Daniel Satinsky: Okay. So, what were you at that time? What kind of an entity were you?
Joel Schatz: I was a little nonprofit called San Francisco Moscow Teleport out of San Francisco. And it was funded by two generous philanthropists from the Bay Area. And it was like, oh, by the way, when we signed the joint venture in ’89 with VNIIPAS, I had one more day to put $250,000 cash into a joint venture, and Soros had not wired the money yet, and they were going to cancel the JV. So, I called him, and I said where is the $250,000 that you promised? He said oh, it’s been earning interest, I’ll wire it today. [
Laughs.]
And the money came into the Vneshtorgbank, the only Soviet bank. So, I went there and I said okay, here’s proof from a telex that the money’s been wired to your bank. And they said okay, it’s probably here, but we don’t know where it is. I said but it’s proof that you got it. He said I can see that we have it. I said I need 50,000 U.S. dollars right now. He said okay, I’ll give you $50,000. I said if you’re not doing it from my wire, where are you getting the money from? Oh, I take it from somebody else’s account. And he gave me $50,000.
You know, I can write 500 volumes of my experience in Russia, and nobody would believe it. Because almost everything that happened was bizarre.
Daniel Satinsky: Right, it was all seat of the pants. So, when you were operating—I don’t want to beat this point to death—but when you were operating it, doing the email, did you have an office in Moscow? Were you in some government agency? Where was your physical presence?
Joel Schatz: I was physically working out of the VNIIPAS building. They gave me a desk. It was a few blocks from Red Square.
Daniel Satinsky: And so, when people were your customers, and they paid you, they paid into an account in San Francisco. There was no business activity in—
Joel Schatz: The dollars were paid to us in California, and the rubles from the Russian people were paid in rubles to the VNIIPAS, who was our informal partner.
Daniel Satinsky: I see, so it was an informal arrangement until it became a joint venture.
Joel Schatz: It was informal because had we asked permission to do a business together, we would have been denied. So, we called it an experiment, because in principle experiments were very loosey-goosey. Nobody really cared if it was an experiment.
Daniel Satinsky: But then once after the joint venture law was passed you were able to form a joint venture.
Joel Schatz: It was a legal business, that’s correct. And we were 50-50 partners, and it grew very quickly. And the same was true with the Sovam Teleport. I signed that telephone contract in 1990 with the main trunk line control center of the Ministry of Communications, and that was a 50-50 joint venture. And then went to Leningrad that year and formed another telephone joint venture called Baltic Communications Ltd. My partner was GTE Spacenet—no, GTE Spacenet was Sovintel. My partner was a British company. I forget the name of the company now, but anyway.
Daniel Satinsky: BT?
Joel Schatz: It was Mercury Communications. And they were also a 50-50 joint venture with me. And then SFMT became absorbed into [Global] Telesystems Group. That company then grew into all kinds of telecom activities throughout Europe. And it eventually went bankrupt. But the Wall Street geniuses said we don’t like your Russia company. It might take down the GTS value. So, we formed this special new company called Golden Telecom, which was our Russia properties, with email and phones and everything, and then we separated it from GTS. When GTS went bankrupt, Golden Telecom was eventually sold for $4 billion to Vimpelcom. I mean, you can’t… you know, you can’t dream this stuff up, it’s so bizarre.
Daniel Satinsky: Right. But when you—and you had Russian partners throughout all this or not?
Joel Schatz: Absolutely.
Daniel Satinsky: And did they take an active part in the company? Are they passive? What role did they play?
Joel Schatz: They didn’t know what they were doing. For example, when we wanted to sign up all the major hotels as telephone customers, I would tell the hotel managers here’s the deal: we don’t want any money from you. We’re going to spend millions of dollars on satellite equipment, on telephones, digital phones. And they said something is not right here—why would you bring all this millions of dollars of stuff and not ask us for anything? I said what I’m asking for is permission to make money as a 50-50 partner with you on all telephone calls. We just make the investment in the equipment and the satellite feed. They just had the hardest time understanding that. There was just no sense of business.
Daniel Satinsky: And these were the—
Joel Schatz: But they all went for it.
Daniel Satinsky: And these were all the Russian hotels and Intourist hotels and so on?
Joel Schatz: Yeah, the major hotels, the National.
