Note: The written version of this interview has been supplemented by the interviewee.

Daniel Satinsky: Okay, we're ready to begin. It's great to talk to you today, Randy. And just for the sake of the interview. Could you just say, who are you? What was your relationship with business in Russia, briefly? And then I want you to talk a little bit about your background and how you came to this.

Randi Levinas: Well, I joined the U.S.–Russia Business Council in 2005, and until the end of 2023, for the last decade or so, I was the Executive Vice President and COO of the organization. During that time, I led its government relations work, its membership development and retention, its programming, financing, and budgeting – all those elements that would incorporate the leadership of the organization in that role.

Daniel Satinsky: I want to come back to that. I want you to describe more about the organization as much as you know, what it started, and what its role was. Did you have any interest in Russia before you joined the Business Council?

Randi Levinas: I had been a student of International Relations, and the Cold War and was involved in international trade and investment issues before I came to the Council. Whereas Russia was a part of my formal educational training, my professional experience was really based on international trade and investment issues. And it was through that lens that I became interested in the U.S.–Russia Business Council, because Russia was suddenly advancing its negotiations to become a member of the World Trade Organization, and the U.S.–Russia Business Council was seeking somebody to assist with that.

Daniel Satinsky: And did you speak Russian at all?

Randi Levinas: No. I learned some along the way.

Daniel Satinsky: Let's go back to the Council itself. What do you know of the history of the Council: when it was formed, and its purpose and all that? If you could just talk about that for us.

Randi Levinas: Sure. The Council was formed in 1993. It was formed by two gentlemen: Gene Lawson, who had been the Vice-Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, and Bob Strauss, who was a former ambassador to Russia. At that time in 1991, there were a lot of openings. It was Perestroika and Glasnost, but [Lawson and Strauss] felt that there was a missing piece in the relationship and that the economic opportunities in Russia for U.S. business would be developing at a rapid pace. And they saw an economic conversation that was missing in the relationship. So that's what they sought to build out.

Daniel Satinsky: What was the target audience for membership in the Council?

Randi Levinas: I think it's fair to say that early on natural resources were a natural target for membership. But it really was cross-sectoral from the beginning. So, they did a fabulous job of pulling together CEOs of major U.S. companies across sectors to be our first Board of Directors. That leadership level and attention to the importance of the market was consistent throughout our history, and we continued to have CEOs and C-suite-level people on our board throughout the organization’s lifespan.

It was a very dynamic, very challenging market, but it was a very profitable market. And there was a lot of risk associated, of course, with that profitability. But I think U.S. companies saw great opportunities there and were very interested, and Gene, working with Strauss, and then with other chairmen over time, really did develop and build the membership strongly.

Daniel Satinsky: What were the functions of the organization? What did it do?

Randi Levinas: We were a platform for the discussion of economic and commercial issues. We were a liaison with the U.S. Government and the Russian government to help the governments understand our interests and concerns about market rules. We were a U.S.-focused entity, company-focused for many years. There was a point in time when some Russian companies came into the organization, but we never lobbied on behalf of any Russian companies. Our work on lobbying was exclusively for U.S. companies, but there were Russian companies as part of the organization over time.

We were an information source. We provided reports, not detailed reports, but you would get in your inbox every morning the 3 top issues of the day in terms of economic and commercial issues. It helped government relations professionals, who are people responsible for the world, manage their Russian or Eurasian portfolio because they had information that was coming into them on a daily basis to help them stay abreast of what was going on. We were also always available for any kind of questions or strategic counsel that companies had. We had programs. We would invite speakers. Sometimes there were government speakers, sometimes they were just knowledgeable people, think tank people. We did a lot of collaborations. We offered a variety of services, your traditional bilateral trade association, the services that you would expect from any bilateral trade association for those people who work in Washington and have familiarity with those.

Daniel Satinsky: How did you work to gather that kind of information? Through your staff, or did you have contractors?

Randi Levinas: The important thing is that sure staff did the research work on resources available, Internet and whatnot. But then there was the knowledge, because, for example, in my case, government relations, as a government relations professional, speaking regularly with all the different departments of the U.S. Government, understanding what they were thinking about developments in Russia, what we were thinking about developments in Russia, and having that information, being able to share that with companies in a manner that they could then translate into their business [plans], that would be helpful for guidance for them with their businesses.

Daniel Satinsky: Was it the case that those interests weren't always co-terminus, the interests of your members and the interest of the Government? I don't want to say contradictory, but they're in different directions at different times. Or was it said that you had to steer things so that there was an information flow that worked between the two different kinds of operations: the government operation and business?

