All military conflicts eventually come to an end and the Russia-Ukraine conflict—the latest phase of which began on February 24, 2022—is no exception. Russian expectations regarding the end of the special military operation (SMO) have evolved under the influence of various external and internal factors.

External factors included the stance and actions of other nations that, while not directly involved in the fighting, significantly impacted the conflict’s course. For instance, Western military and financial support for Ukraine, the imposition and expansion of sanctions against Russia and diplomatic initiatives aimed at conflict resolution created new conditions that either fueled escalation or encouraged a search for ways to end the fighting.

Internal factors also played a crucial role in shaping expectations. Economic changes, mobilization efforts, public trust in the government and media narratives influenced how the population perceived the prospects of ending the SMO. For example, a deteriorating economic situation increased the demand for a swift resolution, while successful military operations, on the contrary, bolstered public support for continuing the conflict.

Attitudes Toward Intervention as a Basis for Assessing End of the SMO

To examine how expectations regarding the cessation of the fighting are reflected in Russian public opinion, the Chronicles company conducted a large-scale telephone survey of Russian adults in February 2025 (CATI, N=1,600).¹

Expectations about the end of military operations reflect not only people’s desire—or lack thereof—for such an outcome but also their perception of its feasibility. A person may strongly advocate for peace and oppose the SMO yet see no possibility for an end to the fighting in the near future. Conversely, one may be convinced of an imminent end to the fighting while remaining a staunch supporter of its continuation. It is also evident that perceptions of a ceasefire depend on how people interpret conditions in distant communities—such as the situation on the front lines, the international environment and Ukraine’s internal political climate. The average Russian citizen learns about these factors primarily from state-controlled mass media. Furthermore, full knowledge of the military and diplomatic capabilities of both sides remains a state secret, protected accordingly.

Thus, what we are essentially measuring are the expectations of Russians, shaped either by their social environment or by media influence. At the same time, these expectations, in turn, influence political decisions in various ways. One does not need to take to the streets demanding an end to the fighting—or, conversely, to fight until the “final victory”—for these expectations to play a role in shaping policy. It is crucial to understand that the cessation of the fighting could both attract those who support peace to the side of the authorities and alienate those who view it as a betrayal of national interests. To assess Russian expectations regarding the timeline for ending the military operation, experts from the Chronicles project used the following survey question:

“When do you think Russia’s military operation in Ukraine will end—within a few months, within a year, in more than a year or never?”

The collected data indicate that just under a third of Russians (30%) believe the SMO will conclude within a few months. Another 21% think it will end within a year (see Figure 1). In total, half of Russians (51%) believe that the war will end within the next year. Meanwhile, 28% expect the conflict to drag on longer: 22% believe it will take more than a year to end the fighting, while 6% think the SMO will never end. The remaining 21% were unable to provide an answer. As we can see, even though the military operation has already lasted for three years, Russians still believe it could end within just one more year. This suggests that the negative trend—the failure to achieve the SMO’s objectives within three years—does not necessarily lead them to conclude that these goals are unattainable. Instead, many still believe they could be achieved in a sudden breakthrough over “a few months” or “a year.” This flexibility in public perception may also reflect the fluidity of these objectives themselves.

Factors Influencing Perceived Duration of the SMO

The perceived duration of the SMO is influenced by various factors—some related to the feasibility of achieving its objectives, while others stem from a desire to return to “peacetime” life, however that may be interpreted.

As shown in Figure 1, supporters and opponents of the SMO hold different views on when the conflict will end. Supporters tend to be more optimistic, with 54% believing the the fighting will conclude within a year, compared to 48% of opponents. They are also less likely to consider the conflict indefinite—only 4% of supporters believe it will never end, compared to 8% of opponents. The belief that the war has no foreseeable end often reflects disappointment in the possibility of a resolution and an emotional sense of uncertainty about how peace can be achieved. Notably, individuals with a less militant stance tend to be more pessimistic about the conflict’s conclusion. They are more likely to believe that the war will either never end or will require more time than SMO supporters anticipate. Those who advocate for peacetime international relations are, paradoxically, more skeptical about the prospects of ending the war soon.

People who remain undecided about their stance on the SMO also occupy an intermediate position in their expectations. Half (50%) believe the SMO will end within a year, with 28% expecting it to conclude in a few months and 22% within a year. Meanwhile, those who refused to state their position on the SMO express even greater skepticism—11% think it will never end, while 26% were unable to provide an answer. This likely reflects the composition of this group, which includes both silent critics of the SMO who prefer not to discuss it and those who are simply uninterested in the topic. A similar pattern emerges when considering people’s social circles. Those surrounded by SMO supporters are more likely (55%) than those surrounded by opponents (44%) to believe the war will end within a year. This again confirms the hypothesis that SMO supporters are generally the most optimistic about its duration.

