Executive summary

The intervention of Russia in Syria in 2015 scored a number of successes and appeared to put the Assad regime in a safe position, at least from a military point of view. However, early on the Russians found that fighting back the armed opposition would be easier than reforming the Assad regime and turning it back into a self-sustaining entity. Even though Russia continued trying to reform the regime and especially its armed forces, some of its initiatives turned out to be counterproductive. This was largely because Russia refused to accept the fact that the regime was uninterested in reform. As Assad sought to prevent the Russians from promoting Syrian officers, whom they deemed to be fit for the purpose of running the military more effectively, the net result was the creation of a Russian patronage system within the Syrian security establishment, which rivaled an Assad-centered one (and, incidentally, an emerging Iran-centered one).

Gradually, the Russians became more and more critical of the regime and its armed forces. Their efforts to get Bashar al Assad to hand over power to a more widely accepted figure in 2017-18 also contributed to increasing distrust of Moscow within the regime. In addition, the Syrians resented increasingly obvious Russian efforts to invest all their resources in their own Syrian network, at the expense of the rest of the regime.

Russian commentary on the state of the Syrian armed forces from 2019 onward casted doubt on the regime’s ability, in the event of a significant challenge, to survive on its own. The Assad regime was aware of the risk, as well, but it seems to have identified the main threat as entanglement in the Israel-Palestine-Iran conflict. There was, however, some optimism in Damascus that diplomatic reintegration into the Arab world would go ahead and that eventually Damascus would cease being dependent on Russian (and Iranian) support. While the Russians likely had less than Iran to fear from a Syrian rapprochement with the Gulf monarchies, Moscow seems nonetheless to have resented the Assad regime’s efforts to contain Russian influence.

Russia’s heavy engagement in Ukraine from 2022 onward had an impact on its commitments in Syria, although initially not a very big one. It was only in late 2023-early 2024 that Russia started heavily cutting funding and support for the Syrians. Driving this were not just accumulating costs of the war in Ukraine; it is also clear that specific Russo-Syrian dynamics were at play, in particular a Syrian crackdown on prominent pro-Russian officers.

Whatever the exact weight of different factors, the Russians implemented much harsher cuts to their support, leaving the Syrian armed forces starved of funding and logistics. Yet the Assad regime did not yield to the pressure. The result was a critical situation as the end of 2024 approached. The Russo-Syrian falling-out can thus be argued to have contributed decisively to the regime’s collapse. It remained unclear at the time of this writing whether the Russians deliberately weakened the regime in order to force Assad to come to terms with Türkiye, as wished by Moscow, or whether relations between Moscow and Damascus simply went awry.

Methodology

Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises, given that conducting primary research in Syria was extremely difficult until 2024. There are other obvious limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research by necessity mostly limited to oral sources, with support from the literature and news reports, but no access to primary written sources: the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete; gaps abound, and following up on specific themes was often impossible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.

Overall, the oral sources proved to be quite approachable. The risk inherent in this type of research is therefore not obtaining access. There are other risks, however: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organizations. Mitigation measures are discussed below. The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalism and ethnographic interviews. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, as many different questionnaires as there were interviews. The questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.

All the researchers have a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees and have been trained to undertake research with a similar methodology. The interviews were commissioned to local researchers.

The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start. It was mitigated by using different types of interviewees – such as government officials and military officers, Iranian and Russian officers and diplomats, members of militias – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without their being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, in order to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. Researchers were chosen who did not know each other to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example, by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers while the project is being managed remotely. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts and that there was no premium placed on specific findings.

The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were in part carried out face-to-face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymized and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.

In total, the paper relies on 30 interviews, carried out between 2016 and 2024. Of these, 14 were with Syrian military personnel, 10 with Syrian officials, three with Russian diplomats and military advisors, two with Iranian advisors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and one with an official translator.

