Academic policy Paper Series, no. 11, April 2025
Competing Allies: How Russia and Iran Jousted for Influence over the Syrian Armed Forces in 2015–2024
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi
April 30, 2025
Introduction
During the period direct Iranian and Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war (2015-2024), evidence started emerging of less than frictionless cooperation between the two allies. There were reports of clashes between militias and military units aligned with Tehran and Moscow, and disagreements over the reform and restructuration of the Syrian armed forces.1 2 Researcher Mahmoud Alloush later talked of “competitive cooperation,” explaining that:
There is a strategic intersection of interests between the two countries in supporting the regime during the Syrian revolution, but competitive factors have become more dominant in shaping this relationship after the course of the war and military operations turned in favor of al-Assad…3
Thus, while friction between Russia and Iran, and between Iranian and Russian proxies and allies, was widely reported, the drivers of this friction were never analyzed in detail. That friction occurred at multiple levels – in the field, within the bureaucracy, within the diplomatic sphere, over economic affairs – and had multiple drivers. This paper focuses on Iran and Russia’s competition for influence in Syria as a major source of friction in security and economic affairs. Why is this important now that the Assad regime has collapsed? A granular analysis of that competition tells us a lot about the relationship between Russia and Iran, about their intervention strategies, about their strategic cultures and about their state-building approaches (or lack thereof).
This paper therefore seeks to answer two main questions:
The paper is organized into four sections. The first section details the evidence of friction between Iran and Russia over the Syrian military and the Syrian economy and discusses the two countries’ efforts to coordinate nonetheless. The following section looks at the impact (in terms of generating friction) of Iran and Russia’s favoring two very different approaches to fixing the crisis in the Baathist state in Syria. The third section discusses the struggle for influence over the Syrian armed forces. Finally, the fourth section looks at how this competition ended, with Iran emerging as dominant but ultimately lacking the resources to keep the Assad regime afloat at the end of 2024, when what turned out to be the final, victorious offensive of the opposition forces was launched.
Methodology
Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises, given that conducting primary research in Syria was extremely difficult until 2024. There are other obvious limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research by necessity mostly limited to oral sources, with support from the literature and news reports, but no access to primary written sources: the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete; gaps abound; and following up on specific themes was often impossible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.
Overall, the oral sources proved to be quite approachable. The risk inherent in this type of research is not obtaining access. There are other risks as well: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading them to provide prejudiced information about rival organizations. Mitigation measures are discussed below. The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalism and ethnographic interviews. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, as many different questionnaires as there were interviews. The questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.
The interviews were commissioned to local researchers. All of them have a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees and were trained to undertake research with a similar methodology.
The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or misrepresent the facts, or both, was assumed from the start. It was mitigated by consulting different types of interviewees – such as government officials and military officers, Iranian and Russian officers and diplomats, and members of militias – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without their being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, in order to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. Researchers were chosen who did not know each other to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example, by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers as part of a remotely managed project. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts and that there was no premium placed on specific findings.
The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were carried out in part face-to-face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymized and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.
In total, the paper relies on 48 interviews carried out between 2016 and 2024. Of these, 10 were with Syrian military personnel and militiamen, eight with members of foreign militias fighting for the Assad regime, eight with Syrian officials, seven with Russian diplomats and military advisors, and 13 with Iranian advisors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and army or Iranian diplomats, plus one local notable in Aleppo and one journalist working for the Syrian regime’s media.
Evidence of friction between Iran and Russia in Syria
Armed clashes among proxies
There is significant evidence of serious friction between Iran and Russia in Syria. The media (largely hostile to the Assad regime) regularly reported clashes between different militias identified as proxies of Russia and Iranand even direct clashes between IRGC and Russian military police. The first reports of clashes between pro-Iranian and pro-Russian factions date back to 2015. In December 2015, for example, regime regular forces reportedly engaged in armed scuffles in Homs with fighters loyal to a fiercely pro-Iranian commander of Quwat al-Ridha, a group within the National Defense Forces (NDF) backed by Hizbullah and the IRGC.4The media sources and foreign diplomats are not neutral, however, mostly sympathizing either with the opposition or with regional powers opposed to Assad.5 This section will focus on evidence from Iranian, Russian and pro-regime Syrian sources.
Another example involved the Tiger Force, which became Russia’s client militia of choice in the coastal area, due to the local NDF unit being too close to Iran. The Russians favored the expansion of the Tiger Force by offering generous pay deals to recruits, in the hope of counterbalancing the power of the militias linked to Iran and to favor the Force’s expansion.6 Friction between the Tiger Force’s leader, Sohail al Hassan, and President Assad’s brother Maher is confirmed by a Syrian intelligence officer, who put at 37 the number of those dying. The direct cause of the clash was Maher’s jealousy at al Hassan emerging as one of the towering military leaders on the regime’s side.7 As the Tiger Force grew, its commander al Hassan came into conflict with Maher al-Assad:
Maher al Assad, as all members of the al-Assad family, doesn’t like to see any strong and popular officer or leader who is not one of them. […] General Maher al-Assad wanted and still wants to destroy General Suheel and his Tiger Forces / 25th Special Task Division, but the Russians prevent this.8
Sources aligned with the regime or with Russia confirmed that other armed clashes had happened. A Russian officer acknowledged that clashes between Iranian-backed groups and Russian-backed groups were relatively frequent and mentioned a major clash in Deir ez Zor between the Russian military police, the 5th AC and Liwa al Quds on one side and Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbullah and Fatimiyun on the other. He also mentioned other major clashes in Aleppo over Al Nayrab airport, in Daraa and in Al-Zuhra – always over territorial control.9 The clashes in Aleppo were confirmed by a source in Liwa al Quds.10
At one point, according to a Russian officer, following a particularly bloody clash between militias linked to Iran (Hezbollah and Fatimiyun) and others linked to Russia (Liwa al Quds, Baath Brigades and Nosur al Zawbah), in which the pro-Iranian former lost 60 killed and after which the Iranians were about to end their relationship with Russia for good. The Russians, however, managed to get negotiations going to resolve issues and reportedly succeeded.11 This clash and the ensuing verbal exchanges show that direct clashes between armed formations were not the only form of friction and that clashes among Iranian and Russian proxies and allies did not leave the two powers indifferent.
Direct Iran-Russia friction
The Russians used the leverage deriving from their air power quite ruthlessly. Already in the aftermath of fighting in Khan Touman in early May 2016, Iranian officers and media complained about Russia’s failure to deploy their air assets in support of IRGC units and pro-Iranian militias.12 According to one source, the Russian and Syrian air force allegedly refused to provide air support to the Fatimiyun Brigades and other militias operating under direct IRGC command even on later occasions.13 According to a Russian adviser, the Russians asked the Iranians to encourage at least the militias they did not directly control to merge into the Syrian army (SAA), but the IRGC refused. In retaliation, the Russians suspended any support not long before the war in Ukraine started, in particular close air support.14
The Russians also had financial and diplomatic leverage, which they did not hesitate to use. They were clear that they were ready to stop financial and diplomatic support to Syria if they lost too much influence over Damascus.15 The Syrian regime had to yield to Russian pressure. One IRGC officer confirmed that the regime, spurred on by the Russians, warned homegrown regime-aligned militias not to cooperate with Iranian-backed militias carrying out operations outside of the chain of command of the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).16
Another IRGC officer believed that it was the Russians advising Assad to get pro-Iranian militias out of Aleppo and replace them with the Syrian army. This source was frank about the competition with the Russians: “We want to have our groups here in Aleppo and […] Russia did not win the war in Syria, Iran did. […] We are trying to override the Russians.”17
The IRGC, meanwhile, put pressure on Damascus by pulling its militias back from the front line, forcing the regular SAA to take on the brunt of the fighting. The IRGC wanted to expand the ranks of the militias and get its friends appointed to senior positions in the government, in response to Russian pressure to marginalize its Syrian clients.18 It is unclear how effective this was in counterbalancing Russian pressure, but after the Russians deployed their air force to Syria, Damascus is likely to have been keener on keeping air power than Iran’s foreign militias.
By 2019 cooperation between the Russians and Iranians had become brittle. Significantly, the center for coordinating advisers, which brought together Iranians and Russians, was closed in March 2019. Moreover,
Some time ago, they were working jointly with the Syrian military, but now when one (i.e., either Russian or Iran) is there in training, the other is not joining them, and this clearly shows major differences between them.19
The differences in approach between Russian and Iranian advisers affected planning and operations, according to a senior official of the Syrian government speaking in 2017:
They have problems with and hostility toward each other, […] when one side is giving an opinion, the other side is showing opposition, and vice versa.20
There were also tussles over who would commander specific operations, Russia or Iran, such as in Deir Ez Zor.21
It seems clear that the military effort was negatively affected by this friction, even if the impact of Russian air power was so important that the trend remained largely positive for the regime.
Two models for Syria: Iran’s parallel network and Russia’s resurrected central state
What caused the high level of friction among nominal allies? One factor is that Iran and Russia intervened in Syria with very different military, strategic and state-building cultures. The Russians at the start thought the key to stabilizing Syria was rebuilding a strong Baathist state, starting with the SAA. In addition, the Russians were in favor of depoliticizing the SAA (at least to some degree) and, after reconciling elements of the armed opposition, incorporating them into the army,. As the Russian approach has been described in some detail elsewhere,22 here the author will focus on the Iranian approach.
Iran’s approach
The IRGC saw clearly that the Russian advisers in Syria had a different conception of fighting, based on creating a maneuverable force as the centerpiece of the military strategy.23 The Iranians instead thought in terms of establishing an ideologically motivated force, essentially by building a structure parallel to that of the remnants of the old Baathist state. Initially the intent was to support the crumbling structure of the old Baathist state, but eventually the new parallel structure was to share power with it, similar to the Iranian model. The Iranians advocated the creation of an IRGC-, Basij- or Hezbollah-like structure alongside (or even in place of) the existing Syrian MoD forces, which they deemed to be beyond repair and incapable of being brought back to the strength required to save the regime.24 Getting their protégé militias to participate in the establishment of new, partially depoliticized and centralized armed forces, as advocated by the Russians, had no appeal to the Iranians.25 Quite the contrary, the Iranians even seemed to be preparing to create political parties based on the pro-Iranian militias, following the Iraqi model.26 The formation of SAA units out of reconciled rebels was so strongly opposed by the Iranians that the Syrian government feared there could be armed clashes between them and the new brigades of reconciled opponents, such as the 8th Brigade. The Iranians alleged that the former rebels were “Wahhabis” who still maintained relations with Turkey and the Gulf monarchies and thus saw them as competitors of the pro-Iranian militias.27
In the longer term, the IRGC did not hide its ambition to turn the Syrian Shi’a militias it sponsored into entities that could be deployed outside of Syria, as happened with Iraqi and Lebanese groups. As Mahmood Shoori has noted,
For Iran, of course, the government [of Syria] is not everything. The experience of working in the Middle East has taught Iranian leaders that playing an active role in regional developments requires multiple choices. Iran’s advisory presence in Syria over the past few years has provided an opportunity for Iran to engage effectively with various religious and social groups and build capacity to prevent the formation of threat centers against it.28
An IRGC commander was even more explicit:
As we brought people from Afghanistan as part of Fatimiyun and as we brought people from Pakistan as part of Zaynabiyun, we would do the same with Syrian militias if we needed them in a different country.29
Once complete victory was achieved, said an Iranian diplomat in early 2017, the foreign volunteer militias should be allowed to remain in Syria.30 Iran also intended to settle Shi’a militiamen on land it bought in southern Syria.31 None of this appealed at all to the Russians.
