Introduction

By 2019-20, commentary on Russia being dissatisfied with its ally Bashar al Assad was becoming commonplace in the policy literature.¹ The Iranians were (erroneously) believed to be happier with the Syrian president, even if the reasons for their dissatisfaction were different.² At the same time, neither country seemed to be seriously considering abandoning the Assad regime to its fate – this would come only in 2023-24³. Daniel Byman’s comments back in 2006, while dealing with US interventions, sound today as a warning to both the Russians and the Iranians:

The United States is on the horns of a dilemma when working with allies to fight insurgents. […] The structural problems that cause the insurgencies also shape how well allies fight them. […] The ally’s interests also include defeating the insurgents: but here the commonality often ends. […] Allied security services also seek other goals—for example, propping up an authoritarian regime or maintaining a favored ethnic group in power—or otherwise have ambitions and problems that undermine the effectiveness of counterinsurgency campaigns. […] Thus, while many of the allies’ problems involve incompetence and ineffectiveness, these are not a product of ignorance or chance. Rather, they stem from the very nature of allied regimes and societies.⁴

In 2016, Walter Ladwig III produced the first book-size analysis of the troubled relationship between US policy makers and local clients in American counterinsurgency campaigns. These clients, says Ladwig, are likely to be at least as interested in maintaining power as in defeating the insurgents and could well reject any reform deemed necessary by their international patron that threatens their power. The American experience has been that no amount of aid and support can steer reluctant clients in the direction desired by Washington. While the case of Vietnam has been already discussed in the literature, Ladwig believes that in more recent campaigns, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, “local partners” again sought to “subvert” US counterinsurgency efforts. Clients have the tendency to manipulate their patrons in order to maximize the assistance they receive, but at the same time they seek to maintain as much autonomy as possible. The ruling elites are unlikely to accept that it is their own deficiencies or their oppression that drive the population to armed resistance. Even if they did accept this, they might well lack the capacity to address the problems at the roots of instability. Often, the client ruling elites try to evade patron pressure with token adjustments. Quite the contrary, the “insurance” provided by large-scale patron interventions can lead to the client acting more ruthlessly than it would have been the case and taking more risks, since he will not bear the full consequences of his actions. Alternatively, the client’s motivation to fight on his own could sag, as he defaults to letting the patron fight the war for him, while the host government can afford to remain corrupt and ineffective. The client often blackmails the patron into supporting him because the cost of losing the client outweighs the harm caused by the failure of the client to reform.⁵

As this author has argued elsewhere, even improving the effectiveness of the client’s security apparatus loses priority status because of overly generous patron support, allowing the client to prioritize coup-proofing and nepotism.⁶ A previous paper of this series shows how the corruption and dysfunctionalities of the regime were affecting the Syrian army (SAA) in the run-up to the collapse in late 2024.⁷ Along similar lines Barbara Elias has highlighted that “lack of influence” over “allies” was not just experienced by the Americans in Iraq, Vietnam and Afghanistan, but also by the Soviets in Afghanistan, by the Indians in Sri Lanka and by the Egyptians in Yemen. Clients were often able to turn their weakness into an asset, which enabled them to extract resources from the patron with little to offer in exchange. In fact, leakage from the patron-funded war effort, enriching local elites, might well disincentivize them from seeking to end the conflict at all. She also notes that respecting local sovereignty greatly strengthens the leverage of local allies.⁸ As Robert Komer noted of the Americans in Vietnam, “we became their prisoners rather than they ours.”⁹ This paper investigates how both the Russians and the Iranians became prisoners of the Assad regime in Syria. This involves looking at two aspects: how Assad managed most of the time to prevent Russia or Iran from acting against his interests, and how at the same time he managed to keep them hooked to his regime and keep it afloat.

The paper is structured in four sections, with the first one exploring Syrian regime views of Russia and Iran. The second discusses how the Assad regime first tried to reject Iranian penetration by direct confrontation. The third section discusses how the Assad regime learned to beat back unwanted Russian and Iranian policies by manipulating their differences. The fourth section, finally, looks at other aspects of the Syrian conflict that contributed to Russia and Iran getting trapped there.

Methodology

Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises, given that conducting primary research in Syria was extremely difficult until 2024. There are other obvious limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research, by necessity, mostly limited to oral sources, with support from the literature and news reports, but no access to primary written sources: the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete; gaps abound; and following-up on specific themes was often impossible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.

Overall, the oral sources proved to be quite approachable. The risk inherent in this type of research is therefore not obtaining access. There are other risks, however: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organizations. Mitigation measures are discussed below. The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalism and ethnographic interviews. The questionnaires were adapted for each interviewee; there were, in fact, as many different questionnaires as there were interviews. The questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.

All the researchers have a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees and have been trained to undertake research with a similar methodology. The interviews were commissioned to local researchers.

The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start. It was mitigated by using different types of interviewees – such as government officials and military officers, Iranian and Russian officers and diplomats, members of militias – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without their being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, in order to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. Researchers were chosen who did not know each other to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example, by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers while the project is being managed remotely. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts and that there was no premium placed on specific findings.

The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were in part carried out face-to-face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymized and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.

The 33 interviews were held in 2016-24 with senior Syrian government officials, military officers and local notables (18), mid-ranking members of militias (5), and Iranian diplomats and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iranian army officers (10). The interviewees were surprisingly forthcoming, keen to in detail reflect on our questions, even when they touched on highly contentious themes. We cross-checked, contextualized and supplemented interviews inside Syria with a number of interviews with Russian analysts, as well as consulting media reporting, and by drawing on work from our peers in academia and think tanks.

Syrian views about Iran and Russia

The role of Iran and Hezbollah in Syria became controversial soon after their intervention, but a consensus quickly formed that they contributed decisively to saving the regime in the first phase of the war (up to 2015).¹⁰ Another important reason endearing Iran to the regime was that the Iranians were much keener than Russia on Assad himself.¹¹The Iranians were seen as having invested much more than the Russians in Syria, without expectation of recovering the financial costs, which was a plus. However, they had political and geopolitical demands and objectives. Iran was set on entrenching its influence and its military position in Syria.¹² The Iranian infiltration of the Syrian state reportedly sowed discontent among the “old guard of the Syrian Ba’ath Party.” Originally Assad sided with the Iranians and removed some of the elements most hostile to them.¹³

The positive perception of Iran’s role likely strengthened, at least among Assad loyalists, when the Russians started signaling that their agenda diverged from Assad’s already in early 2016, as is discussed below. As Iran was “only mildly interested in the diplomatic process^,” it is unsurprising that Damascus would start looking more positively on Iran again.¹⁴

This does not mean that it was all good and well again between Iran and the regime from 2016 onward. When Assad originally sided with the Iranians, he removed some of the elements most hostile to them.¹⁵ Pockets of hostility nonetheless remained. An IRGC source identified the key Syrian security forces opponents of the IRGC role in the country as General Ali Abdullah Ayoub, General Saleem Mohammad, commander Ali Omar, General Sheikh Abu Abas and commander Hussaini.¹⁶

Russia’s attitude to Assad made in any case sure throughout the war that the Iranians could count on at least some sympathy from Assad loyalists, regardless of the resentment that their efforts to entrench themselves deep into Syria were creating.