Daniel Satinsky: So how did—I mean, you made this transition from being an activist to being a manager. Did you have professional managers that you brought over that formed the company and—
Joel Schatz: Yeah. I brought all kinds of people over. I brought technical people. and I brought financial people. And money wasn’t a problem. When it came to GTS, when we first formed Global Telesystems Group, Soros put in a few million dollars of additional cash. And that business was just growing so big. In fact, before it fell into bankruptcy its market cap reached $6 billion. And then it went from 6 billion to zero.
Daniel Satinsky: And why? What caused that to happen?
Joel Schatz: What happened was we had a lot of Wall Street people on the board who didn’t know anything about the technology, and at that time international phone service was so lucrative that it stimulated a lot of competition. New companies went into business. The technology was becoming more efficient, and therefore it was becoming less expensive to operate, and we were expanding as a corporation mostly by selling debt. And then we didn’t have the revenue that we expected in order to repay the debt. That happened to quite a few telecom companies. So, we were being mismanaged by these Wall Street guys that didn’t know anything.
Daniel Satinsky: So, they were setting your kind of fiscal policy and expansion.
Joel Schatz: Yeah, but they were not even interested in looking at the technology. In fact, in one board meeting I said you know, eventually we’re going to have voice over the internet, and they just laughed at me. They just thought I was nuts.
Daniel Satinsky: But that was later. And Global Telesystems, did you bring the Russians along with you? Were they part of that?
Joel Schatz: No.
Daniel Satinsky: So Sovintel and Baltic Communications you had Russian—
Joel Schatz: That’s right. We were the co-owners.
Daniel Satinsky: Co-owners, okay. And so how did—and then you sold those into Global Telesystems, or how did that transition work?
Joel Schatz: We actually, let’s see. I don’t really remember the details, how that happened. I’ve got to think about that. We transferred those joint ventures into Golden Telecom. And that was an all Russian run company that was separated from GTS.
Daniel Satinsky: And who managed that one, Golden Telecom? People you brought in?
Joel Schatz: Soros brought a few people in. We had a guy named Jerry Thames who became the CEO—no, of Golden Telecom, no. Sorry, man, that was GTS. Golden Telecom—I don’t remember, because I left Russia in ’91 and I had a passive role. I stayed with GTS, and I don’t really remember who was running the company at that point.
And I called Soros one day in 1991 and I said, you know, I didn’t grow up to spend the rest of my life living in Russia building telephone companies, I want to go back to America, I have a new idea for a software company. And he says you mean you want to finally leave Russia? I said yes. Because we were living there for like nine years, mostly. He said you finally want to leave after nine years? Do you still have your sanity after nine years? I’ll never forget that conversation. George is a remarkably funny guy, and we just really liked each other.
Daniel Satinsky: I’m sure that makes a huge difference in what you were able to do together, right, that you had a personal bond.
Joel Schatz: Yeah. I could call him at any time for any reason, no problem.
Daniel Satinsky: And those nine years that you lived there, did you have an apartment in Moscow?
Joel Schatz: We had an apartment in Moscow very near the Arbat, and then in St. Petersburg—it was Leningrad back then—an apartment in a former KGB party house in a place called Kamenny
* Island where we had a great kitchen staff, and it was just a beautiful facility. And we paid rubles for rent, so we paid nothing, basically. And we just, you know, just made everything work.
And Brian [Zimbler]—here’s one story about Brian he may not have told you. I needed him back in Leningrad. He was in, I think, Bulgaria—or no, he was in Yerevan, and he needed to get back to Leningrad quickly because I really needed him for a contract, but the only plane he could take was flying to Moscow. He got on the plane in Yerevan, and he mentioned to a guy sitting next to him that he was really upset because he needed to get to Leningrad, and the guy says give me a hundred dollars. He says why? He says give me a hundred-dollar bill. And the guy took his money and went into the cockpit and was talking to the captain, and as they took off the pilot said we’ve made a change of plans, we actually have to fly to Leningrad first.
We said to Brian you highjacked the plane? He says I didn’t look at it in those terms, but I think that’s what happened. And again, that’s just a normal little thing.
And when Gorbachev was arrested during that coup attempt, that three-day coup or four-day coup I was in Kazan signing a joint venture, and they announced the coup on the overnight train, August 31st—I’ll never forget that, ’91. As we were coming into Kazan, they said Comrade Gorbachev is ill—this is an announcement on the train. I had never heard an announcement. I didn’t even know they had a PA system on the train. They said but not to worry—this is the announcement—because tractor production is expected to increase today.