Role of Political Leaders in Conflict Resolution

Beyond attitudes toward the SMO itself, another crucial factor influencing expectations is the perceived ability of specific world leaders to influence the conflict—particularly the heads of four key nations: the US, China, Russia and Ukraine (Figure 2). This effect is most pronounced with US President Donald Trump and Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping.
Individuals who believe the SMO’s outcome is entirely dependent on these leaders (viewing them as decisive agents) are significantly more likely to expect the war to end within a few months—38% for Trump and 39% for Xi, compared to 21% and 22% among those who do not attribute much influence on them. This could be linked to shifts in US foreign policy, which are influenced not only by Trump’s personal approach but also by the general policy shift following the leadership change in Ukraine’s main ally. After three years of a consistent Western stance toward Russia, it is expected that the new US administration will employ different strategies and pursue different goals. Ultimately, Russians place significant weight on the influence of foreign leaders in shaping the course of their country’s conflict with Ukraine. This suggests a belief—whether implicit or explicit—that Russia alone cannot resolve the war and that its resolution depends on the intervention of powerful external figures.

The stronger a person’s belief in the complete dependence of the SMO’s end on Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (separately), the more likely they are to believe that the conflict will conclude within a few months (32% and 36% versus 27% and 30%, respectively). Here, we also observe that people who attribute greater agency to leaders tend to think the conflict will end sooner than others do, likely due to their expectation that these leaders are interested in ending it.

Notably, those who do not believe the end of the fighting depends on Putin’s will are the most likely to see no prospects for its conclusion (12% versus 6% for Russia as a whole) and are also more likely than others to struggle with answering the question altogether. This may be because Russian public opinion generally attributes the greatest agency in the conflict to Putin. If someone believes that even he does not influence the course of military operations, they are more inclined to see the conflict as indefinite or to feel lost when trying to assess its future.

The expectation of when military operations will end is also influenced by the choice between ceasing the fighting and initiating a new mobilization to continue them. Those who favor peace negotiations are more likely to believe that the SMO will end within a few months compared to those who would support a new mobilization—35% versus 27% (Figure 3). At the same time, supporters of peace talks are less likely to predict prolonged fighting for more than a year (20%) but more often struggle to make predictions (23%). Most likely, those in favor of a new mobilization have a more militant stance and are prepared to endure the costs of military confrontation for a longer time. They also answer the question more definitively, as the willingness to support mobilization—associated with the risk of injury or death—requires a greater degree of confidence in the outcome of such a decision.

However, we have no basis to claim a direct causal relationship. It is logical that confidence in the imminent end of the conflict fosters the assumption that further mobilization is unnecessary. In any case, expectations about the end of the fighting and the preference for new mobilization over peace talks are directly and significantly linked in Russians’ minds. The situation looks slightly different among supporters of peace negotiations—uncertainty about the duration of the SMO tends to push them toward advocating for a peacetime resolution.

Role of Civilian Support for the Military

Ordinary people’s assistance to the fighting army (helping in hospitals, providing warm clothing organizing field conditions, etc.) creates a sense of involvement in the SMO. Approval of such involvement correlates with approval of the army’s actions and confidence in its ability to achieve the desired result for those involved. However, the share of people believing that the SMO will end in the coming months does not differ among those with varying attitudes toward supporting the army. Differences emerge only in longer-term expectations: among those who disapprove of aiding the army, a larger proportion predicts the conflict will drag on for another year or more (28% versus 20%) and a higher share believes the war will never end (9% versus 5%).

As we see, the hypothesis that assessments of the military’s capabilities in this conflict influence perceptions of its duration is partially confirmed—but only concerning long-term prospects. Overall, the lower the intention to assist the army, the later Russians expect the SMO to end. Since support for the army is linked to approval of its activities, those who endorse such support tend to be more prowar than those who oppose aiding the military. As described earlier, proponents of military confrontation believe the conflict’s resolution is closer than its opponents do. Therefore, those who support helping the army also believe the fighting will end sooner, whereas their opponents predict further prolongation of the conflict.

Influence of Media Consumption

Media consumption has little impact on the perceived duration of the special operation. Only YouTube audiences appear more optimistic in their estimates of when the SMO will end: 60% expect it to conclude less than in a year, compared to 54% among TV viewers. Additionally, YouTube audiences and VPN users provide more definitive answers (Figure 4). This suggests that these groups possess a higher level of awareness, shaped by their efforts to go beyond the informational perimeter set by the Russian authorities for its citizens.