Iran […] shares Assad’s desire to expand the regime’s control deeper into Eastern Syria and does not share Russia’s interest in a diplomatic settlement. Assad actively supports Iran’s wider regional goals, while Russia seeks to dampen the escalation cycle between Iran and Israel. Assad views Iran as a useful tool against Israel. This alignment deepened after President Trump recognized Israel’s annexation of the Golan Heights in March 2019.¹⁷

Syrian officials tended to agree that Russia’s intervention in 2015 changed the course of the war.¹⁸ There is little question that if Russia had not intervened directly in 2015, “Assad likely would have needed to contract his regime to the Syrian Coast, which would have significantly disrupted Iran’s goals in Syria.”¹⁹ Perhaps even more importantly, Russia’s veto power in the UN Security Council protected Assad and Iran from an escalation of international pressure.²⁰

Add the impact of their air force operations and their hardware deliveries, as well as their role as advisers, especially in planning operations, and it is not surprising that after 2015 the Russians enjoyed a high degree of respect within the regime. The victory of Aleppo was credited to Russian support in planning the operation.²¹ Despite’s Iran’s much larger footprint, Russian support was seen by Assad as decisive, as he would not launch a military operation without Russian support. “If he starts a military operation without coordinating with Russia, then he will bear the responsibility for it” (that is, face the risk of failure).²²

Gradually, however, the perception of Russian intervention started changing. The regime liked it when the Russians were promising aid and services that would contribute to its strengthening. Soon it became apparent, however, that the Russians would not keep all their promises in this regard. For example, Russian promises of advanced equipment were not always kept: neither Mi-35M nor Mi-28 helicopters were delivered.²³ The first major sign that the Russians were reconsidering their commitment came in February 2016, when the intensity of its attacks on opposition forces drastically dropped and some Russian forces were withdrawn. According to the IRGC,

Russia’s military push, had it continued on the same course, might well have defeated the non-jihadist opposition within months.²⁴

The withdrawal might have had multiple reasons, but one appears to have been to warn Assad, after he and his foreign minister had rejected the need for a compromise with the opposition, that

the regime’s recent gains were due to the Russian air force and suggested that any
failure by Damascus to follow Moscow’s lead toward a political resolution could
prove costly.²⁵

Later a Syrian officer commented that

At the beginning, they were trying to support the Syrian government and strengthen the Syrian state. As you know, at the beginning, everything was tough, but now they are just trying to keep their influence in Syria. […] if you look at all the wars in the world, no one supported his allies without any expectation. […] They want to take everything in their hands, but President Assad will not let it happen.²⁶

Already in May 2016, Moscow’s diplomats had stated that “it could envision a peace process that ends with Assad resigning from the presidency.”²⁷  Blatant demonstrations of Russian unhappiness with his performance could reach the point of humiliating Assad, probably only increasing his distrust and resentment:

Russian President Vladimir Putin has stood alongside Assad but does not view him as an equal. In one prominent case, a Russian military officer even constrained Assad from walking alongside Putin during a visit to Russia’s Hmeimim Air base in Syria. Anti-regime media widely distributed a photograph of the incident, which almost certainly inflamed Assad’s commitment to preserving his independence and his claim to sovereignty.²⁸

Assad was aware that Teheran had a vested interest in keeping him in power, contrary to Russia. At the same time, heremained wary of Iranian aims. From Assad’s perspective, therefore, what he needed was to convince the Russians that to enlist his help in containing or reducing Iranian influence, they had to guarantee his own future. This persisting situation pushed Assad toward relying on Russia, as if to dissuade them from going ahead with their transitional government plan. Relations between Moscow and Damascus improved in 2017-18, and by 2018 Assad was likely again seeing an alliance with Russia as more useful than one with Iran.²⁹

Russia’s reassuring Assad over his future in order to secure his cooperation in Moscow’s diplomatic efforts turned out insufficient to resolve all the issues with the Russians, however. Once the Iranians were contained, other problems came to the fore. By spring 2020, tension was running very high again. Russian media were publishing commentary on the corruption of the regime and even an unusual poll about Assad’s popularity in Syria, showing that his approval rating was just 31%, with 54% saying they would not vote for him if elections were held in 2021. Former Ambassador to Syria Aleksandr Aksenenok published a piece on April 17, 2020, accusing Damascus of not being

particularly interested in displaying a far-sighted and flexible approach. […] A sustainable settlement is impossible unless the fundamental socioeconomic causes of the conflict and the mentality that triggered it are eliminated. […] It is becoming increasingly obvious that the regime is reluctant or unable to develop a system of government that can mitigate corruption and crime and go from a military economy to normal trade and economic relations.³⁰

The media reports were deleted from the web within days, suggesting that Moscow had wanted to send a message to Assad and at the same time humiliate him, something not new in Putin’s attitude toward Assad (recall the Hemeimeem Air base incident in December 2017, when Assad was prevented from walking alongside Putin as per protocol). Charles Lister believes that Putin’s main concern was securing funds for Syria’s reconstruction from the West. Assad’s refusal to engage in anything resembling serious reconciliation efforts and his failure to address the issue of corruption, which was bound to deter any external investor, were likely big irritants to Putin.³¹

The regime’s unsuccessful experiment with direct confrontation

The case of the foreign militias brought in by the IRGC

The first attempts by the Assad regime to contain the growing influence and power of its two foreign saviors were targeted at Iran and took the shape of rather direct confrontations. Because Iran had intervened in the Syrian civil war early on, Assad turned on them first. Once the Russians deployed to Syria, the Iranians lost leverage, a fact that encouraged the regime to increase pressure further. January 2016 was a low point in the arc of Iranian influence over the Assad regime. One Iranian army source claimed that Iran had given up putting pressure on the Assad regime to have its own choice of appointees to senior positions approved, because it “created problems between the Syrian government and us.”³² One of the most contentious issues between Iran and Syria was the status of the foreign militias brought into the country by the IRGC.

In early 2015 a major issue arose: the Shi’a militias were acting independently of the Syrian authorities. General Soleimani even had to visit Syria specifically to discuss this issue.³³ The problem was not resolved and remained one of Assad’s chief concerns.³⁴ Attempts were made in 2016 to find a solution based on bilateral Syria-Iran negotiations. A special adviser to Assad commented that the regime and the Iranians had reached an agreement on July 4, 2016, on the future role of the foreign Shi’a militias.

