there. Geopolitical realignment by these regimes cannot be ruled out either. After all, as noted above, the Malian junta brought Wagner in exactly for the purpose of counterbalancing the French – tomorrow it might invite another actor to counterbalance the Russians. The same is applicable elsewhere. As a Russian adviser noted, CAR President Touadéra, recognizing both Russia and the West’s decreasing interest in the country, appeared to be playing up the geopolitical rivalry to shore up his regime.⁷⁹

In some cases, the Russian government has already had to intervene to patch up problems created by Wagner Group. From Moscow’s perspective, the fact that the Wagner model was op portunistic and flexible was simultaneously its main selling point and its weak spot. In Sudan, it was widely assumed that Wagner Group smuggled weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are fighting the Sudanese army in the ongoing civil war, again on behalf of the UAE. Despite media reports that assume Wagner is doing Moscow’s bidding by trying to hedge its bets and keep a foot in each camp⁸⁰, there is no evidence of that. It looks rather dubious that the Rus sian government would trust such a delicate operation to Wagner Group, at least after Prigozhin’s mutiny and all the bad blood between the PMC and the Kremlin. In any case, in June 2024 the Russian government reportedly agreed to clamp down on any Wagner Group support for the RSF, in exchange for the agreement for a Russian naval base in Port Sudan to go ahead and Sudan’s links to Ukraine to be severed⁸¹. If Wagner Group smuggled weapons to the RSF independently of Moscow, contributing to the Sudanese government teaming up with Ukraine to fight Wagner and the RSF, this would be a prime example of the negative side of Wagner’s “opportunism and flexibility.”⁸²

In Libya, funding from the UAE and possibly other Gulf states allowed Wagner to establish a major operation in support of Haftar’s forces, simultaneously furthering Russia’s geopolitical interests.⁸³ Wagner’s willingness to do Haftar’s bidding without restraint, however, ended up irri tating the most Russia-friendly government in the region, Algeria. The same applies to Wagner’s intervention in Mali, especially after it agreed to Bamako’s demands to retake Kidal in the north, definitively derailing the Algiers Peace Agreement. Despite allegations to the contrary, Algeria denies having helped Russia to deploy Wagner to Mali and claims that it even opposed Wagner’s deployment to Libya.⁸⁴ One Algerian source nonetheless acknowledged that Algiers had concerns about the links to France of some Azawad groups.⁸⁵ Whatever Algiers’ role in Russia’s interven tion in Mali, its attitude rapidly soured. Indeed, Russia’s alliance with the Malian junta and Haftar in Libya, both quite hostile to Algeria, was not appreciated in Algiers, which had invested diplo matic capital in sponsoring the peace accords of 2015 in the north of Mali and was not pleased to see them collapse. This resulted in considerable irritation in Algiers about Wagner’s deployment and Moscow’s role in that.⁸⁶ The Algerians are worried, a Malian official said, “that Wagner would push armed groups across the border to cross into Algeria.”⁸⁷ Algerian interviewees argued that involving Wagner and seeking a military solution would worsen the situation and that the Tuaregs needed to be integrated economically and politically.^{88 89}

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to engage in a serious diplomatic effort to calm the situation, especially after Haftar threatened war with Algeria and Algiers seriously considered intervention.⁹¹

The Algerians are said to have never really believed that Moscow was behind Wagner’s most provocative actions, such as the attempt to retake northern Mali, since it did not have much to gain from them. Nevertheless, Algiers strongly insisted that the Russians should fix the problem.⁹³

3.5 Wagner in Syria: The ‘right model’ that ‘could be improved’

In Syria, even after Prigozhin’s mutiny and subsequent death, Russian diplomatic and military sources rather highly rated Russia’s experience with the mercenaries in Syria. Despite the bitter end, as late as April 2024, a Russian military adviser in Syria claimed that “The private military companies, such as Wagner in the past, did a lot to support Russia.”⁹⁴ A Russian diplomat argued that while the model was the right one, it could be improved. He acknowledged that Wagner Group was upsetting the Syrians because it was “operating without any warning,” “never shared anything about its next operation with the Syrian government and army” and “was careless about civilian casualties, and it committed crimes in most of their operations.” He was positive on replacing Wagner with Redut, claiming that Redut and the former Wagnerites under direct MoD contract were operating without any of the drug trafficking and fuel smuggling that had characterized the Wagner period.⁹⁵ Hence PMCs and PSCs remain part of Russia’s plans:

Syrian diplomatic, military, and oil and gas industry sources confirmed that the Russian au thorities always defended Wagner against Syrian criticism and blocked Syrian attempts to take existing contracts, especially in the oil and gas sector, away from the group. It was only after the mutiny that the Russian authorities stopped protecting Wagner, working with the Syrians to get the group out of the country.⁹⁷

3.6 Wagner in Africa: Dependency carries benefits and risks

The Russians have positioned themselves as a trusted partner of troubled countries in Africa, but they had little role, if any, in bringing these regimes to power. This yields considerable benefits for Moscow at a low cost.⁹⁸ African elites increasingly seek to expand their agency and autonomy, mainly vis-à-vis the West and particularly former colonial powers.⁹⁹ They seek to manipulate Wagner to their ends, making it deliver they want.^{100 101} This is true not just in Mali, but also in Burkina Faso.