Russia and the Syrian armed forces

Russia’s ambitions in 2015

When Russia intervened in Syria in 2015, Putin set out as an aim to “stabilize the legitimate authorities”.¹ Indeed, Russian army advisers to the Syrian government lobbied the Assad regime to focus on rebuilding the Syrian army, which had been greatly weakened in 2011-15.² The Russians might have been motivated by a genuine belief that the militias sponsored by Iran, of which there were plenty and which were doing the bulk of the fighting, were undermining the state. Moreover, the fragmented militias seemed to be of little use for the maneuver warfare, integrated with close air support, that Russian advisers were advocating against the rebels – although this did not rule out continuing to rely on militias for other purposes.³ Competition with Iran was another motivating factor for Russian policy to build up the Syrian army at the expense of the militias. This was an attempt to increase Russia’s influence at the expense of Iran, whose influence in Syria was largely channeled through militias. As an adviser to Assad noted as early as 2016, soon after their arrival in Syria, the Russians appeared to worry about the concentration of power and influence in the hands of the IRGC, at the expense of their own influence and that of the Syrian state.⁴ Indeed, the Russians were soon openly arguing that reestablishing a strong Syrian army would be the best guarantee against Iranian influence and pro-Iranian militias.⁵

The obstacles in Russia’s way

By 2024, the Russian view of the Syrian armed forces was that the Syrian top army leadership was dishonest, corrupt and “not working properly”.⁶ Corruption was regularly mentioned as a key factor in the weakness of the Syrian armed forces even by Iranian sources.⁷

Nepotism and patronage are other frequently mentioned issues. The Russians put a lot of pressure on the Assad regime to stop promoting “useless people” in the army, reportedly achieving some success in preventing egregiously nepotistic appointments, but without effecting the removal of the cronies who were already there. Assad never took action, despite the Russians asking for a meeting on this specific issue.⁸ The Iranians agreed on this assessment, as well. Reportedly, Qasim Sulimani attributed the problems of the Syrian army to nepotism: “he always said that strengthening the Syrian army is like feeding President Assad’s family; he said they will take all the advantage and abuse it”.⁹

Even those Russians who thought the Syrian leadership was only a “minor issue” and that “not all” the army leadership was “ineffective”, acknowledged that corruption was widespread, with weapons and fuel being stolen even by senior officers, and that the Syrian government refused to promote “capable officers”.¹⁰

In addition, the fragmentation of the army chain of command was often raised as a major issue, again by Iranians too.¹¹ A Russian advisor described the army as “not a real army, and they are all made up of militias that are not strong enough”.¹² As one senior Syrian official put it,

Assad has a lot of senor military people who take orders from him; they listen to Assad whether to do operations or not. They do not need to take orders from the minister or the ministry. They are trusted people to Assad, and they are supporting Assad. No one can say something to them in the ministry. If anyone complains, he will lose his job. The number of such people is big, and the minister is against them; he tells them that operations need to be authorized by the ministry. Russia is also unhappy with Assad about this. Russia is telling Assad that when operations take place, it must be done under the chain of command of the Ministry of Defense.¹³

Moreover, Wagner Group sources, which were mentoring and training Syrian forces, described Syrian units as poorly trained and weakly motivated.¹⁴

Russia’s role in making things worse

Although the Russian MoD was for years a keen advocate of rebuilding a strong, unified Syrian army, in the end Russian policies might unwittingly have contributed to the further fragmentation of the chain of command. For example, Russian insistence on creating army units out of reconciled rebels in the south led to the emergence of de facto autonomous units that never took order from Damascus. This, aside from creating tension between Moscow and Damascus, also made the chain of command even more convoluted, with the 8^th Brigade of the 5^th Corps in particular only responding to the Russians.¹⁵ Although the Syrian MoD tried to assert control over the 8^th Brigade after 2022, despite Russia having stopped paying their salaries, it never succeeded in earning the loyalty of the ex-rebels.¹⁶ Its efforts to establish control took the shape of replacing several top officers of the division, which likely weakened its combat capabilities very seriously.¹⁷

Overall, the entire 5^th Corps was a Russian creation. The Russians conceived it as part of their plan to fold the disparate pro-Assad militias into the regular army in 2016. They funded, provided logistics to and trained the 5^th Corps, and they retained a high degree of direct control over it.¹⁸ That became de facto ownership:

The same applies to the 4^th Corps, another one created at Russian instigation in 2015 and kept by the Russians on a tight leash until at least early 2024: “The 4^th Corps is not allowed to carry out operations anywhere; they are just allowed in those areas that are under the control of the Russians”.²⁰ In addition, the attempt to use both corps for assimilating militias was not completely successful. As a Russian diplomat acknowledged, the 4^th and 5^th corps never turned into “proper armies” and were never able to perform as proper armies,” mostly remaining “just men with weapons”.²¹