If the Syrian government and these Shia militias win the fighting, then these Shi’a militia leaders will be hired in important positions. It means 40% of the power in the government will be given to them. These militia groups will not be disbanded; they will be present and salaries will be paid by the Syrian government.³⁵

Some months later, an IRGC adviser confirmed that in the postwar Syrian government, the Shi’a militias would have a “lot of power,” as a reward for their role in bringing victory about.³⁶ In October 2017, a senior Syrian official confirmed the existence of a deal, which he said included Hezbollah as well. Foreign volunteers would return to their countries after the war, while Syrian Shi’a militiamen would “be given power and high positions.” According to this source, in 2017 the Shi’a volunteers from abroad tried to renegotiate the agreement and win the right to stay in Syria even after the end of the war.³⁷ However, the issue of Syrian control over the foreign militias remained unresolved. Indeed, in late 2017 it was still being bitterly disputed. Reportedly Assad, who had been regularly consulting the militia leaders, stopped doing so in 2017.³⁸ Assad was reportedly worried by the growing Iranian influence and the expanding size of armed forces under direct IRGC control, over which the Assad’s regime had no influence.³⁹ As of July 2017, according to a senior Syrian official:

This problem has not been resolved up to now, but talking and negotiations are in progress. […] The Ministry of Defense is telling Iran that Fatimiyun and other Shia militias must work under our control, but Iran does not accept this.⁴⁰

One Syrian presidential advisor commented in April 2018 that Assad was still irritated and worried by the refusal of IRGC proxies to take orders from the Syrian military leadership. However, by then Assad appeared to have opted for a compromise due to the renewed tensions with US and Israel and fear of intervention, which pushed him toward mending fences with Iran. The same source indicated that on March 28, 2018, Assad and the IRGC agreed that the IRGC-controlled militias would take orders from the Syrian MoD and coordinate their operations with the Syrian armed forces. In exchange, foreign volunteers would be allowed to settle in Syria for good. They would even be allotted land and allowed to bring their families to Syria. The militias would not be integrated into the regular armed forces until the end of the war. The main opponents of the IRGC militias, Abdullah (Army CoS) and Ali Mamluk, who criticized their lack of discipline, were defeated.⁴¹ According to a Hezbollah commander, it was the Russian transitional government plan, centered around the figure of Faruq Sharaa, that ended up pushing Assad toward a compromise with the Shi’a militias.⁴² In practice, however, even this deal was not really implemented. One source in Hezbollah noted that even the pace of foreign volunteers settling in Syria was kept very slow.⁴³

Another highly contentious issue was the influence exercised by the IRGC over Syria’s own militias. The SAA was deeply irritated by the establishment of the IRGC-influenced National Defense Forces militia (NDF), especially General Ali Abdullah Ayoub. The IRGC, however, had the upper hand in those years and managed to get Assad to replace several top army generals who were opposed to the NDF.⁴⁴ Only after the Russian intervention did the Syrian regime get the chance to redress the situation, but in that case it decided to lean on Russian support (see Playing Russia against Iran below).

Coup proofing

Another example of Assad taking a rather confrontational approach toward one of his allies was the Presidential Guard. The fact that the IRGC was the predominant influence with the Presidential Guard was probably due to Assad’s fear that the Russians might try to remove him from power, whereas the Iranians had no interest in doing so.⁴⁵ A Syrian government official indicated that at least one senior officer of the Presidential Guard, Bashar Isham Al Assad, was sacked over alleged links to Russia.⁴⁶

More generally, Assad reportedly indulged in building his own chain of command, parallel to the official one. As one senior Syrian official put it:

Assad has a lot of senior military people who take orders from him; they listen to Assad whether to do operations or not. They do not need to take orders from the minister or the ministry. They are Assad’s trusted people, and they support Assad. No one can say anything to them in the ministry. If anyone complains, he will lose his job. The number of such people is big, and the minister is against them; he tells them that operations need to be authorized by the ministry. Russia is also unhappy with Assad about this. Russia is telling Assad that when operations take place, it must be done under the chain of command of the Ministry of Defense.⁴⁷

Purges

A less direct way of confronting Russian and Iranian attempts to expand their influence within the ranks of the regime was for Assad to get rid of key individuals who were deemed to be too close to Moscow or Tehran. This was the case especially when somebody was suspected of keeping his dealings with Moscow out of Assad’s sight. Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil, for example, was sacked as early as 2014 for links to the Syrian Kurds and Russia. He was believed to have issues with the IRGC and to be a critic of Assad.⁴⁸

Similarly, Assad sought to prevent the consolidation of Iranian influence in his Military Intelligence (tasked to manage the militias) by replacing its head very often. He also replaced Major General Bassam Merhej al Hassan as chief of the chemical forces, who was believed to be close to Iran. In 2020, he sacked the head of the branch unit responsible for all promotions and matters related to the officer corps in the SAA, Assef al Dikr, who was seen as Russia’s man. In 2021 he also dismissed Major General Zaid Saleh, head of the security committee for Idlib, and Major General Nizar Ahmed al Khader, the commander of the 17^th Division, both considered to be close to the Russians. Gradually, Assad reduced Russia’s influence within the intelligence apparatus, as well.⁴⁹

One major opportunity for further weakening pro-Russia networks in the armed forces was provided by Russia’s entanglement in Ukraine, which led to a decline in Russian influence. Assad’s concerns about Russian influence in the armed forces led to purges of pro-Russian officers in the units deemed to be closest to Russia, like the 8^th Brigade in the south, the 5^th Corps and the 25^th Division.⁵⁰ However, at the same time the Assad regime started worrying again about Iranian influence expanding again to fill the vacuum left by the Russians within the SAA and the Syrian special forces.⁵¹

Assad also relied on the rivalry between Iran and Russia to carry through purges even within his family. One example is that of Rami Makhluf. Relations between the Assad regime and Iran worsened in 2020, as Israel’s campaign of airstrikes entered its third year and Teheran was forced to scale down its economic support due to an economic crisis at home, being in part replaced by Russia. Even if the Israeli airstrikes were largely aimed at Iran and its proxies, they impacted Syria’s military establishment and represented a constant humiliation for the regime. At the same time, the role of Iran and its militias in the civil war was in decline after the defeat of the opposition everywhere, except in Idlib. Bashar al Assad and his cousin, Rami Makhluf, were no longer on good terms, as the former was increasing his demands for the latter to contribute more heavily to support the regime financially. Makhluf was reportedly found to have kept a substantial part of his wealth abroad hidden from Assad, despite the regime’s increasing desperation for cash. Makhluf took the unusual step of going public with criticism of the regime in April 2020, perhaps hoping to mobilize his support among Alawites to block his cousin’s efforts. The regime went as far as detaining dozens of Makhluf’s employees. Interestingly, the assault on Makhluf’s wealth was reportedly coordinated with two other actors within the regime who are usually described as close to the Iranians: Maher al Assad and Ali Mamluk.⁵²