Randi Levinas: I think that until, I would say, 2014 with The Hill, and a little bit different timeline with the Administration, we were generally going in the same direction, we were working together. We were informing each other's work. I don't think we were really going in different directions, I think we were going in the same direction. We wanted Russia to be a member of the global community. When I came on, for example, we wanted Russia to follow international trade rules. We wanted them to play by the rules. And the way we could do that — we did that with the WTO negotiations, obviously because they were joining a system that had set rules, and they had to abide by those and change their economy, change the rules of the game in Russia to become a member of the WTO, which meant opportunities for U.S. business. The U.S. Government wanted that. They were the ones leading the negotiations. It was government-to-government negotiations. The U.S. business community served as a resource. So, we would help them understand what this would mean with this negotiating position and help them understand what access and the opportunities that would be created for U.S. companies.

Daniel Satinsky: So, you were bringing the experience of actually doing business in Russia and the problems that are encountered by doing that to the attention of government people and giving them mutual sharing of understanding of what that environment was like in the early days, right?

Randi Levinas: I think that understanding the environment, and the practical implications of the policy was the information that we could provide.

Daniel Satinsky: There was a business organization in Russia, The American Chamber of Commerce of Russia. What was your relationship with that organization?

Randi Levinas: That was a great partnership. The AmCham in Russia, they were the day-to-day. They really focused on the Russian legislation for the people living there, who are operating in the market, the day-to-day, the tax issues and the regulatory issues really on a much finer scale, a more granular scale than what we were working on — which was the 30,000-foot-high policy issues, issues of national security and issues of the international trade negotiations that were led by the U.S. Trade Representative here in Washington. And then, of course, when we got to the Congressional phase of the negotiations when the negotiations were concluded, we started the congressional part before the negotiations were concluded. But when we were working on that part, it shifted to us because we were leading that coalition of businesses to secure permanent normal trade relations for Russia

For more than 30 years the United States had been giving Russia normal trade relations. What did it mean? Russia had [“normal”] access to our market, at the rate that everybody else had access to. But unless [the United States] approved permanent normal trade relations [with Russia], we wouldn't get access to the market-opening rules Russia agreed to and what we (the United States) had negotiated at the WTO. Because we were conditioning our trade: Every year the United States had to affirm that Russia was in compliance with a law known as Jackson-Vanik, which was a law that at the time restricted Russia's access to our market because Russia wasn't letting Jews out of Russia. That ended in 1991. The Executive Branch acknowledged in 1991 that Russia was in compliance with Jackson-Vanik, but each year the Executive Branch had to go though an administrative exercise to extend Russia normal trade relations, and that was fine — until we had a WTO accession in front of us, and we had this market that was just booming with opportunity from every single sector, and U.S. companies wanted to be on equal footing with companies from all over the world: from Europe, from Latin America, people who wanted to get into the Russian market or were in the Russian market. We didn't want our companies to be at a disadvantage. We needed [Congress to repeal Jackson-Vanik as it applied to Russia and extend Russia] permanent normal trade relations, [because only Congress and not the Executive Branch could repeal the Jackson-Vanik law as it applied to Russia] and that's what the congressional campaign was about.

Daniel Satinsky: Let's talk about that for a minute. Because I think for people not really familiar with this you have to explain a little more detail. Why was this permanent status required? Was it a requirement of the WTO?

Randi Levinas: Well, yes, it is. The issue is [only the United States] had a Jackson-Vanik law on its books. It was something that was required for us in the United States to do. Permanent normal trade relations or Most Favored Nation (MFN) status — it's the same. It's a term that's used interchangeably. Most favored nation status. It means you have unconditional or MFN trade with your trading partners. That is a basic tenet of the WTO, of the World Trade Organization. You must have unconditional trade relations with your trading partners to get access to all the marketing opening measures that are negotiated. If I give you access to my market, I have to give the same to Tom, Dick, and Harry out there as well. That's what it is to be a member of the WTO: everybody has the same access to your market. But in the United States we had Jackson-Vanik on the books, which was that law that I was talking about, and like I said it restricted Russia's access to the U.S. market unless each year we said: “Oh, you're in compliance with the law.”. We didn't have that permanent status. Permanent Normal Trade Relations made our trade “unconditional” with Russia, meaning the United States would be in compliance with WTO rules, and thus have equal access to Russia’s market in this case.

Daniel Satinsky: If I understand this correctly, then until that happened, U.S. companies couldn't be on equal footing with their competitors in the Russian market that it was to the advantage of the U.S. companies, not to the Russians necessarily to have that happen.

Randi Levinas: The Russians weren’t going to see any difference in terms of their access to the U.S. market, because their access to our market had been unfettered since 1991. They had the same access to the same rules inour market as all of our other trading partners — we were just renewing it every year. For them, the difference now was that we were making it permanent.

The difference was once Russia entered the WTO as a member everything that we essentially... And you know this is an interesting point too, because in the negotiations to join the WTO, it's customary and historical that the United States is one of the last countries to close out an accession negotiation because we hold out and we have the highest demands. Our companies are international companies and [they seek harmonized rules globally] And they have demanding interests about what they're seeking. The United States was negotiating in lowering Russia's trade barriers – and all other countries would benefit from that access regardless of whether the United States repealed Jackson Vanik or not. If we didn’t repeal - those same rules that we actually hung out for and negotiated till the bitter end were not going to be available to us unless we convinced Congress to extend PNTR (*Permanent normal trade relations) to Russia.