Another example of the perverse effects of Russian reform efforts is the 25^th Division, once known as the Tiger Force militia. The Russians nurtured its commander, Suhail al Hasan, pushed for the militia to be transformed into an elite army unit, and directly funded it and equipped it with some of the most advanced equipment ever delivered to Syrian units by Russia. Until 2022, the Russians were de facto in control of the division. This reinforced the preexisting enmity between Suhail al Hasan and the Assad regime, especially Maher al Assad, further fracturing the chain of command.²²

Ultimately the most negative impact of Russia’s intervention on the Syrian armed forces was to make them dependent on Russian support in multiple ways. Whether this was unintended or deliberate outcome is still a matter of debate. Syrian officers were fully aware that Syria was unable to sustain even its shaky security apparatus without external support and that Russia was hard to replace in that role, and the Iranians agreed, too.²⁴ The most optimistic Syrian officers argued that Syria could resist only for a short period and would need Russia to last longer.²⁵ Even in the summer of 2024, the Syrian MoD needed the Russian advisors to “keep the situation stable there”.²⁶ A Syrian intelligence officer noted that despite efforts to bring the 8^th Brigade under Damascus’ control, Russian advisers were still needed in 2024 to make it work.²⁷

Another perverse effect of Russian efforts to reform the Syrian armed forces in a context of their deep dysfunctionality is the introduction of a “leading from behind” approach, intended to reduce the high level of casualties among officers. This, when combined with the growing practice of officers getting civilian jobs or running businesses alongside their military occupation, played out badly in 2024, when many tactical units were left without leadership by absentee commanders.²⁸

Deteriorating relations

Russian criticism of the Syrian armed forces

Overall, efforts to reform the Syrian army have been acknowledged by the Russians to have mostly failed. The Russians blamed the Syrian regime. Tensions escalated to the point that Putin in various occasions sent representatives such as his minister of defense, army chief of staff and foreign minister to meet Assad and advocate changes in the Syrian military.²⁹ Within the Russian MoD there was a 2024 discussion about bailing out of all training and advising support for Syrian forces and bringing in private military companies instead.³⁰ Other solutions that some Russian diplomats offered betray the total lack of faith in the ability of the regime to fix its own armed forces:

• eradicate corruption by replacing the high-ranking generals and commanders who support some of the individuals involved in it;³¹
• seize control of the main departments within the ministry of defence, particularly the logistics division;³²
• replace most of the army officers and high-ranking commanders with new officers trained in Russia.³³

Syrian unhappiness with the Russians

In 2016, the Russians agreed in principle with Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and the UAE to a transition process in which Bashar al Assad would have to leave power and a coalition government would take over, including most opposition groups. Former Vice-President Farouk al Sharaa was Russia’s favorite to succeed Assad as president because he is a Sunni, as well as for his good relations with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, various European countries and Russia. Al Assad, who had once had al Sharaa detained, was clearly unhappy about the proposed transition, a matter in which he was supported by the Iranians.³⁴ By mid-2017, therefore, Syrian-Russian relations were already tense, among other reasons. Assad was, however, already then worried that the Russians might bail out of Syria if he completely rejected their pressure for a political settlement.³⁵

Another major grudge was that after 2021 the Russians were making direct contact with all army units, alleging that the regime’s corruption left them with no choice.³⁶

The army was “not happy to be controlled by Russia and Iran”, concluded the official. He also noted how the Russians were keen to see militias incorporated in the army only when the beneficiaries were the corps they were sponsoring and de facto controlling.³⁸

Russian-sponsored militias were also accused of serving little purpose, compared to Iran-sponsored ones, which were more aggressive and proactive.³⁹ The Russians seemed to be using the Syrian militias for their own purposes. According to the account provided by Syrian officials, the regime was irked by Wagner’s efforts to assert control over the militias and Syrian private security or military companies, such as ISIS Hunters. The Syrian government ended up with no control over ISIS Hunters, which reported only to Wagner Group and the Russian armed forces.⁴⁰ Indeed, ISIS Hunters ran into multiple problems with the Syrian armed forces, occasionally even turning their weapons against them, with significant loss of life at two main battles near the Shaer gas field in 2016 and Jazal oil field in 2017, both in Homs.⁴¹ The Assad regime repeatedly tried to take control of ISIS Hunters: “they arranged meetings with Syrian intelligence services, asked the defense minister for help and even requested Wagner Group and the Russian ambassador, but there was no result”.⁴² The Assad regime also objected to Redut taking over Wagner’s role in 2023 and to the continuing existence of the militias Wagner had formed.⁴³

Syrian disillusionment with the Russians grew gradually. A senior Baathist figure noted at the end of 2023 that

