Legitimating nationalism – effectiveness and variation among Russia’s regions
In Legitimating Nationalism: Political Identity in Russia’s Ethnic Republics, released this month with the University of Wisconsin Press, I take such a substate approach. I compare how Russian nation building works in three of Russia’s ethnic republics, Karelia, Tatarstan, and Buryatia, and evaluate its effectiveness in solidifying Russian national sentiment linked to support for the Putin regime.
For nation building to work, its symbols and narratives need to resonate with and be accepted by at least enough of the population to avoid challenges to the legitimacy of the state itself. Reception matters. For legitimating nationalism to work, that resonance needs to not just bond people together in a national community, but to link that community’s security and prosperity to a particular leader who comes to represent the father of the nation, or to a particular party. In Russia, this means situating Vladimir Putin as the father of the Russian nation, the authentic teller of its story, and the only plausible protector of its interests. If nation-building tactics, such as National Unity Day, are working, then participation or exposure to them will lead to enhanced Russian belonging and pride, and in turn, increased likelihood of positively evaluating governance and voting for United Russia. At the regional level, there’s the possibility for similar identity work, such as Tatarstan’s Republic Day, to build regional belonging and pride, which may or may not impact the effectiveness of Russian nation building.
In the book, I test the effectiveness of Putin’s legitimating nationalism with survey data collected in the summer of 2016 from six regions, three ethnic republics (Karelia, Tatarstan, and Buryatia) and three neighboring non-ethnic regions (Murmansk, Samara, and Irkutsk). I first analyze the extent to which exposure to national and regional identity work generates feelings of belonging to and pride in the Russian nation and one’s region. I then examine the relationship between these sentiments, evaluations of governance, and voting intent. Overall, I find that legitimating nationalism is working for Putin, though unevenly across regions, ethnic groups, and tactics. These weak points and existing regional identities indicate that legitimating nationalism requires a careful balancing act to avoid backlash from those not connected to the Russian national idea promoted by the center, along with reliance on other pillars of regime durability, such as repression and performance legitimacy.