Lastly, several ambitious proposals were put forward regarding Russia's BRICS chairmanship in 2024, including moving beyond the traditional modus vivendi of the organization as a mediocre “club of interests” and starting to transform it as an alternative system of global governance for a multipolar world. To achieve that, specific steps were recommended: accelerated implementation of a
settlement currency for BRICS countries and the introduction of BRICS regulatory functions in areas like standardization, vaccine certification and cyber security regulation, to name a few.
It appears, however, that the main accomplishment of the BRICS summit scheduled for October in Yekaterinburg will be the admission of five new states – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Despite resistance from India and Brazil,
China insisted on such a significant membership expansion to use BRICS more effectively as a tool for its geopolitical influence and to strengthen cooperation with key OPEC+ countries. Moscow is already touting the doubling of the alliance's membership as proof of Western failures to isolate Russia. The Kremlin will undoubtedly use the upcoming BRICS leadership meeting to further promote its narrative on the war in Ukraine, as well.
More members, nevertheless, will make the alliance even more heterogeneous and less cooperative, thus, as has happened before, impeding consensus on the most crucial items on its agenda. In this way BRICS will continue to serve as a platform for pursuing relatively narrow objectives while preserving China's dominant role. Beijing's attempts to present itself as the principal advocate for the Global South will continue to encounter opposition from key BRICS nations, such as India, Brazil and South Africa. In addition, if formal criteria are used to be considered part of the Global South — like low- and middle-income per capita thresholds — this means that China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Russia do not make it.
These countries are classified as upper-middle-income and high-income economies, with a GNI per capita exceeding $10,000 on an annual basis.
The complex dynamics of the Global SouthThere is a noticeable intensification of efforts by Russia and China, as well as the US, the UK and EU, to preserve and expand their influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is also becoming clear that there is no universally recognized "leader" in the Global South, and it is unlikely that one will emerge in the near future. The current trend suggests that while signs of American-Chinese bipolarity are increasingly popping up in the Northern Hemisphere, in the South there is a growing emphasis on a hedging policy in response to the dynamic multipolarity. Essentially,
countries of the Global South are striving to preserve maximum flexibility in their relations with major powers, particularly the US and China, and make their foreign policy flexible enough to address unpredictable and rapidly changing scenarios, if necessary.
Undoubtedly, the West will need to pay closer attention to the demands and needs of the Global South to establish a balance, using both practical and conceptual strategies to outdo competitors. In the current conditions, the Global South cannot be conflict-free. However, despite varying levels of anti-American (and anti-Chinese) sentiment, it is not fundamentally anti-Western or entirely revisionist to be hostile to the rules-based international system. In fact, as
Stiglitz notes, less developed countries are even more vulnerable in a world without rules, where so-called “state-civilizations” or (if we strip away the euphemisms) “regional hegemons” will dominate, as Russia insists.
Moscow's claims to leadership of the Global Majority have not been rejected outright but rather have been met with considerable irony and skepticism. They are viewed primarily as based on a transactional relationship driven by short-term pragmatic benefit, and as a means of exerting pressure on the West. In some instances, countries of the Global South have perceived the Kremlin's geopolitical maneuvers, which involve horizontal escalation, as carrying clear risks, since they can initiate or exacerbate local and regional conflicts.
Some Western analysts have argued that Moscow can look with
satisfaction at the results of its foreign policy shift toward the Global South after the beginning of the war against Ukraine. This perspective is emotionally one-dimensional, focusing on short-term gains. The long-term prospects for and net effects of these maneuvers are much more dubious and damaging for Moscow. Russian foreign policy has moved into a gray, marginal zone, characterized by a loss of transparency, trust and international legitimacy. The transformed security landscape has dramatically reduced the country’s influence with its "near abroad," particularly with the
South Caucasus and
Central Asia, and the power vacuum has been filled by China and other neighboring powers, such as Turkey and Iran. There are growing imbalances in Russia's Middle East policy, undermining Moscow's ability to navigate the complex web of regional relationships. The looming threat of a potential conflict between Venezuela and Brazil over Guyana's natural resources limits Russia's capacity to manipulate Maduro's regime and benefit from its partnership with Brazil. Argentina's decision not to join BRICS was also a significant setback for Moscow's presidency of the organization. Despite the booming oil trade between India and Russia, New Delhi is strengthening its relations with the West and diversifying its arms supplies. The issuance of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant for the Russian president on charges of war crimes put the host of the 2023 BRICS summit, South Africa, in a difficult position and ultimately resulted in Putin’s missing the BRICS leaders’ meeting in Johannesburg.