There are no love story and emotions in the political relationships between countries; there are interests and only interests. Russia sent its aircrafts, warships, troops and military advisors to Syria to support the government of President Bashar al Assad not because Russian President Vladimir Putin loves Syria and President Bashar. […] I am sure that Russia had costs, but it returned every single dollar it paid by taking big investments in Syria. […] Russia has won in Syria, not lost, and this reinforces the Syrian officials’ and people’s rage about Russian policies and strategies. […] I and big numbers of Syrians believe that Russia wants to keep the Syrian government, army and economy weak [to make it] depend completely on Russian and Iranian support and help. […] The instability and insecurity of Syria serve the Russians’ interest more than a strong, central-controlled Syrian government with a strong army.⁴⁴

This was not an isolated view. At one point, President Assad sent a formal ultimatum to prevent the Russians from taking over some economic projects.⁴⁵ A similar tone is found in an interview with an army officer:

If you look at all the wars in the world, no one supported his allies without any expectation. In the same way, when the Russians started to support President Bashar al Assad, they wanted something in return; therefore, even if President Assad tries to make any changes, the Russians […] want to take everything in their hands, but President Assad will not let it happen.⁴⁶

Russia’s efforts to reach and maintain an understanding with Turkish President Erdogan were also resented in Damascus.⁴⁷

Putin and his government want to keep war-related good ties with Türkiye and signed agreements and truces with Türkiye to maintain the situation on the Idlib and Aleppo fronts. Putin and his ministers met with Erdogan and his ministers for long hours and express their support to each other. […] Russia and Türkiye have a secret understanding and accords to keep the front lines.⁴⁸

Syrian-Russian tensions increased in 2017-18 as the threat posed by opposition groups was receding. The presence of so many former oppositionists in Dara’a, still armed, was (rightly) seen as a major liability by regime officials.⁴⁹ The Russia-sponsored peace deals in southern Syria were another bête noire of the Assad regime.

Russia, due to big pressure from Israel, engaged in reconciliation deals in southern Syria to guarantee stability and security in the region for Israel’s interests, not for the Syrian government’s goals.⁵⁰

The Russians rejected the Syrian regime’s plans (endorsed by the Iranians) to disarm the southern opposition groups and move the hardliners to the Idlib area, as done elsewhere. Instead, Russia insisted to keep the former rebels in the south armed, with the aim of incorporating them into the armed forces. This would have given Russia a strong constituency within the Syrian armed forces and established a buffer between Israel and the Iranians. One of the results was that some 20,000-25,000 former rebels, “who can [take] control [of] the province of Dara’a and Quenitra in a few hours,” remained in the south, creating a liability for the Assad regime.⁵¹ Indeed, these forces turned against Assad in December 2024 and seized the south in a matter of days.

The way the Russians retained control over the portions of the Syrian air force that they had modernized was also resented. Along the same lines, they agreed to boost the capabilities of the air force, training crews and providing refurbished planes “by the end of 2024”, such as helicopters and Su-24s and Su-25s.⁵² Some upgrades were made, but “Russia updated and fixed around 20 jet fighters but ke[pt] them under its command, and they are only used under Russian orders”⁵³ The Russians authorized their use only in support of units they cherished, such as 30^th Republican Guard Division and 25^th Division. The fact that they insisted on picking Syrian pilot trainees for the Russian Air Force Academy individually, bypassing the Syrian authorities, was also seen as scandalous.⁵⁴

As a result, the warplanes and helicopters available to the Syrian command were old models and lacked spare parts because Russia “did not reply to the Syrian Air Force Command, which keeps asking Russia to update Syrian airplanes”.⁵⁵ The Syrians sought spare parts and technical support from Iran and China, but that hardly proved an adequate solution.⁵⁶
Similarly, the Russians had committed to strengthening and upgrading Syria’s air defense on the basis of the 1980 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union and the 2015 agreement on Russian intervention, but after some early investment the efforts basically came to a halt.⁵⁷ When Israeli air strikes intensified in 2024, in the wake of the Gaza crisis, this became a major issue.