The fact that Rami Makhluf was a key ally of Iran in Damascus and disliked by the Russians further strained relations between Teheran and Assad. Eran Lerman saw Makhluf as perhaps Russia’s enemy number one within the regime. There were also reports that the pressure on Makhluf was related to Russia’s demands that Syria pay back $3 billion owed to Russia in 2019.⁵³

Toward a more nuanced approach

The Assad regime quickly learned its lessons and realized that head-on confrontations with its allies would not work. Certainly, it avoided confronting the Iranians again, to the extent that external observers would in 2019 assess that “Assad align[ed] more closely with Iran than Russia.”⁵⁴ At specific points in time, it would still look as if the regime had definitively aligned with either Iran or Russia. By the end of 2016, for example, Assad did tilt back to Iran, because, as one of his close advisers commented:

Assad knows that maybe Russia will not have a lot of interest in Syria in the future after this fighting, but Iran [does]. Therefore, Bashir Al Assad is giving a lot of preference to Iran. […] Assad is thinking that Iran is committed to help us for the long run compared to Russia. Iran has a lot of interest [in Syria] and they brought their own people, and they said we will not move out from here till the end of this fighting. […] It is for sure that Russia will not be with us forever; they will move out after one year or two, but Iran will be with us till the end.⁵⁵

As insiders argued, the regime favored neither Russia nor Iran. An IRGC officer pointed out that despite Iran’s intervention before Russia in support of Assad, the regime had no favorites.⁵⁶ In fact, according to a Syrian officer in early 2024, the regime ended up trying to reduce the influence of both:

One of the vital things that the Ministry of Defence needs the most is to end Iranian and Russian influence over the army, so they are doing it, and they are getting results.⁵⁷

Alexey Khlebnikov, a Russian foreign policy analyst at the Russian International Affairs Council, wrote that Assad “needs both Iran and Russia and cannot choose one over another. He takes the best from both and uses one against each other when it is necessary.”⁵⁸ Assad had figured out how to extract what he needed from the Russians:

Assad relies on Russia and Iran’s military assistance but still acts independently to advance his own interests. He cooperates with Moscow’s efforts when it suits him and undermines them when it does not. He will often support Russian-designed military operations up to a point and then sabotage them or otherwise shape their outcome.⁵⁹

How Assad got Iran and Russia to work for him

Playing Russia against Iran: The Syrian militias

Assad and his loyalists must have learned quite quickly that directly confronting the Iranians was unlikely to be a successful tactic. It did not take long for Assad to realize that playing Iran and Russia against each other was a more effective approach, as a French diplomat noted already in June 2017.⁶⁰ “Assad has his own role in this, which is he prefers to balance Iran’s octopus-like grip with Russia’s hammer,” echoed Seth J. Frantzman.⁶¹ Jennifer Cafarella and Jason Zhou too assessed that Assad exploited differences between Iran and Russia to play one against the other.⁶²Insider sources too indicated that to achieve his aims, Assad leaned alternatively on Russia or Iran. In early 2016, for example, as the impact of the Russian intervention was fresh and the Russians were talking of withdrawal, Assad appeared especially attentive and responsive to whatever the Russians were suggesting, and less so to what the Iranians were saying.⁶³

The Russians had been early proponents of the integration of all militias under the chain of command originating from the Syrian MoD and of their gradual integration in the regular armed forces (in the case of Syrian militiamen). This encouraged the regime to take up this issue again with the Iranians, who were opposed to the integration of the militias into the SAA. For the Iranians, that would have endangered the influence networks established by the IRGC within the various Syrian pro-government irregular forces. In particular, Assad wanted the NDF to be brought into the army. The IRGC bitterly opposed plans to take control over the Shi’a militias away from them.⁶⁴ In January 2018, however, Assad signaled a retreat by appointing General Ayoub as minister of defense. Assad was becoming worried that Iran’s demands for sharing power with its Shi’a proxies were too onerous.⁶⁵

One day President Assad told the media that Shi’a militias are terrorizing civilians, burning their houses and killing innocent individuals who are not acceptable to us; these talks was strongly denounced by the leaders of Shi’a militias.⁶⁶

Pressure on the Iranians kept building. By the second half of 2018, however, the sentiment was growing within the Syrian armed forces that they could now do without Iran and Hezbollah and that the time for them to pull out of Syria was coming close.⁶⁷ The Iranians were furious and reportedly even reduced their level of support for the Syrian government, asking their allies to do the same (Hezbollah refused though).⁶⁸ According to a senior official in Damascus, during the negotiations over the Shi’a militias, the IRGC went as far as to ask for the replacement of the Syrian defense minister, pushing for the head of the NDF (an IRGC loyalist) to replace him if the Shi’a militias were to be placed under MoD control.⁶⁹ The Iranians argued that the NDF had been created to offset the deficiencies of the regular army in the first place and hence should not be merged into it. More to the point, the Iranians argued that Iran had invested massively in the NDF and did not want to see their investment go to waste.⁷⁰ The original plan to merge the NDF into the SAA was frozen by Iranian opposition. The plan was endorsed by Bashar al Assad himself, but the IRGC threatened to stop operations and logistical and financial support to the regime.⁷¹ In 2018 the process of integrating the NDF into the SAA finally started in areas considered under solid control of the regime. By the end of the year, some 8,000 NDF members had been incorporated, and the plan was to complete the process in three years. Reportedly the Iranians had agreed to it.⁷² At that point there was an understanding that the other militias too, like the Local Defense Forces (LDF) and several others, would also be incorporated into the SAA.⁷³

In the end, the plan for merging the Syrian militias into the SAA was only partially implemented, and both NDF and LDF were still in existence in 2024.⁷⁴ Assad, overall, managed at least to impose a stop on the expansion of the Iranian-sponsored militias, with Russian support.⁷⁵

Playing Iran against Russia: Regional diplomacy and rebel enclaves

By the time Russia intervened in 2015, Assad’s relations with neighboring countries were in a terrible state. Moscow saw as its vested interest to work toward a diplomatic solution of the conflict.