Influence of Sociodemographic Factors

While 34% of women believe that the SMO will end within a few months, only 26% of men share this view (Figure 5). Conversely, a larger proportion of men expect peace to come in more than a year (25% compared to 19% of women). This likely reflects women’s generally more pacifist outlook on life and their desire to live in a world where violence holds less value.
Looking at age groups, two stand out: young adults (18–30 years old) and those over 60. The younger group is the most confident in the SMO’s conclusion—28% believe it will end “within a few months,” another 22% think “within a year,” and 25% expect it to take more than a year. Additionally, the share of young people who think the military conflict will never end is the lowest among all age groups (3%). Youth tend to be more optimistic and are less supportive of military confrontation, which likely explains their positive forecasts. Their broad representation in the media may also contribute to this optimism, reflecting their hopes for a swift resolution and an end to the associated hardships.

The responses of older generations may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, they are more likely than other groups to believe that the SMO will end within a few months (36%). On the other hand, they are also more likely to say it will “never end” (8%). This contradiction may stem from a combination of the older generation’s heavy reliance on state media and the general pessimism characteristic of older people, many of whom have grown weary of the burdens of military conflict and have lost hope of seeing them lifted.

The respondent’s financial status also influences their assessment of the SMO’s duration. The higher the per capita income in a family, the more likely individuals are to predict that the SMO will not end within the next year. For example, 31% of people with a per capita income exceeding RUB 70,000 per month believe the SMO will last more than a year, compared to only 17% of those with an income below RUB 30,000 per family member (Figure 6). Clearly, wealthier social groups tend to be less optimistic about the timeline for peace. The most likely explanation is that affluent Russians have fewer expectations for the SMO’s resolution, as they have more resources to offset its associated costs. Additionally, a significant portion of high-income Russians are, in one way or another, beneficiaries of the military conflict,² reducing their incentive to see it end quickly.

Reflections on SMO Impact on Everyday Life

Reflections on how the SMO has affected daily life also play a role in estimating when the fighting will end. Those who assess its impact positively are more likely to believe the conflict will conclude within a year (62%) compared to others (50% and 51%, respectively) and are the least likely to fear an indefinite war (3%). Conversely, those who note negative consequences of the SMO in their lives are more inclined to believe that “the SMO will never end” (8%).
It is difficult to determine the exact cause of this pattern. Perhaps those who assess the SMO’s impact on their lives as neutral see the conflict as a fait accompli that cannot be changed. Meanwhile, those who have already benefited from the SMO may perceive its end as something positive or as an event from which they have already profited—whether through financial compensation, salary increases or newfound social status. As a result, this group exhibits greater optimism compared to others and looks to the future with more confidence.
Expectations for the end of the SMO do not significantly vary based on where a respondent lives. Residents of major cities, frontline regions and the rest of Russia provide similar response distributions. However, in the North Caucasus Federal District, the highest percentage of respondents (38%) believe the SMO will end in a few months.

This likely stems from how the local population perceives the conflict. One of the key elements of official Russian rhetoric is the defense of the “Russian World” as an ideological justification for intervention. However, the North Caucasus is highly diverse in terms of ethnicity, nationality and religion, making this concept less symbolically significant to many of its residents³.

Stripped of this sacred meaning, the conflict may be seen as arbitrary and fleeting—something that can end at any moment if desired.

Dynamics of SMO End Estimates (2022–2025)

Since the beginning of the SMO, respondents have been asked multiple times about their expectations for its conclusion. However, the available response options have not always remained the same. While the question about the anticipated end date of the fighting has remained largely unchanged, the wording of response options has evolved depending on the projected range of the conflict’s duration. In 2022, researchers did not anticipate a prolonged war, so the option of “several years” was absent, replaced by “a long war.” Naturally, we can only analyze data from periods when response options remained consistent. However, to examine the longest possible timeline of public opinion on the SMO’s duration, all response options can be consolidated into two broad categories: “up to a year” and “more than a year.”

This shift illustrates how the initial euphoria of the first months of the SMO, fueled by confidence in the limitless potential of the Russian army, was gradually replaced by pessimism following setbacks in 2022–2023. Later, however, a slow but steady rise in expectations for an end to the fighting emerged. Yet, it is equally clear that despite the prevailing sentiment since late 2023 that “the SMO will end within a year,” the SMO itself has continued beyond that time frame. Today, the prospects for peace seem somewhat closer, but public perception of these prospects has not significantly shifted in response to recent events. In other words, while both sides have demonstrated a willingness to cease fire, this has not yet been widely reflected in Russian public opinion.