The impact of the Gaza crisis

It is important to note that Syrian-Russian relations were already deteriorating in 2017-18, long before the full-scale war in Ukraine and the Gaza crisis. After 2020, the sense of abandonment within the ranks of the Assad regime became more palpable:

The Syrian full scale war and military operations have been stopped since early 2020, and up to now no country in the world, including Russia and China, has given the Syrian government money and funds to rebuild the electricity stations and plants, damaged and demolished government hospitals and buildings and even schools.⁵⁸

The Gaza crisis that started in October 2023 further compounded the crisis in Syrian-Russian relations. The fear of being dragged into a war with Israel, combined with the awareness of being completely unable to take on the Israelis, appears to have contributed to dampening morale. According to a Syrian intelligence officer, “the Syrian armed forces believe that Iran and Israel would drag Syria into a conflict in the future; they both would use Syria as a conflict field”.⁵⁹ “We are scared of war; we are not going to trust Iranians in the south at all; we cannot take that risk”, commented a Syrian officer in December 2023.⁶⁰ The Assad regime was very clear about the prospect that a growing presence of Iran and its allies in Syria would draw the Israelis into the conflict:

We as Syrians do not want to see others fight in our country for their own sake; we do not want to see Syria in long-term war; we do not want to see Israelis target our territory just because of an Iranian presence in our country.⁶¹

The Assad regime responded with a flurry of diplomatic activity:

Since the beginning of the war in Gaza, the concern was rising day by day, and even our defense minister has been talking since then with the Iranian defense minister and the leader of the Sepah-e Pasdaran regarding the situation. And besides that, President Assad was talking over the situation and possible war between Iran and Israel with President Raisi and with President Pezeshkian. […] He was arranging meetings with officers of the Syrian army, Russian advisors, and Iranians.⁶²

It is in this context that Russia’s unwillingness to extend the protection of its air defenses to Syrian assets further demoralized the Syrians, as regular Israeli air strikes were taking place during 2024.⁶³ A journalist noted that

Israeli air strikes on the Syrian governmental and Iranian targets create a big debate among all Syrian officers, officials and pro-Assad people. I met with different Syrians, and all were very enraged with the Russian weakness in countering and facing the Israeli air strikes and missiles. […] [This] pushes many pro-Assad Syrians to distrust Russia.⁶⁴

A Baathist official commented that

Syrian officials asked the Russians why they did not counter the Israeli attacks […]. The Russians replied that their presence in Syria is to counter only Syrian terrorist groups, not to face Israeli attacks and air strikes. These Russian statements […] led many Syrians to consider Russia as a weak ally...⁶⁵

A member of parliament from Dara’a noted with anger that while the Russians would not or could not stop Israeli air strikes, the Americans were “support[ing] for the Kurdish separate militias (SDF) with everything”.⁶⁶

Russian criticism of the Assad regime intensifies

As noted above, early Russian struggles in Syria were ascribed to Iranian disruption. Iran continued being seen as a disruptive force until the very end of the Assad regime. A Russian diplomat described Iran’s diverging views as a major obstacle toward reorganizing the Syrian government.⁶⁷ However, the Russians became increasingly critical of the Assad regime itself. A Russian diplomat identified two reasons for the worsening relations with Syria:

• the changing relationship with President Assad and his family, due to their corruption and exclusiveness, as well as their attempts to reduce Russian influence in the armed forces;
• Syria’s ambition to develop closer relations with Arab powers.⁶⁸

Irritation at President Assad's poor “management” led to the Russians trying to bypass him and his government as much as possible and establish direct links with military units, essentially trying to acquire control.⁶⁹ Tensions over the Assad regime’s efforts to seize control of some units and militias that were trained and funded by the Russians eventually pushed the Russians to threaten the suspension of all support.⁷⁰ The problems started in early 2022, but worsened over time. The climax came when Suhail al Hasan was replaced at the top of 25^th Brigade in late 2023, which coincided with another deep cut in Russian support.⁷¹

Russia’s declining commitment and influence

By 2024, it had become clear to all inside the Syrian regime and its closest allies too that Russia would be unable or unwilling to commit the same resources to Syria as in the past. As a result, Russian influence was clearly in marked decline. The Russians themselves acknowledged this trend.⁷² Russian patrols were greatly reduced in number.⁷³ Russia had been providing both direct financial support to the Syrian regime, and logistical support for its armed forces. Financial support continued, but despite remaining at the rather high level of $3 billion in total in 2022-23⁷⁴, it had fallen. At the peak of the war, in 2016-17, Russia was spending around $2.5 billion a year to support the Syrian regime.⁷⁵ As early as 2023 the Russians cut funding to units that were deemed disloyal to them.⁷⁶ By 2024, financial support was 70% off the peak figures.⁷⁷ The value of logistical support is not known, but sources say that although it suffered less, it still declined 20%. Close air support sorties were reduced, with the best pilots being sent to fly over Ukraine.⁷⁸