The Astana talks (2017) resulted in the creation of the opposition-held enclave of Idlib, in northern Syria, under de facto Turkish protection. The Assad regime never liked this outcome. Assad did not respect the ceasefire agreed in Astana and tried to derail talks with chemical attacks and by adopting an intransigent position in the Geneva talks.⁷⁶

When it first started planning in 2018 to retake Idlib, the regime faced opposition from both Russia and Iran, which were more interested in cultivating relations with Turkey, the main sponsor of the rebel groups in Idlib. The Syrian regime felt trapped in the agreement with Turkey, which required Damascus to seek a diplomatic solution to the Idlib issue.⁷⁷However, the regime managed to get the IRGC’s support for an offensive against Idlib, due to differences with the Russians who wanted an operation in Hama instead.⁷⁸ By May 2019, the Iranians had fully sided with the Assad regime and supported the idea of an offensive in Idlib, which they started planning despite Russia’s opposition. The shift might have been motivated by the IRGC’s desire to prevent serious peace talks from taking off.⁷⁹

At the other end of the country too, Assad favored a military solution. As the Syrian armed forces and their allies move to take control of southern Syria, Assad viewed that as a priority. Cutting the opposition’s lines of supply from Israel and Jordan into Syria was going to be a decisive step for weakening the opposition everywhere, except in the north. On this aim, there was convergence between Assad, Iran and Hezbollah. However, as acknowledged by a Syrian intelligence officer, even at this stage there were differences between Assad and Iran/Hezbollah, which pushed Assad to align with Russia on some issues, namely in opposing the participation of Hezbollah in the offensive.⁸⁰

Hizbollah also asked the Syrian government to let them engage in offensives in order to get control of the Syria-Israeli border, but the Russians and the Syrian government opposed and rejected their demand and told Hezbollah that it will have negative results and will escalate the situation even more in the region.⁸¹

When the Russians started using the 5^th AC as a tool of the reconciliation efforts in southern Syria (see above), a move not supported by Damascus, Assad managed easily to get the Iranians to collude with the regime in resisting the favorable terms the Russians had negotiated with the former rebels. The Russians held firm and rejected Damascus’ demands several times. The Russians had agreed with the Israelis and the Jordanians to use the surrendered rebels to create a “buffer zone” on the southern border, to keep Iranian proxies away from the area. The rebels were allowed to establish their own 8^th Brigade within the 5^th AC, which Damascus insisted on calling “bandits .” Armed friction between the 8^th Brigade and other Syrian armed forces units occurred repeatedly, but the arrangements also forced the Russians to “walk a tight line” with the commander of the 8^th Brigade, Awdeh, who also acted opportunistically.⁸²

Playing Russia against Iran: Reaching out to the Arab states

A major point of divergence between Assad and Iran, and convergence of the former with Russia, proved to be the Syrian rapprochement with Arab states such as Egypt and UAE.⁸³ An IRGC officer clearly expressed the hostility of his organization for a Syrian-Egyptian rapprochement:

In my view, this is a negative development as they always side with Saudi Arabia. […] They may share information with the Saudis and other problems. Simply I can say that we are not happy about their involvement, and we told Assad you should be careful working with them. Why they were not helping Assad before, […] we will not give permission to Assad for a strong relationship with Egypt.⁸⁴

The Syrian architect of the rapprochement with Egypt was Ali Mamluk, but it did not entail any Egyptian support for Assad, only intelligence sharing.⁸⁵ The rapprochement with the UAE, formalized on November 27, 2018 with the re-opening of the UAE embassy in Damascus, was much more promising for Damascus, and even more upsetting for Iran. Soon the UAE was lobbying for the softening of US sanctions against Syria.⁸⁶ As the UAE started making promises to Damascus of funding for the Syrian armed forces, the Iranians got even more nervous and Assad had to rely on Russian support to advance this file.⁸⁷ The divergence between Syria and Iran on Damascus’ relations with the Arab world paradoxically was confirmed by the Iran-Saudi deal of 2023: the Assad regime was at that point fearful that its negotiating positions vis-à-vis the Arab countries would be weakened, as undermining Iran would become a lesser priority on their agendas.⁸⁸

Playing Iran against Russia: Syria’s Kurds

One important point of contention between the Assad regime and the Russians has been the latter’s support for the Syrian Kurds. On this, the Iranians fully aligned with the regime. The Russians argued for establishing good relations with the Kurds and for incorporating them in the government, but Assad flatly refused, and the Iranians were fully behind him.⁸⁹ A senior official in Damascus described the relations between Russians and Kurdish groups as follows:

The relations between the Russians and Syrian Kurds are very close. Russia is helping the Syrian Kurds in logistics and finance. As a result, the Kurds played an important role against Daesh. The Russians have advisers in Syrian Kurdistan to help the Kurds with training and in combat, etc. The Syrian government and Iran’s government are unhappy about this. […] The Russians are saying to Damascus that you should give autonomy to the Kurds. The Russians are also saying the same to the Iranian government. They must be given a share in the government. If the government is not giving them a share in the government, then they must become an independent state. […] They are saying that it is important for you now to talk with the Kurds and end the contrast with them.⁹⁰

The source might be overstating the nature of Russia’s support for the Kurds, especially by taking Russian warnings as a form of sponsorship for Kurdish autonomy. A source in the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in this regard, noted that “Russian officials said that their support for the Kurds is short-term, not long term.”However, he added that in reality “in our view they want to cooperate with the Kurds long term .” “This thing scared us and also the Syrian government.”⁹¹

The Russians and Assad ended up working at a compromise that would grant some de facto autonomy to the Kurds, with a Kurdish governor in charge of Kurdish areas and a de facto Kurdish administration and Kurdish armed forces, but under the authority of the central government. Foreign Affairs Minister Walid Mualeem was put in charge of the talks from Damascus’ side and Russia offered itself as a broker and guarantor.⁹² The Russians were lobbying hard for a Kurdish reconciliation with the Assad regime until 2017, promising ministerial positions and governorships. Russian support to Syrian Kurdish groups declined in 2018, following their rapprochement with Turkey. However, relations between the Kurds and the Assad regime improved as a result of the Turkish invasion of Syria, while Assad offered some concessions such as a greater number of positions within the government, even if no breakthrough was achieved in the negotiations.⁹³ One of the Russian motives is likely to have been to pull the Kurds out of the US orbit. This remained a valid objective after 2017 as the Americans refused to support the Kurds against the Turkish invasion in 2018.⁹⁴ By May 2019 the negotiations, brokered by the Russians, were still going on; Assad could always count on Iranian support to avoid concessions, however. In fact, the Iranians were adamant that no kind of autonomy should be granted to the Kurds.⁹⁵ Indeed, no agreement was ever reached, to Assad’s satisfaction.

The appointments game: Rolling back Russian and Iranian influence

Carmit Valensi and Udi Dekel believed that the Assad regime counted on the Russians and Iranians wearing each other out in a neverending competition, allowing

the local struggles between the various actors in order to let them wear each other out, and to prevent the emergence of a single dominant power in the area, particularly at the present time, when southern Syria is low on the regime's list of priorities.⁹⁶

This multifaceted and protracted competition for influence between Russia and Iran is discussed in another paper of this series.⁹⁷ One of the primary ways the Russians and the Iranians fought it out was trying to influence appointments. The general pattern of appointments to senior positions in the security forces and even in the civilian administration was one of Iran and Russia competing to promote their “friends.”⁹⁸ For Assad, manipulating appointments thus represented a tool both for exercising pressure and for rewarding Russia or Iran. While the various rounds of appointments might benefit either Russia or Iran to a greater degree , it is clear that Assad’s aim was to “cement his own trusted inner circle,” as Abdullah Al-Ghadhawi noted about the July 2019 wave of appointments.⁹⁹ Assad’s tactics were not lost on Russian observers either. Although Assad lost much sovereignty during the war, he empowered himself by “manipulating his allies,” as Russian military expert Anton Mardasov put it. The risk (for Russia) was that