Mutual rejection
Already in 2016, the Iranians were getting nervous that the Russian plans to fold the militias into the SAA were turning into a serious point of disagreement.32 According to an IRGC commander, the Iranians pushed back on the Russian plans, and the main argument they used was that the decay of the SAA was irreversible:
We told the Russians at the beginning that these policies would not work as most of the militias […] were not interested in being part of the regular army, so the Russians spent loads of money and physical energy reorganizing the army, but it was not enough.33
Another IRGC source called the militias the “Basij military,” referring to the Iranian paramilitary force controlled by the IRGC, and explained that “If they merge with the army, then the army will not fight very well […]. Separate is good.”34
The IRGC did not just complain; it took action. After the plans to fold the militias into the SAA was approved by the Syrian MoD over Iranian opposition, the IRGC tried to sabotage the effort by strengthening its and Hezbollah’s control over the largest militias, such as the NDF and the Local Defense Force (LDF), and by severing the chain of command of many militias with the Syrian MoD. It also tried to blackmail the Assad regime by suspending its funding to the NDF.35
Iranian criticism of the Russian effort to bring the militias under the chain of command of the MoD was not unwarranted. Anton Mardasov and Kirill Semyonov endorse some of the Iranians’ points:
The failures accompanying the formation of the 4th Corps […] were also due to the Russian military having failed to take into account local specifics: few of the militia groups wanted to lose their independence and be incorporated into the organizational structure of the SAA as military personnel.36
Russian-sponsored military reforms were hampered by Syria’s political and social realities. Mardasov further elaborated (with regard to folding militias into the SAA) that
Most militias were reluctant to lose their autonomy, abide by the personnel and organizational rules of the Syrian army and be integrated into it, with the militants to be granted the status of official servicemen.37
A Syrian official spoke frankly, essentially endorsing the abovementioned arguments of Mardasov and Semyonov, noting that “most of these militias” were involved in criminal activities, while they enjoyed power locally and were benefiting from the Iranian presence in Syria, so they had no interest in joining the army and losing these advantages.38While the Russians were highly skeptical of Iran’s approach and claimed that the pro-Iranian militias were in practice nowhere near as effective as the Iranians were touting, one Russian diplomat acknowledged that given the “state of affairs” and Iran’s active opposition to plans to rebuild the SAA, the chances of Russia’s plans succeeding were very low.39
Instead, the Iranians argued, the IRGC- or Hezbollah-like structure that they proposed, based on hybrid forces that were to be adaptable and capable of fighting asymmetrically, would be more cost-effective and could also protect Syria from external challenges (read: Turkey and Israel). The Syrian government always openly rejected the Iranian plan.40 Syrian critics argued that the militias supported by Iran performed poorly on logistics and coordination, pointing out essentially that the Iranians never came close to forming anything resembling a Syrian Hezbollah or Basij and that the Syrian militias sponsored by Iran often suffered from the same issues as the SAA, including corruption. The regime remained formally committed to the rehabilitation of the SAA.41 It might have been worried about Iranian influence more than anything else. Meanwhile, even an IRGC commander acknowledged that Iran’s plans for creating a Syrian Hizbullah or IRGC were never very realistic.
The Syrian government is not accepting that […] they have a weak army; they say we have a strong army, and they are totally against making an army like Hizbullah and Sepah Pasdaran, […] and they are saying that Syria will not let any kind of militia run part of the government now or in the future.42
The struggle for the Syrian armed forces
Iran and Russia did not just subscribe to different concepts of the state and to different approaches to fighting and state-building. There was at least another and possibly more important source of friction between Iran and Russia in Syria: the desire to expand their influence within the Syrian armed forces.
Russian and Iranian narratives
The Russian narrative explaining the poor performance of the Syrian armed forces was that the Syrians had promoted “a lot of useless people in the army.” According to a Russian adviser, the Russians pushed for what they deemed to be capable military leaders from militias such as Liwa al Quds, Liwa Zainabiyoun, Mukhtar army, Liwa Abu Al Fadhal Al Abbas and Liwa Al Imam Al Hussein to be appointed to the army, but the Syrians refused to do so. Note that apart from the Palestinian Liwa al Quds, the other militias named are all Shi’a militias linked to Iran. The source therefore implies that the Russians were not trying to get their own cronies appointed but actually sought to promote meritocracy. Following growing Russian pressure, according to the source, the Syrians agreed to restrain the tendency to promote incompetent cronies, which to some extent they reportedly did.43
The Iranians, by contrast, framed their resistance to expanding Russian influence in 2015-2019 in terms of the sacrifices made from 2011 onward, which entitled them to a dominant position:
The Iranians believe that they were the ones who sacrificed a lot in Syria, and therefore, they are trying to take over the army and foreign affairs of the Syrian government. […] At the beginning, we had several meetings with the Iranian Sepah Pasdaran, and even the Russian authorities met Qasim Sulimani at that time. Even Qasim Sulimani […] used to say, “As long as I am alive, I will take as much advantage as possible of our sacrifices in Syria.” So, yes, of course, the Russian authorities are irritated by the attitude of the Iranians all the time.44
The Iranian sacrifices were real. By March 2017, they had lost over 800 killed in Syria, including some senior officers. The total cost of the war up to that point was over $20 billion, causing discontent in Iran, where according to an Iranian diplomat “Except for the Pasdaran, no one else wants to be engaged in fighting in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. If Iranian Government does not stop fighting, big, big protests might start.” In February 2017, a Syrian delegation visited Teheran, asking for even more support. Not long before, another delegation, headed by Ali Mamlouk, had visited Teheran with the same aim. The Iranian government had granted an extra $2 billion.45
The Iranians clearly resented Russian demands as prevarication. In November 2017, an IRGC commander was so upset with the Russians that he stated
If we had understood at the beginning that Russia would reach such levels, we would have kept them out. Russia is trying to […] make Iran weaker [in Syria], [and] this is not acceptable to us. We are talking to Russia to get them to decrease their influence in Syria and do not create any problems for our strategies there. If Russia does not agree, then we are ready to react against Russia.46
The Russians, however, rejected the Iranian narrative, as they felt that having been dragged into the Syrian conflict by the Iranians themselves, they were entitled to a dominant position due to the decisive role they had played.47
The struggle for influence beneath the narratives
Whatever the actual reasons for their efforts to maintain their influence in Syria vis-à-vis Russia, the Iranians clearly aimed to stay in Syria for the long term, no matter what Russia might say. The Iranians’ arguments against folding the militias into the SAA were not purely technical (see Two models above). Faced with the Russians’ insistence that the NDF should be integrated into the army (because NDF units had the tendency not to respond to the MoD chain of command and were involved in numerous ceasefire violations), the Iranians retorted that they had invested massive sums in getting the militias up to scratch and were not going to see that investment lost.48 Iran’s opposition to integrating militias into the SAA was instrumental to its ability to out-network the Russians (and Damascus). As a Syrian officer put it,
The Iranians know that if [the militias] join the army, it would be hard for them to control them, and that will cause a lot of problems for them, even for them to lose their influence.49
Similarly, an IRGC source openly acknowledged that the Iranians refused to have reconciled opposition fighters integrated into the NDF (as proposed by the Russians), for fear that they could dilute Iran’s influence.50 The Russians viewed the Iranians as disingenuous when they claimed that militias were the key to winning the war and that Iranian control over the militias was necessary to ensure their proper functioning. The Russians noted that the Iranians were also intent on building influence at the top level of Syria’s military and intelligence apparatus, and especially with Assad’s brother Maher, despite their claims that the SAA was doomed.51 Once complete victory was achieved, said an Iranian diplomat in early 2017, the Syrian militiamen linked to the IRGC would get jobs in Syria’s ministries and armed forces.52 This would translate into Iranian influence over the Syrian state as a whole. The IRGC undoubtedly was leaning heavily on the Assad regime to have Syrian officers promoted and demoted, as both Syrian army and IRGC sources acknowledged.53
Whereas the Iranians were quite transparent about their priorities, according to Ambassador Michel Duclos, the Russians were saying off the record that reestablishing a strong Syrian army would be the best guarantee against Iranian influence and pro-Iranian militias.54 Mardasov wondered whether the entire stated Russian policy of building up the SAA at the expense of the militias was not rather an attempt to expand Moscow’s influence at the expense of Tehran. The fact that the Russians were also sponsoring some of the militias and continued to sponsor new ones well into the reform period would seem to undermine their “centralist” argument in favor of the SAA.55
Two strategies for gaining influence and a turning point in Russia’s favor
When the Russians deployed to Syria, Iran’s influence was predominant largely among the militias, by virtue of its early engagement with them, while Russia had stronger influence among SAA generals, most of whom were trained in Russia and Soviet Union,56 as well as over Syria’s air force, which the Iranians were not in a position to support.57 From the very start, when the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate established the first Shabiha militias, Iran’s relationship with the entity was well developed.58 The Iranians also brought their own allied militias from Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Almost all the foreign militias were aligned with Iran, or at least not with Russia.59 Instead, Russia reportedly relied on Soviet-era contacts established within the Baath party and in the SAA for spreading influence.60
According to sources within the Syrian armed forces, the first turning point in the race for influence between Iran and Russia was around 2017-2019. As of October 2017 most of the Iranian military advisers were with the Shi’a militias, and their number was declining, due to relations with the Assad regime being in decline, while the number of the Russian ones was increasing.61 By May 2019, according to a Syrian intelligence officer,
Now the Russians have the upper hand in Damascus. I mean Russian influence increased significantly in Syrian government military and civilian institutions. The reason is that Iranians are feeling weak due to their financial crisis. They’re no longer able to provide funding to the people who were linked to them some time ago. Now those people are aligned with the Russians because the Russians are providing support to them.62
The external perception was the same: the Russians were gaining influence in the military and security apparatus, managing to impose in 2019 a series of appointments of senior officers and officials of their liking.63 During this period, Assad followed Russian recommendations in making appointments, such as of Salim Harba as SAA chief of staff, establishing new units under its influence, such as the 5th Corps and 25th Division, and restructuring the Syrian army staff.64 There were also reports of arrests of pro-Iranian Syrian activists by Syrian security forces, “ordered by Russia.”65 Although there were Iranian advisers in the SAA, the Russians were absolutely predominant there after 2015. According to Russian military expert Semyonov, “There are Russian military advisors in almost every brigade and division of the Syrian army.”66 And although some Syrian army units were under stronger influence of Iran (4th Division, Republican Guard), even in the 4thDivision and in the Republican Guard the Russians were said to have a “large say”: “The Russians interfere at the command level, in major security issues, and in major disputes between the army and the militias supporting it.”67
By May 2017 the Russians had already reshaped the influence map considerably. Assad regime sources say that the General Intelligence Directorate was still under Iranian influence, as both its head, Mohammed Din Zaitoun, and his deputy Zouheir Hamad had close relations with Iran. The Military Intelligence Directorate was also under Iranian influence. Meanwhile, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (the most powerful of the three intelligence directorates) had shifted closer to Russia. The Political Security Directorate was also somewhat close to Russia, despite Iran having some influence in it, as well.68 As of May 2017, the National Security Office was split between Russia and Iran, with six of its members (Ahmad Diyab, Abdel Fatah, Jawdat Salibi Mawwas, General Nasr Al Ali, Commander Mohammad Ibrahim and Ali Hassan Turkmani) considered to be linked to Russia and another five believed to be close to Iran (Ali Mamlouk, Lina Kenaya, Lula Al Shebal, Naji al Ahmad and Abdul Abdul).69
The Russians did invest relatively significant human resources in training and advising militias: as of early 2018, a regime source counted 200 Russian trainers and advisers there. However, the effort looks puny when compared to Iran’s: 1,800 trainers and advisers, supported by 450 from Hezbollah.70 Russia’s influence among Syrian militias was limited to a few of them, such as the ISIS Hunters.71 Some Russian-sponsored militias were ad hoc and did not represent a long-term investment. For example, to reduce the risk of Iranian-sponsored efforts to disrupt new local reconciliation deals, the Russians sponsored the creation of a temporary militia known as the Armed Unified Command-Unit in eastern Qalamoun. The unit was meant to gather reconciled opposition members, until the time was ripe for the SAA to move in and take over.72
The Iranians were sufficiently dominant at the local level that they could strengthen their influence by simply creating new militias. In early 2018 the IRGC sponsored the creation of new militias in southern Syria,73 possibly because it hoped to circumvent the ban on expanding the ranks of existing militias, exploiting Assad’s desire to consolidate his position in the south. At least three new militias were formed in the south, one with direct IRGC support (Battalion 313) and two with Hezbollah support (Companions of Imam Mahdi 313 and Katain Al Imam).74 The Iranians remained totally predominant among foreign militias, although Russia developed close links to the Palestinian Liwa al Quds.75
Even after the first turning point in the competition for influence, there were always relatively minor fluctuations in the spheres of influence. For example, in later years, the General Intelligence Directorate and the Military Intelligence Directorate were reported to have edged closer to Russia.76 Similarly, Russia established relatively strong influence over 5th and 4th Assault Corps when they were formed in 2015-2016, but Iran and Hezbollah later managed to build up substantial influence within both.77
In sum, the Iranians seemingly competed with Russia even for influence in the regular armed forces, while still pursuing its strategy with the militias.78 Similarly, the Russians focused on the regular armed forces but also sought to establish a foothold among the militias. The Russians committed limited resources (human and financial), while exploiting opportunities as they arose. For example, Moscow sought to exploit Iran’s rivalry with Israel by attracting militiamen into the Russian-controlled 5th Corps from pro-Iranian militias that had allegedly been weakened by repeated Israeli airstrikes on their positions. Local sources indicated that the risk of Israeli airstrikes was making the Iranians unpopular in Deir ez Zor.79 Similarly, it was reported that the Russians asserted control over the Damascus and Aleppo airports as Israeli strikes on IRGC positions there made Iranian control unpractical.80 Another example is that of Liwa al Quds. The Palestinian militia was initially supported by the IRGC and Hezbollah before falling under Russian influence, due in part to sectarian Shi’a-Sunni tensions, until Iranian influence started asserting itself again at the time of Russia’s deepening preoccupation with Ukraine.81
During the period direct Iranian and Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war (2015-2024), evidence started emerging of less than frictionless cooperation between the two allies. There were reports of clashes between militias and military units aligned with Tehran and Moscow, and disagreements over the reform and restructuration of the Syrian armed forces.1 2 Researcher Mahmoud Alloush later talked of “competitive cooperation,” explaining that:
There is a strategic intersection of interests between the two countries in supporting the regime during the Syrian revolution, but competitive factors have become more dominant in shaping this relationship after the course of the war and military operations turned in favor of al-Assad…3
Thus, while friction between Russia and Iran, and between Iranian and Russian proxies and allies, was widely reported, the drivers of this friction were never analyzed in detail. That friction occurred at multiple levels – in the field, within the bureaucracy, within the diplomatic sphere, over economic affairs – and had multiple drivers. This paper focuses on Iran and Russia’s competition for influence in Syria as a major source of friction in security and economic affairs. Why is this important now that the Assad regime has collapsed? A granular analysis of that competition tells us a lot about the relationship between Russia and Iran, about their intervention strategies, about their strategic cultures and about their state-building approaches (or lack thereof).