So, I knew we were in deep shit. I got there. We signed the contract. It was for a cellular system. And when I got back to the States, I was describing to the board people and Goldman Sachs guys about this contract, and he said how did you sign a contract in the middle of a coup? I said because in Russia they separated revolution from economics. They said, what?
It’s the truth. We signed a goddamn joint venture in the middle of a coup. And I couldn’t even call Moscow because the coup leaders cut the telephone lines. I finally got a call back to Diane, who was in San Francisco, via Istanbul, and I said hey, we signed the joint venture. She said don’t you know what’s going on? I said yeah, yeah, we’re watching it. I’ve got my BBC portable radio, I know, but we signed the JV. And she was really excited. And I made plans because if the coup leaders had succeeded, people like me would have been very unpopular because they were completely opposed to Western communication, and if I had to maybe escape I’ll escape via disguise as a Russian Orthodox priest. I’d already been making my plans.
Daniel Satinsky: You had plans to do that if necessary.
Joel Schatz: Yes, I had to. Because we didn’t know which way this coup thing was going to end up.
Daniel Satinsky: Right. Wow. So, before that coup happened—
Joel Schatz: There was no sign that that was going to happen. The night before we got on the train it was a peaceful Sunday night in Moscow, lovers walking on the street. It was totally calm and there was no clue.
Daniel Satinsky: And you had no sense of it from people that you were talking to or anything.
Joel Schatz: Nobody had a clue. Gorbachev didn’t have a clue, for god’s sakes. The people who turned on him were the people that he appointed.
Daniel Satinsky: So as far as you were concerned, up until that moment you would be dealing with the Soviet Union ad infinitum, into the future. You were going to be building for some reform of the Soviet Union, though.
Daniel Satinsky: We knew that communication was a necessary ingredient in stabilizing relations between East and West. We just in our gut we knew. The opposite would have been who knows what kind of miscalculation or disaster.
And oddly enough, looking at what’s going on today, we thought we solved the Cold War problem and the nuclear disaster problems 30 years ago, but today I think we’re facing more danger than we faced back then.
Daniel Satinsky: Yeah, I—I mean, that’s another conversation, but I think we’re in worse shape in terms of communication than when it was simply a technical problem. It’s a more deeper chasm we have in communication right now, unfortunately. And to do what you did then, something similar would have faced so much social opprobrium and distaste of dealing with Russians. I mean, you had, at least within the community you lived in, support for this idea that you were not only doing a business but building communications. Am I correct about that?
Joel Schatz: Yeah, that’s correct. And all of our relationships with our Russian partners were more like family than business relationships. We became very close friends. And oddly enough, the reason we ended up in first place, all of our competitors, like British Telecom or U.S. West all tried to do—like Gary Hart, for example, was a representative for U.S. West after he lost his thing on the Monkey Business boat. And I was having drinks with him at the National Hotel one night and he says how did you get so far in this country?
I said, well first of all, every time your company, U.S. West, sends people over to negotiate, they send different people. You don’t have people who form relationships. That was true with almost every Western company. They didn’t understand they needed to send the same people, they needed to live there, they needed to become trustworthy, they needed to become known quantities. So, he was taking notes on that—we need to send the same people. In fact, we never made promises we couldn’t keep. We made a point of being trusted. And it made all the difference.
Daniel Satinsky: Did you ever learn Russian or some bit of Russian?
Joel Schatz: No, I speak like Tarzan in Russian, like “ya hochu contract”, me want contract, and they would laugh. Because all of our business partners spoke English. Many of them were from scientific backgrounds and English was the second language.
And Brian Zimbler, because he came back, and he was traveling back and forth, because he was bilingual would be very helpful during negotiations. We did hire translators when Brian was not around. But language was never a problem. And those contracts were golden. There was never any expectation that they would ever be broken by either side. They were completely firm, based on trust.
Daniel Satinsky: And your competitors came and went. I mean, you really established something—
Joel Schatz: Yeah, let me tell you something else. When Anatoly Sobchak was the mayor of—the late Sobchak—was the mayor of Leningrad, he decided to hold a meeting of all the so-called competitors, because people were approaching him to do all kinds of telecom projects, and he said I want to find out which ones are real. So, he invited representatives of maybe a dozen or more Western technology companies who were all telecom.