Along with this strengthened agency, however, some of these governments risk getting trapped in military adventures. In fact, Russia is increasingly becoming more than “trusted”: When the Malian government renewed its contract with Russia in early 2024, this was certainly less of a free choice than in early 2021, given Mali’s subsequent international isolation. The departure of other foreign military forces has made Bamako dependent on Wagner, without which the Malian armed forces lack the punch to challenge insurgent control.

Such dependency is a risk for Wagner’s clients. By 2023, there were signs that at least in the CAR, this was giving rise to second thoughts among government officials. Wagner started to be seen as a difficult partner, which, having sold the CAR elite “a win-win partnership,” was no longer giving the CAR government “so much.” “The group’s harsh tactics, including rape, torture and other human rights abuses, as well as economic exploitation, have soured the
relationship.”¹⁰³ By 2023, “Touadéra [was] like a disabled man, walking with a cane, and that cane is Wagner,” noted Sergey Eledinov. Echoing this sentiment, other government officials were clear that “Without [Wagner] we’ll have issues within 48 hours”; “whether we want it or not, they are the ones who keep the hinterland safe.” In the words of the archbishop of Bangui, Wagner is “a lesser evil” than the rebel groups that controlled large areas of the CAR for years.¹⁰⁴

This dependency is also a risk for Russia, which cannot afford to run away as Wagner can. The Mozambique example is illustrative: When Prigozhin opted to bail out, the Russian MoD was aghast – bailing out was not something they could afford, if only for the huge reputational damage that it would cause. To avoid that, Russia could get sucked into conflicts, to which it can ill afford to commit resources. In Mozambique, the Russians kept hanging around and are still in talks with Maputo about how to defeat the insurgency in the north. Maputo could wait because this is not a strategic threat, but the picture would look very different in Mali or the CAR if Wagner imploded or bailed out.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, Wagner Group’s venture capitalist approach produced successes and failures, but there is no question that overall it helped expand Russian influence in Africa considerably. The sustainability of this expansion, its geopolitical side effects and the potential risks involved are a different matter.

The faith in the ability of “venture capitalism” to serve Russian foreign policy interests was shaken not just by Wagner’s mutiny in 2023 but also by the failure in Mozambique, growing Syrian resentment against Wagner and Algerian complaints about Wagner operations in Libya and Mali.

While Russian policymakers seem to think that the balance sheet is still positive for Russia, there are also long-term risks to consider. Clearly, Wagner Group is rather embattled in Mali; even in Libya, the complex political and geopolitical situation has already forced Moscow to deal with a series of crises.

African governments seem to like having a force for hire that they can mobilize at short notice to deal with geopolitical and security issues. It is not just a regime survival package: This descrip tion of Wagner’s services only really fits the CAR.105 A nationalist military regime like Mali’s, by contrast, wanted Wagner to reassert its sovereignty without compromises. This creates lasting opportunities for Wagner and Wagner-type entities, but these African clients can be demanding and, at least in Mali and Libya, have been able to dictate the agenda. Divergence from Russia’s interests is thus inevitable and inseparable from the expansion of Russia’s influence. Russia is taking serious risks by expanding influence through these means.

Russian policymakers seem to accept that Wagner’s operations were a mixed bag; at the same time, they seem convinced that PMCs and mercenaries are here to stay, but also that improvements are needed. But will it be possible to separate what was good (for Russia) from what was bad in Wagner Group? Asserting more control appears to be the priority, but replacing Wagner with more pliable actors for its most important tasks appears to have already been deemed to be infeasible. Closer control over PMCs like Redut and over the Africa Corps – which are effectively auxiliary forces of the Russian military – means losing the flexibility that made Wagner effective, not to mention the business model that made it cost-effective. Moreover, closer Russian government association with such military deployments is not what most African clients want – they want mercenaries that respond to their needs, not Moscow’s.

So far, the compromise solution has entailed replacing Wagner where feasible while keeping it on a tighter leash where infeasible. This new model was rolled out starting in early 2024, after 6-7 months’ worth of exploring various options. So far, tangible Russian achievements include a small contract to provide an air defense system to Burkina Faso, along with a revamp of the contract with Haftar in Libya, which had lapsed after the UAE withdrew funding in 2020-21. It is, however, too early to say how this post-Prigozhin approach is working out for Russia . While a correction away from Wagner Group’s excesses and exploitative approach could benefit Russia, is Wagner a beast that lets itself be tamed? More importantly, would Russia have an edge over the competition if all it had to offer were rather standard PMCs?