This paper therefore seeks to answer two main questions:
- Why did Russia and Iran end up competing so much in Syria?
- What factors hampered efforts to cooperate more smoothly?
The paper is organized into four sections. The first section details the evidence of friction between Iran and Russia over the Syrian military and the Syrian economy and discusses the two countries’ efforts to coordinate nonetheless. The following section looks at the impact (in terms of generating friction) of Iran and Russia’s favoring two very different approaches to fixing the crisis in the Baathist state in Syria. The third section discusses the struggle for influence over the Syrian armed forces. Finally, the fourth section looks at how this competition ended, with Iran emerging as dominant but ultimately lacking the resources to keep the Assad regime afloat at the end of 2024, when what turned out to be the final, victorious offensive of the opposition forces was launched.
Methodology
Researching this topic required a number of methodological compromises, given that conducting primary research in Syria was extremely difficult until 2024. There are other obvious limitations to the research methodology adopted, with research by necessity mostly limited to oral sources, with support from the literature and news reports, but no access to primary written sources: the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete; gaps abound; and following up on specific themes was often impossible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.
Overall, the oral sources proved to be quite approachable. The risk inherent in this type of research is not obtaining access. There are other risks as well: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading them to provide prejudiced information about rival organizations. Mitigation measures are discussed below. The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalism and ethnographic interviews. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, as many different questionnaires as there were interviews. The questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.
The interviews were commissioned to local researchers. All of them have a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees and were trained to undertake research with a similar methodology.
The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or misrepresent the facts, or both, was assumed from the start. It was mitigated by consulting different types of interviewees – such as government officials and military officers, Iranian and Russian officers and diplomats, and members of militias – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without their being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, in order to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. Researchers were chosen who did not know each other to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example, by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers as part of a remotely managed project. The field researchers were also informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts and that there was no premium placed on specific findings.
The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were carried out in part face-to-face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymized and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.
In total, the paper relies on 48 interviews carried out between 2016 and 2024. Of these, 10 were with Syrian military personnel and militiamen, eight with members of foreign militias fighting for the Assad regime, eight with Syrian officials, seven with Russian diplomats and military advisors, and 13 with Iranian advisors from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and army or Iranian diplomats, plus one local notable in Aleppo and one journalist working for the Syrian regime’s media.
Evidence of friction between Iran and Russia in Syria
Armed clashes among proxies
There is significant evidence of serious friction between Iran and Russia in Syria. The media (largely hostile to the Assad regime) regularly reported clashes between different militias identified as proxies of Russia and Iranand even direct clashes between IRGC and Russian military police. The first reports of clashes between pro-Iranian and pro-Russian factions date back to 2015. In December 2015, for example, regime regular forces reportedly engaged in armed scuffles in Homs with fighters loyal to a fiercely pro-Iranian commander of Quwat al-Ridha, a group within the National Defense Forces (NDF) backed by Hizbullah and the IRGC.4The media sources and foreign diplomats are not neutral, however, mostly sympathizing either with the opposition or with regional powers opposed to Assad.5 This section will focus on evidence from Iranian, Russian and pro-regime Syrian sources.
Another example involved the Tiger Force, which became Russia’s client militia of choice in the coastal area, due to the local NDF unit being too close to Iran. The Russians favored the expansion of the Tiger Force by offering generous pay deals to recruits, in the hope of counterbalancing the power of the militias linked to Iran and to favor the Force’s expansion.6 Friction between the Tiger Force’s leader, Sohail al Hassan, and President Assad’s brother Maher is confirmed by a Syrian intelligence officer, who put at 37 the number of those dying. The direct cause of the clash was Maher’s jealousy at al Hassan emerging as one of the towering military leaders on the regime’s side.7 As the Tiger Force grew, its commander al Hassan came into conflict with Maher al-Assad:
Maher al Assad, as all members of the al-Assad family, doesn’t like to see any strong and popular officer or leader who is not one of them. […] General Maher al-Assad wanted and still wants to destroy General Suheel and his Tiger Forces / 25th Special Task Division, but the Russians prevent this.8
Sources aligned with the regime or with Russia confirmed that other armed clashes had happened. A Russian officer acknowledged that clashes between Iranian-backed groups and Russian-backed groups were relatively frequent and mentioned a major clash in Deir ez Zor between the Russian military police, the 5th AC and Liwa al Quds on one side and Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbullah and Fatimiyun on the other. He also mentioned other major clashes in Aleppo over Al Nayrab airport, in Daraa and in Al-Zuhra – always over territorial control.9 The clashes in Aleppo were confirmed by a source in Liwa al Quds.10
At one point, according to a Russian officer, following a particularly bloody clash between militias linked to Iran (Hezbollah and Fatimiyun) and others linked to Russia (Liwa al Quds, Baath Brigades and Nosur al Zawbah), in which the pro-Iranian former lost 60 killed and after which the Iranians were about to end their relationship with Russia for good. The Russians, however, managed to get negotiations going to resolve issues and reportedly succeeded.11 This clash and the ensuing verbal exchanges show that direct clashes between armed formations were not the only form of friction and that clashes among Iranian and Russian proxies and allies did not leave the two powers indifferent.
Direct Iran-Russia friction
The Russians used the leverage deriving from their air power quite ruthlessly. Already in the aftermath of fighting in Khan Touman in early May 2016, Iranian officers and media complained about Russia’s failure to deploy their air assets in support of IRGC units and pro-Iranian militias.12 According to one source, the Russian and Syrian air force allegedly refused to provide air support to the Fatimiyun Brigades and other militias operating under direct IRGC command even on later occasions.13 According to a Russian adviser, the Russians asked the Iranians to encourage at least the militias they did not directly control to merge into the Syrian army (SAA), but the IRGC refused. In retaliation, the Russians suspended any support not long before the war in Ukraine started, in particular close air support.14
The Russians also had financial and diplomatic leverage, which they did not hesitate to use. They were clear that they were ready to stop financial and diplomatic support to Syria if they lost too much influence over Damascus.15 The Syrian regime had to yield to Russian pressure. One IRGC officer confirmed that the regime, spurred on by the Russians, warned homegrown regime-aligned militias not to cooperate with Iranian-backed militias carrying out operations outside of the chain of command of the Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD).16
Another IRGC officer believed that it was the Russians advising Assad to get pro-Iranian militias out of Aleppo and replace them with the Syrian army. This source was frank about the competition with the Russians: “We want to have our groups here in Aleppo and […] Russia did not win the war in Syria, Iran did. […] We are trying to override the Russians.”17
The IRGC, meanwhile, put pressure on Damascus by pulling its militias back from the front line, forcing the regular SAA to take on the brunt of the fighting. The IRGC wanted to expand the ranks of the militias and get its friends appointed to senior positions in the government, in response to Russian pressure to marginalize its Syrian clients.18 It is unclear how effective this was in counterbalancing Russian pressure, but after the Russians deployed their air force to Syria, Damascus is likely to have been keener on keeping air power than Iran’s foreign militias.
By 2019 cooperation between the Russians and Iranians had become brittle. Significantly, the center for coordinating advisers, which brought together Iranians and Russians, was closed in March 2019. Moreover,
Some time ago, they were working jointly with the Syrian military, but now when one (i.e., either Russian or Iran) is there in training, the other is not joining them, and this clearly shows major differences between them.19
The differences in approach between Russian and Iranian advisers affected planning and operations, according to a senior official of the Syrian government speaking in 2017:
They have problems with and hostility toward each other, […] when one side is giving an opinion, the other side is showing opposition, and vice versa.20
There were also tussles over who would commander specific operations, Russia or Iran, such as in Deir Ez Zor.21
It seems clear that the military effort was negatively affected by this friction, even if the impact of Russian air power was so important that the trend remained largely positive for the regime.
Two models for Syria: Iran’s parallel network and Russia’s resurrected central state
What caused the high level of friction among nominal allies? One factor is that Iran and Russia intervened in Syria with very different military, strategic and state-building cultures. The Russians at the start thought the key to stabilizing Syria was rebuilding a strong Baathist state, starting with the SAA. In addition, the Russians were in favor of depoliticizing the SAA (at least to some degree) and, after reconciling elements of the armed opposition, incorporating them into the army,. As the Russian approach has been described in some detail elsewhere,22 here the author will focus on the Iranian approach.