But before that meeting I went out with my bilingual translator, Veronica Frintal, and I took photographs of our site in Leningrad. We had an actual teleport with microwave dishes, and we had a gigantic trailer at the bottom of the building which had backup battery generators, and it was a real teleport. And then I went around, and I took photographs of empty lots where all the competitors said they were building, they said we’re in process of building, and I had 8 x 10 photographs of these dozen empty lots. And when it came my turn Sobchak said and who are you, and I explained, and I showed photographs of our teleport on Ulitsa Gertzena, and I said and here are the photographs of my competitors’ projects, and I showed them one by one. And he said, “Meeting canceled.”
And then he asked me why do you think that your competitors are just lying? I said because they don’t have respect for your people. They think they can just play games. And they were—Ital Cable—they were big corporations that were doing that.
Daniel Satinsky: So, were they playing games, or were they premature, or was it that you got there first?
Joel Schatz: They were kind of jockeying with each other, trying to see who can maybe land some kind of a contract, and so they were making up stories to look good.
Daniel Satinsky: Well, what they would call marketing, right?
Joel Schatz: Yeah, I mean, I felt…because I felt such compassion for my Russian compatriots, I felt they that they should be ashamed of themselves for what they were doing. I felt angry at them for misbehaving so badly. For example, they promised the guys from the Astoria Hotel, they wanted to charge them $800,000 for a three-meter dish which was an inflated price times a thousand, because the hotel managers didn’t know anything about the technology. They were just trying to gouge.
Daniel Satinsky: It sounds like, from what you’re saying, it was a combination of your sensibilities, or your sensitivities, your relationships, and the fact that you had access to capital to actually implement these plans.
Joel Schatz: Right. I mean, it was never a problem. Soros would always write a check, in the early days. And then I really began to learn the rules of how to operate in the Soviet bureaucracy, and once I learned that there were no rules, which was the rule, I made up my own rules, and did my thing, and nobody ever stopped me. For example, we needed to dig a trench in front of the parliament building in Leningrad. I couldn’t get permission to do it. So, I rented jackhammers, a bunch of guys in uniforms, we got sawhorses with road cones, and we sealed off the street in front of the…and we dug up a trench. And I’m walking around with a clipboard, because when you’re walking around with a clipboard you obviously are an important person. [You’ve got] a clipboard, right?
The local police never asked what we were doing. We laid fiber, we covered the trench back over, and after we finished, I wrote a formal request to do that, thinking that maybe in five years some clerk might find it. I just did what I needed to do. And I did that for years. I was just making up my own rules.
Daniel Satinsky: And this was in the late Soviet period, this was ’89, ’90, somewhere?
Joel Schatz: This was, yeah, ’88 to ’90, yeah. And then a bank opened in Leningrad for foreign currency, a Russian owned bank. So, I went there and I said how do I make a deposit of dollars, and the girl showed me how to do that. And I said and how can I make a withdrawal? Oh, you can’t, you can only make deposits. Maybe in a year you can make withdrawals. I said let me ask you how many customers do you have? She said we don’t have any customers. Can you imagine why? You know, it was like oh my god.
Daniel Satinsky: What impact do you think your enterprise had on teaching Russians about international business and telecom business? Did you have an impact?
Joel Schatz: I think so because our Russian counterparts learned quickly about the technology, and they were learning about marketing, and they were learning about business structure, about making business plans. I mean, under the Soviet system they had, for example, in Moscow a surplus of skis and a shortage of windshield wiper blades because the central committee never asked the market what they needed, they just said this is what you should have. They just proclaimed. There was no feedback at all. People would ask me, when I would come back to the States, what’s it like in Russia. I said imagine the entire U.S. economy being run by the U.S. Postal Service. That’s the Soviet Union. Everyone was a civil servant, from cosmonauts, to engineers, to—
Daniel Satinsky: All true.
Joel Schatz: They were civil servants. And I made up a new definition of Murphy’s law when I was living there. In Russia Murphy’s law is nothing is possible, but occasionally something works.
Daniel Satinsky: That fits.
Joel Schatz: And, you know, my Russian colleagues, they agreed, that’s really accurate.