Even the presence of Russian advisers had become much rarer by 2024, and they largely focused on advising senior officials, such as Assad, heads of intelligence and high-ranking generals (occasionally).⁷⁹ In other words, by 2024 the Russians were no longer taking part in operations.⁸⁰ The roughly 80 Russian advisers present in October 2024 were spread between ministries such as defense, foreign affairs and economics, as well as the presidency. The periods of deployment were also shortened.⁸¹ At the peak of Russian engagement in 2017, there were 671 advisors in Syria.⁸² Sources differ somewhat about the exact distribution of the advisers in 2024, but there seem to have been some with the Liwa al Quds militia, some with the 25^th Division, 19 with the Syrian air force, 12 with military intelligence, 12 with air defense and two with some army brigades.⁸³ Although the Syrians appear to retain a positive impression of Russian advisers, even compared to Iranian ones,⁸⁴ and despite the shared interest with the Syrians in keeping the country out of the Gaza crisis,⁸⁵ together with supporting secularism (which appealed especially to Christians),⁸⁶ inevitably the influence of Russian advisers declined with their numbers.

That is not to say that Russian influence was nonexistent by late 2024, as Russians still worked closely with the 14^th Special Forces Division, 25^th Division, 4^th Corps, Air Force Command, Chief of Staff and Ministry of Defense, with which they coordinated military operations and air strikes.⁸⁷ In the summer of 2024, the Russians promised to stop further withdrawals and reductions except in the event of an emergency nearer home.⁸⁸ Still, the downward trend was unmistakable. In January 2024, a Syrian general noted in amazement that “Two years ago, the Russians were talking about getting the Iranians out of Syria and controlling the country alone...”⁸⁹

Interestingly, some of the Russians’ Syrian interlocutors were thinking that the Russians still present were no longer keen to maintain close relations with the Syrian government, the members of Syrian parliament and the Syrian security council, or sought to influence them.⁹⁰ Russian behavior hinted to their old counterparts that they had given up. This was evident in the 8^th Brigade:

Three years ago, Russia’s officers were holding daily meetings with local leaders and government officials to coordinate Russian military activities and solving the locals’ problems with the governmental security and military departments. Now, the Russian officers have no plans and strategies except how to make money and get gifts and bribes to send to their families in Russia. The Russian officers and soldiers are selling their foodstuff and oil products, and even their trucks’ engine oil, to make cash dollars.⁹¹

The Iranians were clearly benefiting from the Russian drawdown, but contrary to what had been the case before 2022, when Moscow had been keen to compete with Tehran for influence, the Russians did not seem bothered.⁹²

The Russian military policemen and officers are touring in Dara’a Province [where they were not supposed to be] and they see Iran’s militiamen, but they do nothing and avoid making problems with them. Two years ago, Iran’s militiamen were afraid of making problems with the Russians and did not appear in areas where the Russians were working and patrolling.⁹³

Diplomatic divergence

The Syrians knew they were not in a position to quarrel with Russia over its declining commitment.⁹⁴ However, they did try to diversify their sources of external support, even if they kept seeking Russian support as well.⁹⁵ The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried first of all to mitigate the risks by seeking to lower its international profile. It issued a letter to its officials, saying:

Currently, we will need to establish a cordial relationship with neighboring countries; we should try to keep good relations with the Turks and the Saudis; and we will need to keep close relations with the opposition in order to keep the situation stable.⁹⁶

While some Syrian officials argued that Syria should raise taxes and increase oil and gas exports, Damascus also appealed for financial support to Iran, in the end obtaining little, and to China, achieving nothing.⁹⁷ Assad then turned to the Gulf states, as well as other Arab capitals, “trying to convince the strong countries in the region to support the Syrian government politically and militarily”.⁹⁸ In fact, the outreach to some Arab countries was bearing some fruit for Damascus:

When Syrian officials met with the UAE a while ago, they promised to support the Syrian government and provide funding for the armed forces.⁹⁹

The UAE also supported Syrian effort to reconnect diplomatically throughout the region and offered funding for reconstruction.¹⁰⁰ A Syrian officer noted that Arab support would be conditional on getting the Iranians out of Syria.¹⁰¹

In the meeting of our minister of foreign affairs with the UAE, the core request of the UAE officials was to cut off all relations with the Iranians in order for the UAE to be able to provide any kind of support for the Syrian government. In the same way, the Saudis are asking for the same thing, so if the situation gets worse in Syria once again, that will force us to do whatever we need to do for keeping peace and stability in Syria. […] Of course, the Arab countries are not happy about the Iranian presence in Syria; the Saudis, Kuwait, the UAE and even Egypt asked clearly that Syria should cut and end its relations with the Iranians. In return, they promised that they would bring pace and stability to Syria, and they even promised that they would make Syrian relations with the West and the Americans normal [again].¹⁰²

These Syrian efforts exacerbated the worsening relationship with Russia.