Iran’s approach
The IRGC saw clearly that the Russian advisers in Syria had a different conception of fighting, based on creating a maneuverable force as the centerpiece of the military strategy.23 The Iranians instead thought in terms of establishing an ideologically motivated force, essentially by building a structure parallel to that of the remnants of the old Baathist state. Initially the intent was to support the crumbling structure of the old Baathist state, but eventually the new parallel structure was to share power with it, similar to the Iranian model. The Iranians advocated the creation of an IRGC-, Basij- or Hezbollah-like structure alongside (or even in place of) the existing Syrian MoD forces, which they deemed to be beyond repair and incapable of being brought back to the strength required to save the regime.24 Getting their protégé militias to participate in the establishment of new, partially depoliticized and centralized armed forces, as advocated by the Russians, had no appeal to the Iranians.25 Quite the contrary, the Iranians even seemed to be preparing to create political parties based on the pro-Iranian militias, following the Iraqi model.26 The formation of SAA units out of reconciled rebels was so strongly opposed by the Iranians that the Syrian government feared there could be armed clashes between them and the new brigades of reconciled opponents, such as the 8th Brigade. The Iranians alleged that the former rebels were “Wahhabis” who still maintained relations with Turkey and the Gulf monarchies and thus saw them as competitors of the pro-Iranian militias.27
In the longer term, the IRGC did not hide its ambition to turn the Syrian Shi’a militias it sponsored into entities that could be deployed outside of Syria, as happened with Iraqi and Lebanese groups. As Mahmood Shoori has noted,
For Iran, of course, the government [of Syria] is not everything. The experience of working in the Middle East has taught Iranian leaders that playing an active role in regional developments requires multiple choices. Iran’s advisory presence in Syria over the past few years has provided an opportunity for Iran to engage effectively with various religious and social groups and build capacity to prevent the formation of threat centers against it.28
An IRGC commander was even more explicit:
As we brought people from Afghanistan as part of Fatimiyun and as we brought people from Pakistan as part of Zaynabiyun, we would do the same with Syrian militias if we needed them in a different country.29
Once complete victory was achieved, said an Iranian diplomat in early 2017, the foreign volunteer militias should be allowed to remain in Syria.30 Iran also intended to settle Shi’a militiamen on land it bought in southern Syria.31 None of this appealed at all to the Russians.
Mutual rejection
Already in 2016, the Iranians were getting nervous that the Russian plans to fold the militias into the SAA were turning into a serious point of disagreement.32 According to an IRGC commander, the Iranians pushed back on the Russian plans, and the main argument they used was that the decay of the SAA was irreversible:
We told the Russians at the beginning that these policies would not work as most of the militias […] were not interested in being part of the regular army, so the Russians spent loads of money and physical energy reorganizing the army, but it was not enough.33
Another IRGC source called the militias the “Basij military,” referring to the Iranian paramilitary force controlled by the IRGC, and explained that “If they merge with the army, then the army will not fight very well […]. Separate is good.”34
The IRGC did not just complain; it took action. After the plans to fold the militias into the SAA was approved by the Syrian MoD over Iranian opposition, the IRGC tried to sabotage the effort by strengthening its and Hezbollah’s control over the largest militias, such as the NDF and the Local Defense Force (LDF), and by severing the chain of command of many militias with the Syrian MoD. It also tried to blackmail the Assad regime by suspending its funding to the NDF.35
Iranian criticism of the Russian effort to bring the militias under the chain of command of the MoD was not unwarranted. Anton Mardasov and Kirill Semyonov endorse some of the Iranians’ points:
The failures accompanying the formation of the 4th Corps […] were also due to the Russian military having failed to take into account local specifics: few of the militia groups wanted to lose their independence and be incorporated into the organizational structure of the SAA as military personnel.36
Russian-sponsored military reforms were hampered by Syria’s political and social realities. Mardasov further elaborated (with regard to folding militias into the SAA) that
Most militias were reluctant to lose their autonomy, abide by the personnel and organizational rules of the Syrian army and be integrated into it, with the militants to be granted the status of official servicemen.37
A Syrian official spoke frankly, essentially endorsing the abovementioned arguments of Mardasov and Semyonov, noting that “most of these militias” were involved in criminal activities, while they enjoyed power locally and were benefiting from the Iranian presence in Syria, so they had no interest in joining the army and losing these advantages.38While the Russians were highly skeptical of Iran’s approach and claimed that the pro-Iranian militias were in practice nowhere near as effective as the Iranians were touting, one Russian diplomat acknowledged that given the “state of affairs” and Iran’s active opposition to plans to rebuild the SAA, the chances of Russia’s plans succeeding were very low.39
Instead, the Iranians argued, the IRGC- or Hezbollah-like structure that they proposed, based on hybrid forces that were to be adaptable and capable of fighting asymmetrically, would be more cost-effective and could also protect Syria from external challenges (read: Turkey and Israel). The Syrian government always openly rejected the Iranian plan.40 Syrian critics argued that the militias supported by Iran performed poorly on logistics and coordination, pointing out essentially that the Iranians never came close to forming anything resembling a Syrian Hezbollah or Basij and that the Syrian militias sponsored by Iran often suffered from the same issues as the SAA, including corruption. The regime remained formally committed to the rehabilitation of the SAA.41 It might have been worried about Iranian influence more than anything else. Meanwhile, even an IRGC commander acknowledged that Iran’s plans for creating a Syrian Hizbullah or IRGC were never very realistic.
The Syrian government is not accepting that […] they have a weak army; they say we have a strong army, and they are totally against making an army like Hizbullah and Sepah Pasdaran, […] and they are saying that Syria will not let any kind of militia run part of the government now or in the future.42
The struggle for the Syrian armed forces
Iran and Russia did not just subscribe to different concepts of the state and to different approaches to fighting and state-building. There was at least another and possibly more important source of friction between Iran and Russia in Syria: the desire to expand their influence within the Syrian armed forces.
Russian and Iranian narratives
The Russian narrative explaining the poor performance of the Syrian armed forces was that the Syrians had promoted “a lot of useless people in the army.” According to a Russian adviser, the Russians pushed for what they deemed to be capable military leaders from militias such as Liwa al Quds, Liwa Zainabiyoun, Mukhtar army, Liwa Abu Al Fadhal Al Abbas and Liwa Al Imam Al Hussein to be appointed to the army, but the Syrians refused to do so. Note that apart from the Palestinian Liwa al Quds, the other militias named are all Shi’a militias linked to Iran. The source therefore implies that the Russians were not trying to get their own cronies appointed but actually sought to promote meritocracy. Following growing Russian pressure, according to the source, the Syrians agreed to restrain the tendency to promote incompetent cronies, which to some extent they reportedly did.43
The Iranians, by contrast, framed their resistance to expanding Russian influence in 2015-2019 in terms of the sacrifices made from 2011 onward, which entitled them to a dominant position:
The Iranians believe that they were the ones who sacrificed a lot in Syria, and therefore, they are trying to take over the army and foreign affairs of the Syrian government. […] At the beginning, we had several meetings with the Iranian Sepah Pasdaran, and even the Russian authorities met Qasim Sulimani at that time. Even Qasim Sulimani […] used to say, “As long as I am alive, I will take as much advantage as possible of our sacrifices in Syria.” So, yes, of course, the Russian authorities are irritated by the attitude of the Iranians all the time.44
The Iranian sacrifices were real. By March 2017, they had lost over 800 killed in Syria, including some senior officers. The total cost of the war up to that point was over $20 billion, causing discontent in Iran, where according to an Iranian diplomat “Except for the Pasdaran, no one else wants to be engaged in fighting in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. If Iranian Government does not stop fighting, big, big protests might start.” In February 2017, a Syrian delegation visited Teheran, asking for even more support. Not long before, another delegation, headed by Ali Mamlouk, had visited Teheran with the same aim. The Iranian government had granted an extra $2 billion.45
The Iranians clearly resented Russian demands as prevarication. In November 2017, an IRGC commander was so upset with the Russians that he stated
If we had understood at the beginning that Russia would reach such levels, we would have kept them out. Russia is trying to […] make Iran weaker [in Syria], [and] this is not acceptable to us. We are talking to Russia to get them to decrease their influence in Syria and do not create any problems for our strategies there. If Russia does not agree, then we are ready to react against Russia.46
The Russians, however, rejected the Iranian narrative, as they felt that having been dragged into the Syrian conflict by the Iranians themselves, they were entitled to a dominant position due to the decisive role they had played.47
The struggle for influence beneath the narratives
Whatever the actual reasons for their efforts to maintain their influence in Syria vis-à-vis Russia, the Iranians clearly aimed to stay in Syria for the long term, no matter what Russia might say. The Iranians’ arguments against folding the militias into the SAA were not purely technical (see Two models above). Faced with the Russians’ insistence that the NDF should be integrated into the army (because NDF units had the tendency not to respond to the MoD chain of command and were involved in numerous ceasefire violations), the Iranians retorted that they had invested massive sums in getting the militias up to scratch and were not going to see that investment lost.48 Iran’s opposition to integrating militias into the SAA was instrumental to its ability to out-network the Russians (and Damascus). As a Syrian officer put it,
The Iranians know that if [the militias] join the army, it would be hard for them to control them, and that will cause a lot of problems for them, even for them to lose their influence.49
Similarly, an IRGC source openly acknowledged that the Iranians refused to have reconciled opposition fighters integrated into the NDF (as proposed by the Russians), for fear that they could dilute Iran’s influence.50 The Russians viewed the Iranians as disingenuous when they claimed that militias were the key to winning the war and that Iranian control over the militias was necessary to ensure their proper functioning. The Russians noted that the Iranians were also intent on building influence at the top level of Syria’s military and intelligence apparatus, and especially with Assad’s brother Maher, despite their claims that the SAA was doomed.51 Once complete victory was achieved, said an Iranian diplomat in early 2017, the Syrian militiamen linked to the IRGC would get jobs in Syria’s ministries and armed forces.52 This would translate into Iranian influence over the Syrian state as a whole. The IRGC undoubtedly was leaning heavily on the Assad regime to have Syrian officers promoted and demoted, as both Syrian army and IRGC sources acknowledged.53
Whereas the Iranians were quite transparent about their priorities, according to Ambassador Michel Duclos, the Russians were saying off the record that reestablishing a strong Syrian army would be the best guarantee against Iranian influence and pro-Iranian militias.54 Mardasov wondered whether the entire stated Russian policy of building up the SAA at the expense of the militias was not rather an attempt to expand Moscow’s influence at the expense of Tehran. The fact that the Russians were also sponsoring some of the militias and continued to sponsor new ones well into the reform period would seem to undermine their “centralist” argument in favor of the SAA.55
Two strategies for gaining influence and a turning point in Russia’s favor
When the Russians deployed to Syria, Iran’s influence was predominant largely among the militias, by virtue of its early engagement with them, while Russia had stronger influence among SAA generals, most of whom were trained in Russia and Soviet Union,56 as well as over Syria’s air force, which the Iranians were not in a position to support.57 From the very start, when the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate established the first Shabiha militias, Iran’s relationship with the entity was well developed.58 The Iranians also brought their own allied militias from Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Almost all the foreign militias were aligned with Iran, or at least not with Russia.59 Instead, Russia reportedly relied on Soviet-era contacts established within the Baath party and in the SAA for spreading influence.60
According to sources within the Syrian armed forces, the first turning point in the race for influence between Iran and Russia was around 2017-2019. As of October 2017 most of the Iranian military advisers were with the Shi’a militias, and their number was declining, due to relations with the Assad regime being in decline, while the number of the Russian ones was increasing.61 By May 2019, according to a Syrian intelligence officer,
Now the Russians have the upper hand in Damascus. I mean Russian influence increased significantly in Syrian government military and civilian institutions. The reason is that Iranians are feeling weak due to their financial crisis. They’re no longer able to provide funding to the people who were linked to them some time ago. Now those people are aligned with the Russians because the Russians are providing support to them.62
The external perception was the same: the Russians were gaining influence in the military and security apparatus, managing to impose in 2019 a series of appointments of senior officers and officials of their liking.63 During this period, Assad followed Russian recommendations in making appointments, such as of Salim Harba as SAA chief of staff, establishing new units under its influence, such as the 5th Corps and 25th Division, and restructuring the Syrian army staff.64 There were also reports of arrests of pro-Iranian Syrian activists by Syrian security forces, “ordered by Russia.”65 Although there were Iranian advisers in the SAA, the Russians were absolutely predominant there after 2015. According to Russian military expert Semyonov, “There are Russian military advisors in almost every brigade and division of the Syrian army.”66 And although some Syrian army units were under stronger influence of Iran (4th Division, Republican Guard), even in the 4thDivision and in the Republican Guard the Russians were said to have a “large say”: “The Russians interfere at the command level, in major security issues, and in major disputes between the army and the militias supporting it.”67