Assad’s policy of balancing relations with Iran and Russia could “create an artificial competition between them, or increase the natural competition, for [Assad] to profit in the form of weapons or loans or otherwise.” It is also “possible for Damascus to force Moscow to make concessions under the pretext that if it does not, then Iran will,” he added.¹⁰⁰

Sabotaging peace talks from within

The Russian government was a proactive proponent of peace talks with regional powers and segments of the opposition throughout the Syrian conflict.¹⁰¹ The Aleppo victory gave the Russians the chance to move forward with a proposal for a diplomatic solution of their liking, which could bring in part of the armed opposition. The Astana talks were the result, even if Turkey was more positive about them than Iran and Damascus.¹⁰²

Assad, from 2016 onward, sought instead to sabotage Russia’s plans, not intending to share more than a small bit of power. Assad’s position was strengthened not only by military victories per se, but also by the recapture of key oil and natural gas infrastructure in Deir ez Zor province in September 2017 and of the Abu Kamal Border Crossing with Iraq in early November 2017. Cafarella and Zhou argue that while the gains of the Assad regime might have forced the opposition to make concessions, they also deepened Assad’s resistance to a diplomatic settlement.¹⁰³

Assad’s problem was how to keep sabotaging the talks while keeping the Russians in Syria. An outright rejection would not do. Assad and his entourage could not afford to be completely dismissive of Russian insistence that he start negotiations with the opposition. According to a senior official in Damascus,

Both Assad and the people around him are worried about the Russians quitting Syria if they do not get the negotiations they want. This is the reason why Assad is showing his agreement with Russia over negotiations. Assad does not want the Russians to move out of Syria, because if Russia moves out of Syria there will be lots of problems for Assad.¹⁰⁴

Most of the top officials of the regime were still against the idea of serious talks with the opposition. Among them were General Ali Al Makhlouf, Ali Haidar, Abdullah Abdullah, Jamal Hassan, Bashir Jafari, Imad Khanis, General Jamie Hassan and Al Faraj. Only Assad Ali Turkmani, Mohammad Bilal Makhlouf, Mohammad Ibrahim Al Shaar and Mudar Makhlouf were reportedly in favor.¹⁰⁵ The Iranians also opposed peace talks and were confident that a transitional government would not emerge, because “Bashar Al Assad‘s Government does not want it ,” as an Iranian general put it.¹⁰⁶Even within the regime’s lower ranks there was considerable skepticism about the reconciliation plans advocated by the Russians and the ceasefires that were meant to facilitate the talks. The view of a commander of the Fatimiyun Brigade, for example, was that:

In my view, peace is not possible with these opposition groups; this is only a game. Peace will not come until these groups are finished. Neither Assad nor the Iranians want to do peace with these groups. They want to finish them off. Only Russia wants to do peace with these groups. This recent ceasefire, it was done because of Russia. In reality, Assad said we are successful and we can win the fighting.¹⁰⁷

A Syrian army adviser expressed similar views:

Iran and the Assad government do not give any importance to the ceasefire. […] Neither us nor the opposite side give importance to the ceasefire. The opposition groups accepted the ceasefire only because they were in trouble after losing Aleppo. […] Only due to Russian pressure did the Assad government [formally] accept it. We will only [really] accept a ceasefire if the opposition groups pull out of Syria, if not this ceasefire will be broken. […] These groups were near defeat, but Turkey’s government and W esterners wanted to make these groups strong again, and then the peace talks started. […] Even if a peace agreement was signed, it will not last because Bashar Al Assad and the Iranian government do not want peace with these opposition groups. These groups look for their chances – when they become strong, they will break the peace agreement.¹⁰⁸

The external view of Assad’s approach to peace talks has been that Assad would rather see the destruction of the country than compromise with the opposition. Between 2015 and 2019, Assad managed to thwart no less than five Russian diplomatic efforts to get serious peace talks going. Russian efforts to negotiate directly with the opposition turned out to be counter productive, damaging Russia’s credibility when Assad undermined the guarantees Russian had offered to opposition elements.¹⁰⁹ Whenever the Russians seemed to be abandoning its transitional government plans, Assad would reward them with a new “tilt” toward Russia.¹¹⁰ For example, only after the Russians committed to the offensive he was planning in Idlib did Assad agree to form a constitutional reform committee, in September 2019, of course making sure that his loyalists would have sufficient influence within it.¹¹¹ In Cafarella’s and Zhou’s view, the Russians sought to strengthen their diplomatic capital by pushing through a negotiation plan that they knew did not have the support of the regime. The plan was centered around the formation of a constitutional committee composed of members from the opposition, the regime and civil society. Assad sabotaged the plan, which had been endorsed by the UN.¹¹²

Short of inclusive talks, the Russians appeared to succeed in getting Assad’s consent for organizing reconciled opposition leaders into some kind of legal opposition to the regime, which could then negotiate with Assad.¹¹³ By October 2017 a senior government source was depicting a softer Assad:

he is considering major reforms. […] Maybe he transfers power to someone else. […] Assad has plans to do a peace deal with opposition groups, except Daesh and Tahrir as Sham. He plans a peaceful future for Syria. Before Assad wanted to win the war by force, but now he is bringing changes in his strategy. He wants to do a peace deal, as well by the help of Russia.¹¹⁴

According to the source, Assad formally agreed with the Russians to work for a deal with non-jihadist elements of the opposition.¹¹⁵ In particular, Assad agreed to negotiate with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) after the Russians got Turkey’s agreement for such talks. Another senior official in Damascus confirmed that Assad and his regime were interested in negotiations, especially with the FSA, as long as they cut off relations with Turkey and other external sponsors. This source indicated that Assad was facing Iran’s opposition on this plan and that during Damascus/FSA meetings in February and April in Aleppo, IRGC aligned groups such as NDF and Fatimiyun tried to sabotage the talks.¹¹⁶

Had the Russians won over Assad, finally? Although the source claimed that “Assad has a lot of concessions in his mind ,” he also stressed that “they will be given power but not a lot.” What Assad had in mind was conceding “10-15% of power” to them and “perhaps” leaving power, if necessary, in exchange for the opposition elements accepting the regime without substantive reforms (the FSA would have to “accept the law”), cutting off links with foreign sponsors “such as Turkey, France ,” “Qatar or Saudi Arabia,” and agreeing to “work under the central government.” The 10-15% of power sharing Assad had in mind would consist of some appointments as provincial governors of provinces such as Aleppo or Idlib, but the source stressed that “they must not be independent.”¹¹⁷