A Syrian army officer confirmed that “The Russians were not happy with President Assad because of his visits to some countries in the Middle East”.¹⁰³ A senior Baathist also stated his belief that “Russia knows that President Bashar al Assad and his regime want to establish good ties with the West, America and Gulf States as before the 2011 war”.¹⁰⁴ Although both the Syrians and the Russians believed that the Iranians would block any UAE approaches to Syria¹⁰⁵, Russia likely saw Assad’s efforts as a sign of long-term disloyalty.

The impact of the reduced Russian commitment on the Syrian regime’s collapse

The impact of Russia’s reduced commitment on the Syrian regime and especially its armed forces was very significant, and not only because salaries were delayed or not paid at all.¹⁰⁶ One IRGC colonel acknowledged that “There has been a huge impact on the Syrian armed forces since the Russians reduced their presence in Syria. The morale of the Syrian armed forces is not the same as it was before”.¹⁰⁷ Russian influence over the militias declined, as well, and they turned elsewhere for support.¹⁰⁸

The reduction in Russian support translated into salaries failing to keep pace with Syria’s very high inflation, serving to demoralize and encourage corrupt practices. A particularly damaging form of corruption was the practice of officers’ selling semipermanent leave to their subordinates.¹⁰⁹ To save money (and probably for other reasons as well), the Syrian MoD moved many active soldiers to the reserve, demobilized many veterans, and discharged existing reservists.¹¹⁰ Many units were moved back to their barracks, which entailed more interaction with civilian life.¹¹¹ It became easier for officers to do business, at the cost of attention to their duties.¹¹²

Over the course of 2024, it became common to hear from both Syrian and Russian sources that the Syrian armed forces would be unable to cope with an external war,¹¹³ or even with an internal crisis.¹¹⁴ An army officer noted that at the end of 2023 the Syrian government remained very weak in the south.¹¹⁵ Indeed, the 8^th Brigade quickly joined the opposition in December 2024, becoming a leading actor in the collapse of regime control in the south.¹¹⁶

I personally heard from different governmental officers and officials, and they confirmed that they are not happy at all with the Russian role in Syria in general and in Dara’a Province in particular. The Syrian government asked the Russian officers to take serious steps to empower the governmental department, security and police stations in different towns and villages in Dara’a. The key problem was that […] around 70 to 80% of Dara’a towns and villages have ex-fighters present, although the government has police and security stations in them, the real power and influence is with ex-fighters’ groups, which are sponsored and led by Russia.¹¹⁷

The purges intended to roll back Russian influence in the armed forces suddenly appeared to backfire when the 25^th Division, possibly the most effective unit in the entire army, failed to hold territory in the north in late November. Its new commander, Salah Abdullah, was replaced by his predecessor and Russian loyalist Suhail al Hasan on December 2, but by then it was too late.¹¹⁸

A major consequence of corruption and declining financial support from Russia was manpower problems. A Syrian officer put the number of “active fighters” in the Syrian Arab Army at 100,000 in August 2024.¹¹⁹ Another source put its total strength at 150,000 in April 2024.¹²⁰ These figures thus show its strength as almost equal to that recorded in July 2017, despite the incorporation of a number of militias into the army.¹²¹ The incorporation of the militias had contributed to the shrinking of the overall militia size from 147,000 to 55,000 over the same time span.¹²² Moreover, the remaining militias were no longer active. The NDF (National Defense Forces) had by then been demobilized and given a reserve role, with 39,000 men. Another 16,000 men were in the LDF (Local Defense Forces), at an even lower level of preparedness.¹²³ The combined number of militias was down compared to 2021.¹²⁴ In addition, in mid-2024 there were some 13,000 foreign militiamen, including 7,000 from Hizbollah, 3,000 from Fatimiyun, 1,000 from Zaynabyun and 2,000 Iraqis and Yemenis.¹²⁵ During 2024, the IRGC and Hizbollah agreed on the latter pulling its forces out of Syria, with the Iranians mobilizing reserves from Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani and other foreign militias.¹²⁶ The IRGC was also planning to increase the number of militiamen, despite Syrian opposition.¹²⁷