By May 2017 the Russians had already reshaped the influence map considerably. Assad regime sources say that the General Intelligence Directorate was still under Iranian influence, as both its head, Mohammed Din Zaitoun, and his deputy Zouheir Hamad had close relations with Iran. The Military Intelligence Directorate was also under Iranian influence. Meanwhile, the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (the most powerful of the three intelligence directorates) had shifted closer to Russia. The Political Security Directorate was also somewhat close to Russia, despite Iran having some influence in it, as well.68 As of May 2017, the National Security Office was split between Russia and Iran, with six of its members (Ahmad Diyab, Abdel Fatah, Jawdat Salibi Mawwas, General Nasr Al Ali, Commander Mohammad Ibrahim and Ali Hassan Turkmani) considered to be linked to Russia and another five believed to be close to Iran (Ali Mamlouk, Lina Kenaya, Lula Al Shebal, Naji al Ahmad and Abdul Abdul).69
The Russians did invest relatively significant human resources in training and advising militias: as of early 2018, a regime source counted 200 Russian trainers and advisers there. However, the effort looks puny when compared to Iran’s: 1,800 trainers and advisers, supported by 450 from Hezbollah.70 Russia’s influence among Syrian militias was limited to a few of them, such as the ISIS Hunters.71 Some Russian-sponsored militias were ad hoc and did not represent a long-term investment. For example, to reduce the risk of Iranian-sponsored efforts to disrupt new local reconciliation deals, the Russians sponsored the creation of a temporary militia known as the Armed Unified Command-Unit in eastern Qalamoun. The unit was meant to gather reconciled opposition members, until the time was ripe for the SAA to move in and take over.72
The Iranians were sufficiently dominant at the local level that they could strengthen their influence by simply creating new militias. In early 2018 the IRGC sponsored the creation of new militias in southern Syria,73 possibly because it hoped to circumvent the ban on expanding the ranks of existing militias, exploiting Assad’s desire to consolidate his position in the south. At least three new militias were formed in the south, one with direct IRGC support (Battalion 313) and two with Hezbollah support (Companions of Imam Mahdi 313 and Katain Al Imam).74 The Iranians remained totally predominant among foreign militias, although Russia developed close links to the Palestinian Liwa al Quds.75
Even after the first turning point in the competition for influence, there were always relatively minor fluctuations in the spheres of influence. For example, in later years, the General Intelligence Directorate and the Military Intelligence Directorate were reported to have edged closer to Russia.76 Similarly, Russia established relatively strong influence over 5th and 4th Assault Corps when they were formed in 2015-2016, but Iran and Hezbollah later managed to build up substantial influence within both.77
In sum, the Iranians seemingly competed with Russia even for influence in the regular armed forces, while still pursuing its strategy with the militias.78 Similarly, the Russians focused on the regular armed forces but also sought to establish a foothold among the militias. The Russians committed limited resources (human and financial), while exploiting opportunities as they arose. For example, Moscow sought to exploit Iran’s rivalry with Israel by attracting militiamen into the Russian-controlled 5th Corps from pro-Iranian militias that had allegedly been weakened by repeated Israeli airstrikes on their positions. Local sources indicated that the risk of Israeli airstrikes was making the Iranians unpopular in Deir ez Zor.79 Similarly, it was reported that the Russians asserted control over the Damascus and Aleppo airports as Israeli strikes on IRGC positions there made Iranian control unpractical.80 Another example is that of Liwa al Quds. The Palestinian militia was initially supported by the IRGC and Hezbollah before falling under Russian influence, due in part to sectarian Shi’a-Sunni tensions, until Iranian influence started asserting itself again at the time of Russia’s deepening preoccupation with Ukraine.81
Where the Iranian and Russian approaches differed was the type of Syrian counterparts they chose. Even when Iran and Russia were well past the peak of their presence on the ground, the Russians had more advisers to the regular Syrian forces than the Iranians, who only had 47 in total.82 Nonetheless, these few IRGC advisers were quite active, regularly visiting the MoD and being present at the tactical level as well, still taking part in operations in 2023-2024.83 In general, the Iranians seemed more determined than the Russians to work at the grassroots level. The Iranians main stronghold in the SAA was Maher al Assad’s 4thDivision.84
The Russians held the advantage in terms of access to the top levels of the MoD and of the state, as they were able to provide, in the words of one Syrian officer, “more competent” military advisers, who in fact ended up doing much of the SAA’s planning. The IRGC advisers were less able in this regard, which is not surprising given the IRGC’s specialization in asymmetric and nonconventional operations.85 This aligns with a comment by a Russian diplomat that “Iran is unable to advise the Syrian government on a global scale,” drawing a contrast with the Russians. The Russians focused on high-ranking officials, such as the president of Syria, heads of intelligence and high-ranking generals, while the Iranian advisers operated at lower levels. The Russian diplomat also agreed that “Most of the time, the Syrians feel more comfortable with the Iranians on a daily basis.”86 A kind of uneasy division of labor came to develop, at least as far as the work of the advisers was concerned.
The Ukraine conflict: A turning point in Iran’s favor
The second key turning point in the competition for influence between Iran and Russia was in 2023-2024, when Russian influence collapsed, to the benefit of both the Syrian government, which took control of both 5thCorps and 25th Special Task Division (STD),87 and the Iranians.
The Russian presence in Syria declined after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Russian support for the Syrian armed forces also declined, especially from the end of 2023, probably more due to the efforts of the Assad regime to assert its control over SAA units and militias previously patronized by Russia, than to the engagement in Ukraine. Inevitably this translated into reduced influence.88 Most of the militias once linked to Russia started turning to the Assad regime, which, however, lacked resources, and to the IRGC.89
The Iranians saw Russia’s entanglement in Ukraine as an opportunity for further expanding their influence over the militias:
If the Russians do not support the armed forces, and if the Russians are not there for the militias, it is clear enough that the Islamic Republic of Iran would have a greater chance of [exerting] influence over Syria as the Syrian government and militias both would need our support. […] The decline of Russian influence is a positive development for Iran’s point of view. […] The Islamic Republic of Iran would be happy if the Russian influence in Syria declined.90
According to one of its commanders, the IRGC in 2024 allocated an extra $100 million of funding to militias in Syria for this purpose. The IRGC even sought to establish its influence over such a key Russian client as the 8th Brigade, whose creation it had once so bitterly resisted. This did not come easy, but the IRGC reportedly managed to establish relations with some 8th Brigade commanders, having spent $10 million.91
For the Iranians, the militias remained the primary focus, as they remained distrustful of the capabilities of the SAA.92 However, during 2024 the IRGC was very active trying to get “their people” in the Syrian armed forces promoted, reversing years of Russian gains.93 Iran’s growing influence was confirmed by a Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official:
While the Russians are busy carrying out the special operation in Ukraine and losing their influence in Syria, the Iranians, on the other hand, are getting closer and closer to the armed forces by providing funds and supplies, and at the same time, the Iranians are getting closer to the Syrian government, as there is enough of a gap now between the Russians and the Syrian officials. […] The Iranians are trying and doing more to influence the Syrian government.94
Two Syrian military sources acknowledged that Iranian influence was growing as a result, especially among the militias. After the start of the Gaza crisis, moreover, the IRGC started reinforcing its own presence in Syria as well.95 Even a Palestinian militiaman, despite his group’s closeness to Russia, expected Iranian influence and power to keep growing as long as Russia was engaged in Ukraine, with the Gaza conflict only magnifying Iran’s role.96 One source regularly in contact with regime officials noted at the end of 2023 that around 10 different sources and interviewees all confirmed to him that Iran was expanding its influence and power among Syrian governmental forces, militias and security departments after Russia got involved in Ukraine.97 The Iranians also benefited from the fact that after the war in Ukraine started, the Russians gave up on lobbying the Iranians on behalf of Damascus, asking the Syrians instead to deal with the IRGC directly.98
In 2023 Russian sources were clear that there was resentment among the Russians that the Iranians were becoming very assertive in trying to advance their interests in Syria, even though Russia still contributed significantly more than Iran did to supporting the regime.99 This tension was reduced after the Russians, distracted by the war in Ukraine, largely gave up on Aleppo, which had been a focal point of intra-militia and Russia-Iran confrontation. In Deir Ez Zor, Russian influence was sustained after the war in Ukraine started, but in Aleppo it nearly vanished.100 As a Syrian official put it in late 2023, Russia accepted Iranian influence in Syria and was no longer trying to eradicate or contain it; the Russians were now seeing Iran as a key ally.101 As the Russians were no longer interested or able to compete effectively with the Iranians, cooperation between the two countries on Syria actually became easier (see Condemned to cooperation below).102
How the long struggle for influence ended
Condemned to cooperation
At the start of the Russian intervention in Syria, cooperation between Iran and Russia was described as good by Syrian and Iranian sources. A center was established to facilitate coordination between the Russian, Iranians and Syrians.103 There was also coordination between Russia and Iran at the ministerial level and operational level and among senior officials.104 Airstrikes were coordinated, as were logistics, operations and intelligence.105 An IRGC source confirmed in February 2016 that Russia was also providing arms and support even to Hezbollah in Syria.106 In early 2016 the assessment of an IRGC colonel claimed that “There is great coordination between Russian advisers, our advisers and Assad’s advisers.”107
Gradually, even Syrian and Iranian sources started acknowledging that the relationship had become more competitive.108 Relations between Russia and Iran and their proxies deteriorated as they competed for influence – on the ground and with the Syrian regime.109 However, efforts to foster collaboration between Russian and Iranian proxies and allies were never abandoned. A conflict resolution commission was set up by Syria, Iran and Russia to ease friction from within the ranks of the alliance. It was composed of special representatives appointed by each side.110 Coordinating was hard work, however. Liwa al Quds again provides an example of this. Tension over the group kept escalating for years. It was kept out of the LDF, although it cooperated closely with it for a period, under the coordination of the intelligence services. In 2016, however, the Russian advisers took over and told Liwa al Quds to stop cooperating with the LDF, presumably to keep the group away from the increasingly Iran-influenced LDF.111 A senior figure in Liwa al Quds pointed out that the Russians, Iranians and Hezbollah initially agreed in a meeting over the transition to hand control over to the Russians. However, this deal collapsed when the tension and conflicts between the Russians-backed groups, Iran’s IRGC and Hezbollah-backed forces emerged, centering on the partition of territorial control in Aleppo city and Deir Ez Zor in 2019. At that point, Maher al Assad had to mediate between the Russians, Hezbollah and IRGC.112 One commander in Liwa al Quds stated that the clashes with pro-Iranian groups were due to sectarian tensions, with Shi’a groups accusing Sunni ones of disloyalty, but he acknowledged that competition over territory was also a big issue.113 A new understanding was reached, according to a senior member of the militia, and by 2022 neither the IRGC nor Hezbollah objected anymore to Russian support for Liwa al Quds (weapons, funds or training). However, alongside the Russians, Iranian advisers were still posted with Liwa, as were Hezbollah’s.114
Russian commentators criticized the August 2018 military cooperation agreement between Iran and Syria as bound to lead to more Syrian dependence on Iran and more direct Iranian influence inside Syria.115 These attitudes betrayed a high level of sensitivity about Iranian influence. In reality, as Mardasov and Semyonov noted, Russia’s influence over the “Syrian power apparatus” and its ability to replace Iranian influence with its own was “nothing more than an outright exaggeration.”116 Russia did not want to occupy a dominant position in the power structures in Damascus or contain Iran’s influence in Syria, because either option would be too expensive financially and politically.117 On the Iranian side, according to a commander in an IRGC-linked militia, it was acknowledged that it had been primarily the Russian advisers who worked to get the SAA back on its feet.118 The IRGC was the least keen to admit the degree to which the Russians and Iranians were interdependent – as late as March 2023 one IRGC representative stated that “We do not like the Russians at all, because they are bad for our future and our interests,”but even heacknowledged that the Russians were crucial to Syria: “They continue to assist the Syrian air and ground forces directly, offering better military strategy, better combat tactics and better political training to the army.”119 Iranian, Russian and even Hezbollah advisers often worked side by side in the same units.120
Neither Russia nor Iran aimed to crush each other’s influence and assert a monopoly over the Assad regime. The two sides were testing the opportunities for expanding their influence. According to a Russian military adviser, there was always the option of falling back to a partition of zones of influence between Russia and Iran, with the Russians focusing on the SAA and air force, and the Iranians on the militias.121
The conditions for fuller cooperation came into place when it became clear that Russia was deeply entangled in Ukraine, by 2023-2024. Indeed, despite all the competition and the frictions, the Russians, Iranians and Syrians tended to agree that the two allies of the Assad regime by 2024 were again working together, even describing each other as “good allies.”122 A Russian diplomat in January 2024 described Russia’s plans for the coming months as including cooperation and intelligence sharing with Iran.123 Another Russian diplomat agreed in October that coordination never stopped and explained that while the Russian and Iranian governments had different views, they were good allies with distinct objectives.124 A Syrian intelligence officer assessed that
They still have arguments, and they both still have their own goals, but at the end of the day, they both have the same goal in Syria; they both have to win in Syria. Therefore, their relations are not that bad, and most of the time they are supporting each other and working together.125
A Syrian army officer described the relationship as one of competition within Syria and of effective cooperation against external threats, with regular coordination meetings between the Iranians and Russians in Syria.126 The improvement in relations between the Iranians and the Russians was likely both due to the realization of the growing risk of instability and due to Russia’s pragmatism. It turned out, however, that Iran was not up to the task.