What Assad had to offer was likely too little to really entice any opposition faction. Moreover, he might just have given way to Russian demands without having any real intention of complying. Soon, in fact, Assad was sabotaging (with Iran’s help) the local reconciliation deals, which the Russians had sponsored, deploying his intelligence services and undermining the new Russian plan. Despite deploying military police units to the reconciled areas and trying to use their influence over one of Assad’s services, Military Intelligence, the Russians could not prevent the destabilization of the deals. The reconciliation deals were in tatters by the end of 2018 and a low-scale insurgency resumed in the Dara’a area.¹¹⁸ Cafarella and Zhou thus concluded that

The Syrian regime’s unconstrained ability to impose these intimidation tactics demonstrated yet again the relative lack of leverage held by Russia.¹¹⁹

Although one of Russia’s key motives was to mobilize Western funds for the reconstruction of Syria, Cafarella and Zhou argue that Assad feared the westerners would attach conditions to the reconstruction funds and that he was not at all interested in seeing the return of 6 million largely hostile Syrians from abroad.¹²⁰

How Assad kept Russia and Iran behind him, despite all

In part, Russia and Iran were stuck in Syria for reasons that had little to do with anything Assad was doing or not doing. Teheran saw “the Syrian government as crucial to its regional security structure .”¹²¹ While Russia’s involvement in Syria has been described as a “war of choice.”¹²² Given the large investment made, the Syrian war became

a matter of great personal prestige for the Russian president. By sending his air force to Syria, he has also put Russia’s military reputation on the line. Still, he now finds himself unable to cash in on his investments unless he works together with Khamenei.¹²³

A Russian analyst concurred in 2020 that:

Russia has already made significant investments in Syria, and it needs to reap the economic benefits in the form of different contracts, access to resources, exploration of shale oil and gas off the Syrian coast. In order to benefit from that, Moscow needs to get Syria back on track economically.¹²⁴

However, none of this explains why Iran did not seek to replace Assad at the top of the regime, and why Russia did not manage to do so, given his efforts to undermine many of its objectives in Syria.

Assad as the guarantor and the manager of Syria’s rogue elements

By early 2020 the Russians were sufficiently frustrated with Assad to start venting serious criticism in public, leading to speculation that they might want him replaced. Mark N. Katz commented that this option was never realistic, since Iran would not agree to it, or at least would not agree on who should replace him. Moreover, argues Katz, replacing Assad would not eliminate the power of the regime’s elite, which would still want to sabotage the peace process.¹²⁵

An Assad replacement, especially, one brought to power by the Russians, could have less control over the aforementioned rogue elements than Assad.¹²⁶

Katz concludes that Moscow never seriously planned to replace Assad; instead it wanted just to warn him.¹²⁷ In other words, Russia’s talk of replacing Assad was just a bluff aimed at regaining some leverage over him. Mardasov has a different way of putting it: while “Moscow and Tehran guarantee his survival, Assad [was] the guarantor of their influence in Syria.”¹²⁸ Cafarella and Zhou argued that the Russians eventually realized they needed Assad at least to navigate and manipulate the “complex dynamics” of the “deep patronage networks” that support the regime, as they could not cope with them directly.¹²⁹

From this perspective, Alexander Bick legitimately wondered whether “Russia’s success in stabilizing Assad’s government may have left Moscow with less leverage, not more.”¹³⁰ The problem for Russia was that the price to pay for a deal was dumping Iran and Assad, but Russia’s position in Syria remains dependent on Iran and its allies.¹³¹

The appointments game: Simulating Russian or Iranian gains

To convince Iran and Russia that each was expanding its influence in Syria, despite some friction with the regime, the Assad regime managed new appointments and promotions to demonstrate how it was leaning toward one or the other, depending on the need of the moment. For example, in the first four months of 2018, Assad made a wave of appointments at the top of the security forces. He was still clearly trying to manage Russia and Iran at the same time, but Iran emerged as a winner in this wave, with at least six of its “friends” being appointed to top jobs:

● General Ziad Saleh was appointed head of security for Aleppo;
● Commander Mohamed Rafi was appointed chief of logistics within the MoD;
● Commander Fateh Al Hassoun was appointed head of Military Intelligence for Hama;
● Colonel Tahir Hamid Khalil was appointed to lead the 18^th Armored Division;
● General Muhamad Mahla was appointed commander of a battalion of the Republican Guard;
● General Ahmed Abbas was appointed head of SAA Special Forces.¹³²

Russia got only three “friends” appointed to senior positions:

● Colonel Jamel Al Hassan as head of Syrian Air Force Intelligence;
● Colonel Mohammed Bilal as head of the 103^rd Brigade of the Republican Guard Division;
● General Ghazi Jalali as deputy chief of the General Staff for logistics and supplies.¹³³

A Syrian army officer confirmed in April 2018 that the trend had recently been one of Iran expanding its influence over the Syrian state. The new appointees linked to Iran were, in his view, working to further expand the influence of Iranian proxies, bringing new appointees from the ranks of the militias linked to Iran.¹³⁴ A presidential adviser to Assad confirmed that already by April 2018 Assad had appointed (under Iranian pressure) several commanders of Shi’a militias to positions in the ministries of defense and interior, among other ministries. The most notable appointments were:

● Commander Hassan Zaher Al Asad, from Liwa Al Imam Zain Al Abidain to the SAA 14^th Division in Homs;
● Commander Haider Al Jabri, from Liwa Al Imam Zain Al Abidain to the Republican Guard 103^rd Brigade;
● Commander Ali Jaffari from the LDF to lead the Military Intelligence Damascus branch;
● Commander Samir Al Al Hasan from the LDF to head MoD operations for Homs.¹³⁵

The April 2019 purge represented, on the contrary, a hard hit for Iran’s influence and saw the removal of many senior intelligence officers, including Ali Mamlouk, but also General Etaf Najib, former colonel head of unit general intelligence directorate for Damascus branch, General Mahala (head of the Military Intelligence Directorate and personally close to IRGC Quds Force leader Solaimani), General Abdul Salam Fajr Mahmoud (director of investigations for Air Force Intelligence), General Nofal Al Hassan (head of Military Intelligence in Idlib) and many others, for a total of 150 in April alone. The majority of those removed were linked to the IRGC, although the regime also removed some notorious human rights abusers and others accused of corruption, probably further to please the Russians, who played a key role in planning the purge and in lobbying Assad to implement it. The Russian special envoy to Syria and the Russian ambassador, as well as Russian MoD representatives, were reportedly all involved, even if not all external observers agree on this. The Russians were concerned that Iran had too much influence within the Syrian intelligence apparatus and wanted instead to have more control of their own, following the involvement of Syrian intelligence officers in sabotaging the deals and truces brokered by the Russians, most recently in Idlib. Many of the replacements, such as General Milhem at the head of Military Intelligence, were close to the Russians. The Russians also reportedly opposed the proposed appointment of Mamlouk as vice president, as were several dignitaries of the regime, but they were all overruled by Assad, who perhaps wanted to counterbalance the blow to the Iranians somehow. Some military officers linked to Iran were also promoted, again probably in an effort not to alienate the Iranians too deeply. Reportedly the Iranians complained vocally about the purge. It was the deepest ever implemented in Syria’s intelligence apparatus.¹³⁶