Conclusion

Russia rescued the Syrian regime in 2015-16, but its ambitious plan to save the Syrian regime and rebuild a strong state in Syria got bogged down in the contradictions of that very regime. The Russians started losing faith in Assad and his government, but they were stuck in Syria by then. From 2017 onward, their efforts to strengthen the regime clashed with the interests of the Assad clique and ended up backfiring. As the Russians sponsored their choice of more capable commanding officers, Assad’s purges reserved their reforms.

With the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Russia did reduce its commitments in Syria, pulling out forces and reducing funding. However, the trend of reducing support for the Assad regime had started earlier – no later than 2020, perhaps even earlier. Russia had also grown irritated at Assad’s rejection of its efforts to mediate a stable settlement. Assad, for his part, started worrying about what the Russians might be up to, after they had lobbied for his replacement at the head of the Syrian state. From there onward, relations between the two regimes deteriorated steadily. The Russians increasingly sought to bypass Assad and his clan to build their own network of loyalists within the Syrian armed forces. Assad tried to undermine their efforts, against which the Russians eventually retaliated by increasingly restricting support to units deemed to be loyal to them. Assad probably suspected the Russians were still plotting to replace him some day with someone more acceptable to opposition groups, the more so as the Russians had turned into de facto protectors of a number of opposition groups in the south. In late 2023-early 2024, a Syrian crackdown on Russian cronies within the security forces proved the turning point as far as Russian support to the Syrian regime was concerned, not the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022.

The Russians also intensified their contacts with the Turks to reach a settlement, which seemed destined to take place over Assad’s head. Unsurprisingly, Assad sought to sabotage these efforts as well. Russia’s behavior undoubtedly resulted in a weakened regime in Syria, in part because some of the reforms were ill-conceived and in part because the regime rejected Russia’s efforts and sought to actively undermine them. It remains unclear whether the Russians expected their financial pressure could threaten the regime’s very existence. What is clear is that not just Syrians, but Russians too were aware of the regime’s growing weakness in 2024. Probably, the Russians wanted to gain leverage in their negotiations with Assad by making him and the regime feel that ignoring Russian demands has consequences. The Russians likely calculated that no foreign government would in the end step in to replace the Russian cash that was not accruing to Damascus anymore. In that calculation they proved right, but the regime, however worried it was, did not budge on key Russian demands – quite the contrary, as the purges of pro-Russian elements in the armed forces show.

While the collapse of the Assad regime was certainly a major image hit for Russia, in the long run what will matter is its ability to maintain military bases in Syria. There is not enough evidence to discuss the hypothesis that the collapse of December 2024 was in fact the culmination of Russian-Turkish talks. Russia might not be particularly interested in being “influential” in Syria per se, but it is certainly keen on retaining its bases there. If it could do that, likely thanks to Turkish intercession, it could claim a not-so-negative outcome.

Should Russia lose its bases, the reasons for this failure would still require assessment. Were Russian geopolitical and strategic assets dragged into the abyss because of an ill-conceived gamble to coerce the Syrian regime into reforming (an interpretation that Assad’s supporters would favor)? Or was the regime doomed anyway, and the Russians just decided to risk accelerating the collapse in a last-ditch effort to reform it (an interpretation that Russian officials would favor)? Or, perhaps, was the regime likely going to survive, but without serving Russia’s foreign policy and geostrategic aims while nevertheless draining billions of dollars from the Russian state coffers every year? Overall, the third hypothesis seems to be the most solid, even though it needs further investigation. Before the Russians started cutting their funding, it was not apparent that the Assad regime, though increasingly dysfunctional, was doomed. As important as the bases were for Russia, one might speculate that persistent recent Russian efforts to establish footholds in Libya and Sudan might have been driven by growing unease about the fate and/or safety of Tartus and Khmeimim, or even about the disproportionate overall cost of maintaining them (support for the regime plus the cost of Russian deployment). Assad’s refusal to seriously negotiate a political and geopolitical settlement was a major blow to Russia’s ambition as a regional power, an ambition that rested first and foremost on its role as a mediator between actors as different as Türkiye, Iran, Israel and the Arab states.¹²⁸