Iran’s failure to fill the gap
For all of the IRGC’s optimism about expanding its influence in the wake of Russian downsizing in 2023-2024, the Iranians clearly did not have sufficient resources available. As a result, the Iranians had less success with the SAA than with the militias, and some units, like the 25th STD, remained impermeable to their influence, despite the Russians losing control over it.127
A Russian diplomat, a Syrian military intelligence officer and an SAA officer all believed that the IRGC’s claims were overstated and that Russian influence, while declining, would not wither completely, noting that the Russians still had advisors and were still providing money and logistics.128 That was likely true, but mainly because the IRGC’s extra resources, as discussed above, were an order of magnitude smaller than Russia’s cuts. The Russians by 2024 had cut their financial commitments by $1.7 billion,129 while Iran, as discussed above, added $100 million. The Iranians did not deploy much extra manpower either. As the collapse of the regime approached, one year after the beginning of the Gaza crisis, the IRGC had only 1,500 men in Syria. Despite talks of remobilization of the foreign militias, as of July 2024, there were (according to a Syrian military source) 7,000 men in the ranks of Hezbollah, 3,000 men in the Afghan Fatimiyun, 1,000 in the Pakistani Zainabyun and some 2,000 Iraqis and Yemenis of various groups, for a total of about 13,000 men. This was a major reduction compared to the peak years of the civil war, when the foreign militias reached a peak manpower in Syria of 37,400 men in April 2018, according to a source within the Assad regime.130 The Iranians’ attempts to increase numbers were hampered by Hezbollah cutting its own numbers in Syria due to the confrontation with Israel.131
Thus, the rather unanimous assessment of Iran steadily expanding its influence at the expense of Russia did not signify optimism. The Syrians were doubtful about the regime’s ability to survive a crisis without extensive Russian support.132 Moreover, a Russian officer noted that some militias were behaving increasingly autonomously, not only in relation to Russia but also to Iran, and warned that problems should be expected in and around Latakia.133 As of late 2023, the Assad regime was already experiencing renewed friction with Iran and Hezbollah about the militias, since its leverage vis-à-vis Teheran had been reduced by Russia’s retrenchment.134 In the words of a Syrian general, we find signs of disappointment for Russia’s declining commitment:
The Russians have nothing to give, so they cannot gain ground among Syrian officers, particularly the Alawite ones. Two years ago, the Russians were talking about getting the Iranians out of Syria and control the country alone, but now the Russians need support and help from Iran and its militias in Syria and even in Ukraine.135
Conclusion
The Iran-Russia coalition in Syria appears to have been formed haphazardly in 2015. Its improvised character is apparent from the lack of agreement on any strategic plan beyond the commitment of Russian air power to the conflict. Perhaps this was inevitable, given the big gap separating the countries’ strategic, military and political cultures. The Russians arrived with their own state-building plan, centered around rebuilding the SAA. That might have been neither realistic nor sound, but the Iranian plan was no less dubious: it involved creating a network of armed groups that Iran would help mold into a kind of Syrian Hezbollah before forcing the Baathist state into a new ruling coalition, deeply reshaping the pre-2011 Syrian regime. By 2024, there was little sign that a Syrian Hezbollah was even at an embryonic stage of development. As one Russian interviewee noted, it would have been conceivable for Russia and Iran to agree on separate spheres of action so as to minimize friction. But that was not done until 2023-2024, and even then mainly because the Russians were dramatically downsizing their contribution.
The Russians showed greater pragmatism than the Iranians. Once it became clear that their original plan – pregnant with assumptions about what a proper Syrian state should and could look like – could not work, they shifted toward an approach that looked much like Iran’s, that is, building up a network of armed groups and military leaders. Unlike the Iranians, however, it does not appear that the Russians were under any illusion that this approach was a route to state-building of any kind. The Russians tried other routes to end the conflict, such as diplomacy and political reconciliation, which have not been discussed here. As all those seemed to falter, Moscow might have started seeing the Assad regime as a burden unlikely to yield more than the preservation of Russian bases in the country.
Iran’s own plan for state-building failed rather dramatically in Syria. The Iranians proved quite effective at network building, which is not surprising given their past experience in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen and given their arrival on the Syrian scene years ahead of the Russians. The Russians proved quite resilient competitors, however, not least thanks to their superior resources. When the Russians gave way from 2023 onward, the Iranians failed to make any progress toward their end goal.
We know, of course, how it all ended. The Russians had virtually no assets on the ground at the end of 2024, but the Iranians and their foreign militias had almost 15,000 battle-tested men, not counting Syrian groups linked to the IRGC. The size of the attacking opposition force was by all accounts not much larger. Efforts to bring reinforcements from Iraq failed, and the Iranians and their allies gave up on the fights early on – during the fighting for Aleppo, which they had contested first with the opposition and then with the Russians for long years. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn is that while the Russians and Iranians spent a lot of energy competing with each other, their undoing was their failure to figure out a way to address the crucial weaknesses of the Assad regime.
The Russians held the advantage in terms of access to the top levels of the MoD and of the state, as they were able to provide, in the words of one Syrian officer, “more competent” military advisers, who in fact ended up doing much of the SAA’s planning. The IRGC advisers were less able in this regard, which is not surprising given the IRGC’s specialization in asymmetric and nonconventional operations.85 This aligns with a comment by a Russian diplomat that “Iran is unable to advise the Syrian government on a global scale,” drawing a contrast with the Russians. The Russians focused on high-ranking officials, such as the president of Syria, heads of intelligence and high-ranking generals, while the Iranian advisers operated at lower levels. The Russian diplomat also agreed that “Most of the time, the Syrians feel more comfortable with the Iranians on a daily basis.”86 A kind of uneasy division of labor came to develop, at least as far as the work of the advisers was concerned.
The Ukraine conflict: A turning point in Iran’s favor
The second key turning point in the competition for influence between Iran and Russia was in 2023-2024, when Russian influence collapsed, to the benefit of both the Syrian government, which took control of both 5thCorps and 25th Special Task Division (STD),87 and the Iranians.
The Russian presence in Syria declined after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Russian support for the Syrian armed forces also declined, especially from the end of 2023, probably more due to the efforts of the Assad regime to assert its control over SAA units and militias previously patronized by Russia, than to the engagement in Ukraine. Inevitably this translated into reduced influence.88 Most of the militias once linked to Russia started turning to the Assad regime, which, however, lacked resources, and to the IRGC.89
The Iranians saw Russia’s entanglement in Ukraine as an opportunity for further expanding their influence over the militias:
If the Russians do not support the armed forces, and if the Russians are not there for the militias, it is clear enough that the Islamic Republic of Iran would have a greater chance of [exerting] influence over Syria as the Syrian government and militias both would need our support. […] The decline of Russian influence is a positive development for Iran’s point of view. […] The Islamic Republic of Iran would be happy if the Russian influence in Syria declined.90
According to one of its commanders, the IRGC in 2024 allocated an extra $100 million of funding to militias in Syria for this purpose. The IRGC even sought to establish its influence over such a key Russian client as the 8th Brigade, whose creation it had once so bitterly resisted. This did not come easy, but the IRGC reportedly managed to establish relations with some 8th Brigade commanders, having spent $10 million.91
For the Iranians, the militias remained the primary focus, as they remained distrustful of the capabilities of the SAA.92 However, during 2024 the IRGC was very active trying to get “their people” in the Syrian armed forces promoted, reversing years of Russian gains.93 Iran’s growing influence was confirmed by a Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official:
While the Russians are busy carrying out the special operation in Ukraine and losing their influence in Syria, the Iranians, on the other hand, are getting closer and closer to the armed forces by providing funds and supplies, and at the same time, the Iranians are getting closer to the Syrian government, as there is enough of a gap now between the Russians and the Syrian officials. […] The Iranians are trying and doing more to influence the Syrian government.94
Two Syrian military sources acknowledged that Iranian influence was growing as a result, especially among the militias. After the start of the Gaza crisis, moreover, the IRGC started reinforcing its own presence in Syria as well.95 Even a Palestinian militiaman, despite his group’s closeness to Russia, expected Iranian influence and power to keep growing as long as Russia was engaged in Ukraine, with the Gaza conflict only magnifying Iran’s role.96 One source regularly in contact with regime officials noted at the end of 2023 that around 10 different sources and interviewees all confirmed to him that Iran was expanding its influence and power among Syrian governmental forces, militias and security departments after Russia got involved in Ukraine.97 The Iranians also benefited from the fact that after the war in Ukraine started, the Russians gave up on lobbying the Iranians on behalf of Damascus, asking the Syrians instead to deal with the IRGC directly.98
In 2023 Russian sources were clear that there was resentment among the Russians that the Iranians were becoming very assertive in trying to advance their interests in Syria, even though Russia still contributed significantly more than Iran did to supporting the regime.99 This tension was reduced after the Russians, distracted by the war in Ukraine, largely gave up on Aleppo, which had been a focal point of intra-militia and Russia-Iran confrontation. In Deir Ez Zor, Russian influence was sustained after the war in Ukraine started, but in Aleppo it nearly vanished.100 As a Syrian official put it in late 2023, Russia accepted Iranian influence in Syria and was no longer trying to eradicate or contain it; the Russians were now seeing Iran as a key ally.101 As the Russians were no longer interested or able to compete effectively with the Iranians, cooperation between the two countries on Syria actually became easier (see Condemned to cooperation below).102
How the long struggle for influence ended
Condemned to cooperation
At the start of the Russian intervention in Syria, cooperation between Iran and Russia was described as good by Syrian and Iranian sources. A center was established to facilitate coordination between the Russian, Iranians and Syrians.103 There was also coordination between Russia and Iran at the ministerial level and operational level and among senior officials.104 Airstrikes were coordinated, as were logistics, operations and intelligence.105 An IRGC source confirmed in February 2016 that Russia was also providing arms and support even to Hezbollah in Syria.106 In early 2016 the assessment of an IRGC colonel claimed that “There is great coordination between Russian advisers, our advisers and Assad’s advisers.”107