Other techniques meant to simulate support for the expansion of Russian or Iranian influence might have been used too. One Alawite general claimed at the end of 2023 that the Assads were manipulating Russia’s and Iran’s attempts to expand their respective influence, by encouraging Syrian officers to link up with either country but then report to the “Syrian deep state .”¹³⁷

Economic assets

By sacrificing the interests of Syrian businessmen and handing over much of the economy to Russia and Iran, Assad was trying to keep Russia and Iran engaged in the conflict. One of the tactics that Assad developed to keep Iran and Russia hooked to Syria was making incompatible promises in terms of economic assets to his two top allies . Handing over to Iran contracts promised to Russia might have driven Putin’s efforts to block further Iranian inroads.¹³⁸ The phosphates industry, for example, was initially handed over to Iranian control, but eventually they lost the contract, which fell into Russian hands.¹³⁹ Russia also managed to establish its absolute preeminence in the oil and gas sector as well, with Iran being completely marginalized, although it was still granted some contracts to be kept onside.¹⁴⁰The lease to Russia of the Damascus airport has been seen by some commentators as a tactical move by Assad meant to pressure Iran into expanding its economic aid to Syria.¹⁴¹ The Iranians were largely cut out of the most lucrative deals and were forced to focus elsewhere. In comparison to the Russians, the Iranians had received significantly less in terms of reconstruction contracts and mostly established themselves in more basic businesses.¹⁴² They invested heavily in sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, infrastructure, power generation, health, higher education, transport, some manufacturing and had minority shares (compared to Russia) in oil and gas, phosphates and construction, for a total of about 60 projects.¹⁴³

In the economic field, Russia emerged as a clear winner over Iran because

President Bashar Al Assad and his inner circle support Russia to do business and develop the Syrian economy, despite the militia groups and some people in the government supporting business with Iran.¹⁴⁴

According to Sinan Hatahet, "contracting Russian private companies comes at a lower political cost to Syria than allowing Tehran to further expand in key sectors of the Syrian economy.”¹⁴⁵ By 2019 Assad was leaning toward Russia as the more viable economic partner, not only because Russia was regaining control of key economic assets, but alsobecause of its ability to influence the application of the UN resolution. However, Assad avoided cutting the Iranians completely out.¹⁴⁶

Conclusion

Militarily, Iran’s and Russia’s interventions in Syria were a success. Politically, they turned out to be a failure, because neither country handled the relationship with the Assad regime and aligned medium- and long-term aims successfully. The Assad regime was able either to impose its own terms or at least sabotage Iran’s and Russia’s aims, because Iran and Russia could not form a common front and had serious differences. Indeed, Damascus’ efforts to contain growing Iranian dominance had proved to be unsuccessful before Russia’s intervention. With Russia engaged, Assad was able to play his two allies against each other. The arguments put forward by Byman, Ladwig, Elias and others (see Introduction) are confirmed to apply to Russia’s and Iran’s interventions in Syria. What has been argued about Western multinational interventions in general can therefore be argued about the Russia-Iran interventions in Syria as well (see Introduction). They tend to be ineffective or at the very least not cost-effective. Iran’s and Russia’s interventions may have differed somewhat from Western ones in Afghanistan or Iraq, but they ended up in a similar place, which is not a completely unexpected outcome.¹⁴⁷ Intervening to rescue a failing regime is again confirmed to be a very risky and likely wasteful enterprise.

It can be added that dyarchical intervention, with two powers of roughly equal weight, is likely to magnify all the dysfunctional aspects highlighted in the literature. Formulating an agreed strategy is almost impossible, with the result being that local partners have more space to impose their own aims. This might be good or bad depending on whose perspective, but it stands to note that Assad’s regime was not unique among client regimes in holding flawed assumptions about its own autonomous potential and the desire of its sponsors and protectors to go to any length to keep it afloat.

While the dysfunctional dimensions of patron-client and principal-agent relationships are by now well known, why and how intervening powers, having started to face diminishing returns and even growing losses, struggle to disengageremains unclear. The refusal to accept that their investment has gone to waste is likely a major factor. However, this paper has shown a client regime working hard to keep their patrons hooked. For Assad, the task was not just to neutralize any Iranian or Russian aim that went against his own interests. He also had to make sure both Iran and Russia remained committed to pursuing their intervention in Syria and to keeping the regime afloat financially. In this too he showed considerable skill . However, his final attempt to crush Russian influence within the Syrian armed forces in late 2023-early 2024 ended up contributing significantly to the collapse of late 2024. Considering how quickly the Iranians gave up, once it appeared clear that the Syrian armed forces had little appetite for a fight in November-December 2024, one might argue that perhaps even the IRGC at that point was worn out and that it had exhausted any faith in the viability of the regime were it to be deprived of the hefty flow of resources from its partners. Assad’s victory in “managing” the Iranians and the Russians was thus a pyrrhic one, as it was achieved in part by wearing them down.

The Assad regime’s resilience to being molded along the lines either of the Iranians’ or of the Russians’ desires was evident long before 2024. Bick wondered in 2020 whether Putin in the end would abandon his dreams of “playing peacemaker” in Syria and instead accept that Syria could still serve Russia’s interests as a “failed state in which Russia can continue to act as an arbiter among regional and international powers, while waiting for opportunities to emerge in the future .”¹⁴⁸ Thomas Schaffner believed that Putin was doing just that, as even from the standpoint of March 2021 Putin’s adventure in Syria looked not like a “quagmire,” but rather like a campaign that had “a mostly positive impact on the country's vital interests as seen from the Kremlin.”¹⁴⁹ Moscow might well have harbored low expectations of being able to fix the Assad regime from the start and indeed it only focused on getting the Syrian armed forces in better shape, thereby reducing the burden on Russia’s shoulders. Even that proved too much of a challenge, however. Perhaps it could be argued that Moscow’s more flexible approach to Syria (compared to Iran’s) enabled the Russians to make virtue out of necessity to some degree, turning the quagmire to its own advantage. Russia in the end emerged from the intervention in Syria with a higher diplomatic profile than it had when it entered it, and with better relations with most of the Gulf Arabs and with Turkey. That was not the case of Iran, whose approach was affected by the rigidity of the IRGC.

Still, it seems obvious ex-post that even Russia’s intervention in Syria was not particularly cost-effective, not least because Russia could conceivably have achieved some of its diplomatic gains without intervening directly at all. As of May 2025, it was still unclear whether Russia’s strategic aim of preserving its bases on Syrian territory would be achieved, while it seemed clear that in any case Russia would not enjoy the same freedom of action in Syria that it had while Assad was in power. Even Russia’s flexible approach, therefore, might not be enough to offset its troubled relations with local partners.