There is also an irony in the fact that Russia’s state-driven ultra-conservative ideology overlooks the diversity of cultures and differences in approaches to public and private life in the Global South. While Putin's regime is currently promoting the concept of depoliticization and demobilization of society, various countries in the Global South such as Brazil, Mexico, Cuba and South Africa still prioritize grassroot mobilization and emphasize community ties. Meanwhile, these countries have made significant strides in gender equality by legalizing same-sex marriage, same-sex adoption and altruistic surrogacy, among other rights. In contrast, Russian lawmakers has gone so far as to include in the Russian constitution an explicit ban on same-sex marriage in 2020, positioning the country as a defender of “traditional values,” in opposition to the West. Furthermore, in December 2022 the Duma extended the scope of Russia’s “gay propaganda” law, forbidding the public portrayal of “non-traditional sexual relations.” It must be acknowledged, nevertheless, that the Kremlin is willing to overlook these inconsistencies in its relations with the Global South, as it prioritizes the achievement of its primary geopolitical objective: the dismantling of the current international order.
The challenges of Russia's reintegration into the global worldMoscow is increasingly perceived by the Global South, if not as a complete satellite of, then as a country highly dependent on the emerging world hegemon, China. Russia has de facto already become integrated into the China-centric economic, technological and military-political system, which makes it increasingly challenging to disengage from it, even with Moscow’s goal of achieving strategic autonomy. The once-prevailing belief that a change in the political regime in Moscow could easily restore the status quo in its relations with the West has become obsolete. The accelerated pivot to the East, driven by geopolitical circumstances, has activated profound geoeconomic and geostrategic dynamics.
The prospects for Russian energy and metals returning to the premium segments of the European market are bleak. Investment and technological cooperation with the West is likely to remain frozen for many years, if not decades. Moscow's aggressive actions have expedited its transition into a role of resource supplier, primarily to China and the Global South, which has fostered illusions about the viability of a rent-based economy in the context of what is thought to be the increasing strategic importance of natural resources for the Global Majority.
The asymmetric ties between Russia and China continue to expand rapidly in quantitative terms, yet their structure remains unchanged – Russian raw materials in exchange for higher value-added products from China. In 2023, the trade volume between China and Russia reached
$240 billion, marking an increase of more than 25% compared to the previous year. Notably,
more than half of Russia's oil and oil product exports were directed to China, constituting about 20% of China's total oil imports. Meanwhile, Chinese exports to Russia, over half of which consist of machinery and equipment, surged
64% compared to the period before the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2021. It is evident that Beijing is employing a standard strategy in its relations with Moscow, one that it has successfully used with countries of the Global South: increasing Russia's unilateral dependence on China's more modernized and diversified economy, which is 10 times larger than Russia's in terms of GDP.
There has also been a shift that clearly limits Russian sovereignty in the move toward adopting the yuan as a reserve currency. Currently, all Russian energy exports to the Chinese market are conducted in yuan. Technological dependence is also increasing, particularly in the most sensitive and strategic areas, including the development of artificial intelligence (AI), the information and communications sector, cyberspace, aerospace and advanced military-technical cooperation. A decreasing share of this interaction is China’s reselling Western technologies to Russia, with an increasing portion involving China's
promotion of its own technologies. Western direct and secondary sanctions have accelerated this process.