Nevertheless, assessments of when the war will end are shaped not only by the situation on the front lines but also by Russians’ growing desire for a resolution. According to the Levada Center, in January 2025, the proportion of those in favor of ending the fighting and moving toward peace negotiations reached its highest level since this question was first asked in September 2022.⁴ A total of 51% supported conflict resolution, while only 31% favored continuing the SMO.

This shift suggests that in addition to the increasing expectation of an imminent end to the SMO, there is now a stronger desire among people to see it concluded. The mere possibility of a ceasefire, influenced by changing external factors, is shaping public willingness to express this opinion. Negotiations have become more tangible. The fact that the US and Russian authorities have engaged in direct contacts has signaled to the public that a resolution may indeed be within reach.

Conclusions

The assessment of the prospects for ending an armed conflict can influence political decisions. This does not necessarily mean taking to the streets demanding a ceasefire or, on the contrary, fighting until victory is achieved. However, understanding that the cessation of the fighting may either attract those in favor of peace to the government’s side or alienate those who view it as a betrayal of national interests can shape various political decisions.

Despite the SMO having been ongoing for three years, at least half (51%) of Russians believe it could end within the next year. This suggests that the negative dynamic of the SMO, where the objectives have not been achieved in three years and it continues, does not make them believe that the goals cannot be accomplished in a “few months” or “a year.” As we can see, public consciousness is quite flexible and ready to accept changes in the goals and tasks of the SMO according to the real situation on the front lines.

The assessment of expectations regarding the end of military operations is influenced by several factors. One of the main ones is the situation on the front lines: whether there is progress (whether the front is advancing or stagnant), the speed of progress and the ability of the rear to supply the front (whether there is enough weaponry and personnel). As problems on the front lines have increased, the expectations for the end of the fighting in 2022–2023 quickly shifted to a more distant time. However, the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, the slow advance of Russian forces and the replenishment of reserves in 2024–2025 have shifted the expectations for the end of the SMO closer to the present day.

Foreign policy also plays an important role: the number of allied and opposing countries that can influence the outcome of the conflict. In February 2025, the key figures influencing the assessment of the end of the SMO are Trump, who changed the country’s policy toward the conflict and, at least verbally, expressed his desire to end it, and Xi. The more people believe in their ability to influence the resolution of the conflict, the sooner they think it will end. It is also important to note that both the desire for and expectation of peace talks are linked to changing external circumstances. The end of the armed confrontation has become more likely and therefore, the number of those who not only believe peace talks are possible but also advocate for them has increased. The proposal creates demand: first, an acceptable discourse appears and only then does it gain public support. If Trump’s rhetoric continues and is echoed by Russian officials, we can expect a rise in approval of a peacetime resolution.

From the perspective of Russian public opinion, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine also influence the outcome of the SMO, but to a significantly lesser degree. Due to Russia’s personalistic regime and centralized decision-making, the lack of belief in Putin’s ability to end the SMO on his own often leads respondents to conclude that the SMO will never end.
The end (or suspension) of the conflict is viewed positively and as something desirable by public opinion. Conversely, the SMO without a clear end date reflects a pessimistic view of the situation. This outlook is notably held by opponents of the SMO—people with an antiwar stance—and those in their circle. At the same time, the most steadfast supporters of the SMO, those who want it to continue, are willing to tolerate its costs for a longer period.

Media consumption has a partial influence on the assessment of the conflict’s end date. Russians who use VPNs and YouTube to bypass the information perimeter set by Russian authorities have a more definite and pessimistic view of when the SMO will end.
Younger generations of Russians expect the SMO to end sooner than middle-aged generations. Older generations have a more contradictory view. On the one hand, many expect the fighting to end within the next year, but on the other hand, many do not see any prospects for its end.

Economic factors also play a role in the assessment of the SMO’s end. Wealthier social groups are less optimistic about the prospects for peace, possibly because they have less hope for the SMO’s end, as they have more means to compensate for the associated costs. A significant portion of high-income Russians are beneficiaries of the SMO in one way or another, so their demand for its swift conclusion is weaker.

Personal reflections on the preliminary results of the SMO also influence the assessment of when the fighting will end. People who have benefited from the SMO perceive its end as something positive or as an event from which they have already gained something, whether through material compensation, salary increases or acquired social status. As a result, this group is more optimistic compared to others and views the future with more confidence. Those who view the SMO’s impact on their lives negatively are more likely to expect its continuation and see fewer prospects for exiting the situation.