Gradually, even Syrian and Iranian sources started acknowledging that the relationship had become more competitive.108 Relations between Russia and Iran and their proxies deteriorated as they competed for influence – on the ground and with the Syrian regime.109 However, efforts to foster collaboration between Russian and Iranian proxies and allies were never abandoned. A conflict resolution commission was set up by Syria, Iran and Russia to ease friction from within the ranks of the alliance. It was composed of special representatives appointed by each side.110 Coordinating was hard work, however. Liwa al Quds again provides an example of this. Tension over the group kept escalating for years. It was kept out of the LDF, although it cooperated closely with it for a period, under the coordination of the intelligence services. In 2016, however, the Russian advisers took over and told Liwa al Quds to stop cooperating with the LDF, presumably to keep the group away from the increasingly Iran-influenced LDF.111 A senior figure in Liwa al Quds pointed out that the Russians, Iranians and Hezbollah initially agreed in a meeting over the transition to hand control over to the Russians. However, this deal collapsed when the tension and conflicts between the Russians-backed groups, Iran’s IRGC and Hezbollah-backed forces emerged, centering on the partition of territorial control in Aleppo city and Deir Ez Zor in 2019. At that point, Maher al Assad had to mediate between the Russians, Hezbollah and IRGC.112 One commander in Liwa al Quds stated that the clashes with pro-Iranian groups were due to sectarian tensions, with Shi’a groups accusing Sunni ones of disloyalty, but he acknowledged that competition over territory was also a big issue.113 A new understanding was reached, according to a senior member of the militia, and by 2022 neither the IRGC nor Hezbollah objected anymore to Russian support for Liwa al Quds (weapons, funds or training). However, alongside the Russians, Iranian advisers were still posted with Liwa, as were Hezbollah’s.114
Russian commentators criticized the August 2018 military cooperation agreement between Iran and Syria as bound to lead to more Syrian dependence on Iran and more direct Iranian influence inside Syria.115 These attitudes betrayed a high level of sensitivity about Iranian influence. In reality, as Mardasov and Semyonov noted, Russia’s influence over the “Syrian power apparatus” and its ability to replace Iranian influence with its own was “nothing more than an outright exaggeration.”116 Russia did not want to occupy a dominant position in the power structures in Damascus or contain Iran’s influence in Syria, because either option would be too expensive financially and politically.117 On the Iranian side, according to a commander in an IRGC-linked militia, it was acknowledged that it had been primarily the Russian advisers who worked to get the SAA back on its feet.118 The IRGC was the least keen to admit the degree to which the Russians and Iranians were interdependent – as late as March 2023 one IRGC representative stated that “We do not like the Russians at all, because they are bad for our future and our interests,”but even heacknowledged that the Russians were crucial to Syria: “They continue to assist the Syrian air and ground forces directly, offering better military strategy, better combat tactics and better political training to the army.”119 Iranian, Russian and even Hezbollah advisers often worked side by side in the same units.120
Neither Russia nor Iran aimed to crush each other’s influence and assert a monopoly over the Assad regime. The two sides were testing the opportunities for expanding their influence. According to a Russian military adviser, there was always the option of falling back to a partition of zones of influence between Russia and Iran, with the Russians focusing on the SAA and air force, and the Iranians on the militias.121
The conditions for fuller cooperation came into place when it became clear that Russia was deeply entangled in Ukraine, by 2023-2024. Indeed, despite all the competition and the frictions, the Russians, Iranians and Syrians tended to agree that the two allies of the Assad regime by 2024 were again working together, even describing each other as “good allies.”122 A Russian diplomat in January 2024 described Russia’s plans for the coming months as including cooperation and intelligence sharing with Iran.123 Another Russian diplomat agreed in October that coordination never stopped and explained that while the Russian and Iranian governments had different views, they were good allies with distinct objectives.124 A Syrian intelligence officer assessed that
They still have arguments, and they both still have their own goals, but at the end of the day, they both have the same goal in Syria; they both have to win in Syria. Therefore, their relations are not that bad, and most of the time they are supporting each other and working together.125
A Syrian army officer described the relationship as one of competition within Syria and of effective cooperation against external threats, with regular coordination meetings between the Iranians and Russians in Syria.126 The improvement in relations between the Iranians and the Russians was likely both due to the realization of the growing risk of instability and due to Russia’s pragmatism. It turned out, however, that Iran was not up to the task.
Iran’s failure to fill the gap
For all of the IRGC’s optimism about expanding its influence in the wake of Russian downsizing in 2023-2024, the Iranians clearly did not have sufficient resources available. As a result, the Iranians had less success with the SAA than with the militias, and some units, like the 25th STD, remained impermeable to their influence, despite the Russians losing control over it.127
A Russian diplomat, a Syrian military intelligence officer and an SAA officer all believed that the IRGC’s claims were overstated and that Russian influence, while declining, would not wither completely, noting that the Russians still had advisors and were still providing money and logistics.128 That was likely true, but mainly because the IRGC’s extra resources, as discussed above, were an order of magnitude smaller than Russia’s cuts. The Russians by 2024 had cut their financial commitments by $1.7 billion,129 while Iran, as discussed above, added $100 million. The Iranians did not deploy much extra manpower either. As the collapse of the regime approached, one year after the beginning of the Gaza crisis, the IRGC had only 1,500 men in Syria. Despite talks of remobilization of the foreign militias, as of July 2024, there were (according to a Syrian military source) 7,000 men in the ranks of Hezbollah, 3,000 men in the Afghan Fatimiyun, 1,000 in the Pakistani Zainabyun and some 2,000 Iraqis and Yemenis of various groups, for a total of about 13,000 men. This was a major reduction compared to the peak years of the civil war, when the foreign militias reached a peak manpower in Syria of 37,400 men in April 2018, according to a source within the Assad regime.130 The Iranians’ attempts to increase numbers were hampered by Hezbollah cutting its own numbers in Syria due to the confrontation with Israel.131
Thus, the rather unanimous assessment of Iran steadily expanding its influence at the expense of Russia did not signify optimism. The Syrians were doubtful about the regime’s ability to survive a crisis without extensive Russian support.132 Moreover, a Russian officer noted that some militias were behaving increasingly autonomously, not only in relation to Russia but also to Iran, and warned that problems should be expected in and around Latakia.133 As of late 2023, the Assad regime was already experiencing renewed friction with Iran and Hezbollah about the militias, since its leverage vis-à-vis Teheran had been reduced by Russia’s retrenchment.134 In the words of a Syrian general, we find signs of disappointment for Russia’s declining commitment:
The Russians have nothing to give, so they cannot gain ground among Syrian officers, particularly the Alawite ones. Two years ago, the Russians were talking about getting the Iranians out of Syria and control the country alone, but now the Russians need support and help from Iran and its militias in Syria and even in Ukraine.135
Conclusion
The Iran-Russia coalition in Syria appears to have been formed haphazardly in 2015. Its improvised character is apparent from the lack of agreement on any strategic plan beyond the commitment of Russian air power to the conflict. Perhaps this was inevitable, given the big gap separating the countries’ strategic, military and political cultures. The Russians arrived with their own state-building plan, centered around rebuilding the SAA. That might have been neither realistic nor sound, but the Iranian plan was no less dubious: it involved creating a network of armed groups that Iran would help mold into a kind of Syrian Hezbollah before forcing the Baathist state into a new ruling coalition, deeply reshaping the pre-2011 Syrian regime. By 2024, there was little sign that a Syrian Hezbollah was even at an embryonic stage of development. As one Russian interviewee noted, it would have been conceivable for Russia and Iran to agree on separate spheres of action so as to minimize friction. But that was not done until 2023-2024, and even then mainly because the Russians were dramatically downsizing their contribution.
The Russians showed greater pragmatism than the Iranians. Once it became clear that their original plan – pregnant with assumptions about what a proper Syrian state should and could look like – could not work, they shifted toward an approach that looked much like Iran’s, that is, building up a network of armed groups and military leaders. Unlike the Iranians, however, it does not appear that the Russians were under any illusion that this approach was a route to state-building of any kind. The Russians tried other routes to end the conflict, such as diplomacy and political reconciliation, which have not been discussed here. As all those seemed to falter, Moscow might have started seeing the Assad regime as a burden unlikely to yield more than the preservation of Russian bases in the country.
Iran’s own plan for state-building failed rather dramatically in Syria. The Iranians proved quite effective at network building, which is not surprising given their past experience in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen and given their arrival on the Syrian scene years ahead of the Russians. The Russians proved quite resilient competitors, however, not least thanks to their superior resources. When the Russians gave way from 2023 onward, the Iranians failed to make any progress toward their end goal.
We know, of course, how it all ended. The Russians had virtually no assets on the ground at the end of 2024, but the Iranians and their foreign militias had almost 15,000 battle-tested men, not counting Syrian groups linked to the IRGC. The size of the attacking opposition force was by all accounts not much larger. Efforts to bring reinforcements from Iraq failed, and the Iranians and their allies gave up on the fights early on – during the fighting for Aleppo, which they had contested first with the opposition and then with the Russians for long years. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn is that while the Russians and Iranians spent a lot of energy competing with each other, their undoing was their failure to figure out a way to address the crucial weaknesses of the Assad regime.
Grajewski, N. (2021, November 17). The evolution of Russian and Iranian cooperation in Syria. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Lister, C. (2019, September 12). Russia, Iran, and the competition to shape Syria’s future. Middle East Institute.
Ibrahim, H., al-Mahmoud, H., & Karazi, H. (2024, August 22). Syrian regime stuck between two allies: Russia and Iran, economic and military rivals in Syria. Enab Baladi.
Hage Ali, M. (2019, March 29). Power points defining the Syria-Hezbollah relationship. Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/29/power-points-defining-syria-hezbollah-relationship-pub- 78730; Al-Souria.net. (2016, January 4). Ṣirāʿ khafī bayna jaysh niẓām al-Assad wa milīshiyāt ”al-difāʿ al-waṭanī” fī Ḥimṣ [Hidden conflict between Assad regime army and National Defense militias in Homs]. صراع-خفي-بين-جيش-نظام-الأسد-وميليشيا-الدفاع-الوطني-في-حمص/https://www.alsouria.net/content
O. Peri and H. Varulkar, ‘Struggle Between Russia, Iran For Control Over Syria's Centers Of Power’, MEMRI, September 23, 2019 Inquiry & Analysis Series No. 1475; Ambassador Michel Duclos, ‘Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance? An interim report’, Atlantic Council, June 2019.
‘How is Russia working to prevent the presence of Iranian influence on the Syrian coast’, Orient Net, 8 May 2019.
Interview with *AM*, GID officer in Damascus, May 2018.
Interview with 25th Division officer in Hama Province, October 2023.
Interview questions for Russian officer operating in Aleppo, April 2023
Interview with Liwa al-Quds’ commander, August 2022; Interview with Liwa al-Quds’ member, Aleppo, July 2022.
Interview with Russian MP officer, Latakia, July 2023.
Grajewski, cit.
Interview with Fatimiyun commander in Deir Ez Zor, 7 November 2017.
Interview with Russian military adviser, March 2024.
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria, October 2024.
Interview with IRGC colonel, adviser to the NDF, Damascus, January 2018
Interview with IRGC officer in Aleppo, March 2023.
Interview with *H*, IRGC commander, November 2017.
Interview with *B, Syrian Military intelligence [SMI] officer, May 2019.
Interview with O***, senior Syrian government official, Damascus, 5 May 2017.
Grajewski, cit.
Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Russia and the Collapse of the Assad Regime’, Russia Program, George Washington University, Academic Policy Paper Series, no. 8, February 2025.
Interview with colonel **J who is an advisor for Syrian Government and Fatimyun group, 6 February 2017.
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate, July 2024; Interview with IRGC commander, Syria, July 2024; Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2024; Interview with Syrian army officer, August 2024; Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate, July 2024.
Vladimir Sazhin, ‘Russia and Iran in Syria’, Modern Diplomacy, 9 November 2020.
Ofira Seliktar • Farhad Rezaei, Iran, Revolution, and Proxy Wars, Palgrave 2020, 192?.
Interview with Syrian officer, 8th brigade of 5th corps, April 2024.
Mahmood Shoori, ‘The Future of the Middle East: the Battle of Wills Continues. The Iranian Point of View, in Andrey Kortunov et al (eds), ‘Russia and Iran in Syria and Beyond: Challenges Ahead’, Working Paper No 59/2020, Moscow : Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), 2020, p. 10.
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria, July 2024.
Interview with *A* who works in legal and international affairs of the ministry of foreign affairs of Iran, 22 March 2017.
Igor Delanoë, cit., p. 143.
Interview with *A* who works in legal and international affairs of the ministry of foreign affairs of Iran, 22 March 2017; Interview with Colonel **R, IRGC adviser and trainer of Fatimiyun, 1 December 2016; Interview with General N*, Iranian army, Syria, 19 January 2016.
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria, July 2024.
Interview with Colonel **R, IRGC adviser and trainer of Fatimiyun, 1 December 2016.
Leenders and Giustozzi, cit.
Anton Mardasov , Kirill Semyonov, ‘Russia without Assad’, Riddle, 15 May 2020.
Anton Mardasov, Why Russia’s grip on Syrian military is weaker than it seems, Al Monitor, 21 April 2020.
Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 2023.
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria, October 2024.
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate, July 2024; Interview with IRGC commander, Syria, July 2024; Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2024; Interview with Syrian army officer, August 2024.
Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2024; Interview with Syrian army officer, August 2024.
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria, July 2024.
Interview with Russian military adviser, March 2024.
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria, January 2024.
Interview with *A* who works in legal and international affairs of the ministry of foreign affairs of Iran, 22 March 2017; Interview with colonel **J who is an advisor for Syrian Government and Fatimyun group, 6 February 2017.
Interview with *H*, IRGC commander, November 2017.
Lt Gen Chvarkov, quoted in Vladimir Sazhin, ‘Russia and Iran in Syria’, Modern Diplomacy, 9 November 2020.
Interview with Colonel **R, IRGC adviser and trainer of Fatimiyun, 1 December 2016.
Interview with Syrian officer, 8th brigade of 5th corps, April 2024.
Interview with Colonel **R, IRGC adviser and trainer of Fatimiyun, 1 December 2016.
Vladimir Sazhin, ‘Russia and Iran in Syria’, Modern Diplomacy, 9 November 2020.
Interview with *A* who works in legal and international affairs of the ministry of foreign affairs of Iran, 22 March 2017.
Interview with Colonel A* in Syria, IRGC adviser, 23 Feb 2016; Interview with commander *MH, IRGC, Syria, 21 February 2016; Interview Colonel S**, IRGC, Syria, 20 Jan 2016.
Duclos, cit., p. 4.
Anton Mardasov, Why Russia’s grip on Syrian military is weaker than it seems, Al Monitor, 21 April 2020.
Interview with a 55-year-old Alawite general who works in the Ministry of Defence HQs in Damascus, LP December 2023; Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate, July 2024.
On the Syrian air force and Russia see Giustozzi, ‘Russia and the collapse’, cit., pp. 16, 19.
Interview with 50-year-old Alwite security man from the Air Forces Intelligence in Damascus. He has good ties with the officers and security men in the Air Forces Intelligence Command in Damascus, December 2023 LP.
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate, July 2024.
Igor Delanoë, cit., p. 144.
Interview with **, senior official, Syrian Arab republic, Damascus, 20 October 2017; Interview with **K, group commander in Liwa (Al Imam Al Baqr) in Aleppo province, December 2018.
Interview with *B, Syrian Military intelligence [SMI] officer, May 2019.
O. Peri and H. Varulkar, ‘Personnel Changes In Top Syrian Security Echelons – Under Russian Pressure’, MEMRI, 11 July 2019; O. Peri and H. Varulkar, ‘Struggle Between Russia, Iran For Control Over Syria's Centers Of Power’, MEMRI, 23 September 2019.
Igor Delanoë, ‘Russie-Iran : après la victoire militaire en Syrie, quel partenariat ?’, Confluences Méditerranée 2020/2 N° 113, 137-150, 144; Interview with 25th Division officer in Hama Province, October 2023.
Carmit Valensi and Udi Dekel, ‘Russia and Iran: Is the Syrian Honeymoon Over?’, INSS Insight No. 1171, May 27, 2019.
Kiril Semenov, expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, Cit. in RÉGIS GENTÉ, ‘Syria: Competition for Influence Between Moscow And Tehran’, OrientXXI, 17 March 2020.
Ammar Hamou, ‘Five years after the Russian military intervention, Iran’s influence in Syria is growing’, Syria Direct, October 05, 2020.
Interview with O***, senior Syrian government official, Damascus, 5 May 2017; Interview with **K, group commander in Liwa (Al Imam Al Baqr) in Aleppo province, December 2018.
Interview with O***, senior Syrian government official, Damascus, 5 May 2017.
Leenders and Giustozzi, cit., 621.
Interview with Syrian officer, ISIS Hunters, April 2024.
Interview with *AM*, GID officer in Damascus, May 2018.
Interview with M*, presidential advisor, Damascus, 18 April 2018.
Interview with *H*, IRGC commander, November 2017; Interview with *AM*, GID officer in Damascus, May 2018.
Interview with Liwa al-Quds’ member, Aleppo, July 2022; Interview with 25th Division officer in Hama Province, October 2023; Interviews with Liwa al-Quds’ commander, AL-Nayrab, July 2022.
Kirill Semenov, ‘Russia’s Role in Reforming Syrian Special Services’, March 26, 2020 Carnegie Middle East Center; journalist working for the regime’s media in December 2023;’ Government forces aim to reduce Iranian influence in Syria’, North Press Agency, 23 April 2024; Lina Khatib and Lina Sinjab , ‘Syria’s Transactional State’, London : Chatham House, 3 April 2024, Ch. 4.
Anton Mardasov, ‘Why Russia’s grip on Syrian military is weaker than it seems’, Al Monitor, 21 April 2020.
Duclos, cit., p. 4.
Khaled al-Khateb, ‘Is Russia exploiting Iranian weakness in east Syria?’, Al Monitor, Jan 27, 2021.
O. Peri and H. Varulkar, ‘Struggle Between Russia, Iran For Control Over Syria's Centers Of Power’, MEMRI, 23 September 2019.
Interview with Liwa al-Quds’ member, Aleppo. (2022, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with 25th Division officer in Hama Province. (2023, October). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria. (2024, October). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian army officer, 5th corps. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Giustozzi, A. (2025, February). Russia and the collapse of the Assad regime (Academic Policy Paper Series No. 8). Russia Program, George Washington University.
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Russian military adviser. (2024, March). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Palestinian militiaman, al-Nairab. (2023, November). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian journalist working the government media. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Russian military adviser. (2024, March). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with IRGC commander, Syria. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview questions for Russian officer operating in Aleppo. (2023, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Sunni notable, Aleppo. (2023, November). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with [...], official working in the presidential office, Damascus. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Colonel A* in Syria, IRGC adviser. (2016, February 23). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Colonel A* in Syria, IRGC adviser. (2016, February 23). [Interview carried out by the research team];
Interview with commander *MH, IRGC, Syria. (2016, February 21). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with commander *MH, IRGC, Syria. (2016, February 21). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with General N*, Iranian army, Syria. (2016, January 19). [Interview carried out by the research team];
Interview Colonel S**, IRGC, Syria. (2016, January 20). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview Colonel S**, IRGC, Syria. (2016, January 20). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Colonel A* in Syria, IRGC adviser. (2016, February 2016). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with commander *MH, IRGC, Syria. (2016, February 21). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Colonel A* in Syria, IRGC adviser. (2016, February 23). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate. (2024, May). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with a 25th Division officer. (2023? November). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview questions for Russian officer operating in Aleppo. (2023, April). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interviews with Liwa al-Quds’ commander, AL-Nayrab. (2022, July). [Interview carried out by the re- واللجان القدس لواء بين خلاف .)6 search team]; Action Group for Palestinians of Syria. (2018, August -Clash between Liwa al-Quds and Popular Commit[ الطرفين بين قتلى يوقع الزور دير في الشعبية -مجموعة/10301/tees in Deir ez-Zor causes casualties]. Actionpal.org. https://www.actionpal.org.uk/ar/post العمل-من-أجل-فلسطينيي-سورية/خلاف-بين-لواء-القدس-واللجان-الشعبية-في-دير-الزور-يوقع- Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid. (2019, April 21). [Article on militia conflict in قتلى-بين-الطرفين; Syria]. Al-‘Arabi al-Jadid. https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=ae326abd-1512-4222-a94f-8504ac45a1a9&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5VXX-GBP1- F11P-X2D1-00000-00; Syrian Observer. (2020, July 7). Conflict rages between regime militia and Liwa al-Quds in Deir Ez-Zor. The Syrian Observer. https://syrianobserver.com/news/59053/conflict-rages-between-regime-militia- and-liwa-al-quds-in-deir-ez-zor.html; Enab Baladi. (2021, March 18). Clashes between regime-backed militias in Deir ez-Zor. Enab Baladi. https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/474551
Interviews with Liwa al-Quds’ commander, AL-Nayrab. (2022, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Liwa al-Quds Commander Aleppo. (2023, February). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Liwa al Quds’ cadre. (2022, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Chvarkov, Lt. Gen. (2020, November 9). As quoted in Sazhin, V. Russia and Iran in Syria. Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/11/09/russia-and-iran-in-syria/
Mardasov, A., & Semyonov, K. (2020, May 15). Russia without Assad. Riddle. https://ridl.io/en/russia-without-assad/
Mardasov, A., & Semyonov, K. (2020, August 17). Russian operation goes ‘offshore’ in Syria. Riddle.
https://ridl.io/en/russian-operation-goes-offshore-in-syria/
https://ridl.io/en/russian-operation-goes-offshore-in-syria/
Interview with **K, group commander in Liwa (Al Imam Al Baqr) in Aleppo province. (2018, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with IRGC officer in Aleppo. (2023, March). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Semenov, K. (2020). As cited in Hamou, A. (2020, October 5). Five years after the Russian military intervention, Iran’s influence in Syria is growing. Syria Direct.
Interview with Russian military adviser. (2024, March). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria. (2024, October). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian army officer, 5th corps. (2024, January). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with IRGC commander, Syria. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Syrian army officer. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Russian diplomat in Syria. (2024, October). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with senior Syrian official. (2017, May). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Russian diplomat on Iran and Russia. (2024, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Leenders, R., & Giustozzi, A. (2022). Foreign sponsorship of pro-government militias fighting Syria’s insurgency: Whither proxy wars? Mediterranean Politics, 27(5), 614–643.
Interview with Syrian officer, Military Intelligence Directorate. (2024, July). [Interview carried out by the research team]; Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with Syrian official, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2024, August). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with commander Russian MP officer, Latakia. (2023, July). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with [...], Ministry of Foreign Affairs in [...]. (2023, December). [Interview carried out by the research team].
Interview with a 55-year-old Alawite general who works in the Ministry of Defence HQs in Damascus. (2023, De- cember). [Interview carried out by the research team].
- Dr. Antonio GiustozziRUSI
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