One of our slogans “PNTR is for us”, because everybody said: Oh, we're giving Russia PNTR. No, we weren't giving Russia anything. This was for U.S. companies.

Daniel Satinsky: I want to know, when you started, and you were involved with these negotiations, what were the critical issues that were being fought about between the US and Russia in terms of compliance with WTO. Rules over how Russia had to change its economy to fit and join the WTO.

Randi Levinas: This is why I was so interested in coming to USRBC, because a WTO accession covers every single sector. It was a massive negotiation. In financial services, where there was very little access, Russia’s market opened up for aircraft: the tariffs on aircraft went down tremendously. In terms of intellectual property rights, that was a tough issue, and it remained difficult for many years, but there were certain concessions that the Russians agreed to, that they hadn't agreed to for decades. With respect to access, I mean tough issues related to agriculture. Agriculture is always difficult, because there are certain sanitary restrictions. And regarding animal and plant health that are very, very difficult. It gets into minutia, detailed technical standard issues, and we couldn't get our pork into Russia for years, we couldn't get our poultry into Russia. Finally, through the WTO negotiations, we were able to do that. [Note: Russia stood up other barriers shortly thereafter that prevented U.S. market access for some of these goods, but the WTO negotiations dislodged barriers initially.]

There was a real tough discussion about information technology and U.S. mass market goods getting into Russia. The thing is what was at play in the WTO discussions was that we were very complementary markets, because we had finished goods and services that would be going towards the Russian market. The Russians had more raw materials, and you and I talked about that initial natural resource base from which the U.S.–Russia Business Council grew at the beginning of this session. And there was so much opportunity across every single sector. I'm trying to even remember if I'm leaving out a sector. Manufacturing goods, agriculture and machinery. But it was difficult all throughout. One of the first issues I encountered when I came to the Council was that we were in the middle of the negotiations. You have bilateral negotiations, and then you have multilateral negotiations, and in the bilateral we were still negotiating with Russia, and Russia all of a sudden increased their tariff on agricultural equipment. And I was like: “Wait a minute!”. There is a tenet in international trade negotiations that when you're negotiating, everything stands still, it's called a standstill commitment. And we had to haggle with the Russians, and it was a fight that went on for many years, where they wanted to keep on tripling the duty. They had agreed to go down to 5%, and every other time we turned around it was increased to 15%, which was a lot of money on some of these big machines.

Daniel Satinsky: Is that a reflection of the internal politics in Russia?

Randi Levinas: Absolutely. Let’s be honest, we have the same issue here with domestic constituencies. In the days when we used to negotiate free trade agreements, the domestic concerns would always pop up and say: “I don't want to open my market. Why should I open my market? We should be making this here.”.

Daniel Satinsky: Did you have a sense when you were doing the negotiations about what was going on their side, I mean sort of who they had to push down to get this?

Randi Levinas: It's a trading that goes on, and you have to decide what's more important and what's not. There were people on our side who wanted to shut down information technology at the very end and say: “Okay, we don't need that. Let's close this. We want to move forward now.” But we couldn't. In our system of government, it's much more difficult than in theirs. Once they had the agreement and they had their interests, they got to a certain point, where they didn't have to deal with domestic interests who had interests who would either support or not support a final vote. We knew once the Kremlin/Russian Government agreed, the Duma would say yes, the Federation Council would say yes, and that was it. On our part we needed votes, so I needed to make sure the Farm Bureau was on board, that the information technology industry was on board, that the banks were on board. Everybody needed to be, they were a key part, all the different groups. Interest groups were very important to making sure that we had the votes in place, because this was a tough fight.

And I can tell you it really was very difficult, because there was no notion in the U.S. Congress about what Russia was in 2008-2012. They thought it was the Soviet Union. They thought that there were long lines for bread in Russia, that Russians had no money to buy anything that we could sell them. They would be shocked when the companies I'd march in with,10-15 companies, and each company would go through whether it's fast-moving consumer goods, or healthcare, or aviation and manufacturers. Companies would start talking about the market and what the opportunities were, and [Members of Congress] didn't believe it, it was all brand-new information to them. We had a huge learning curve.

Daniel Satinsky: By and large, our elected officials hadn't been to Russia, so they didn't have any reference point — is that fair statement?

Randi Levinas: There were, there had been some. There was some good inter parliamentary work, but it wasn't an active group. I think that was revived at one point while I was there, and that really helped. It was very important. We had delegations of Senators that went over. There were Congressmen that went over. But we're talking about 535 votes in the end. It was very difficult to get them. First of all, it was a long process, and people are never really focused on something until it's right before you on any vote. But we were trying to get people to understand that this is a place where it was profitable. It was good for U.S. business, it was good for U.S. jobs, it was good for workers. There were opportunities here that would bring back benefits to the United States. It was a tough row to hoe.

Daniel Satinsky: You were negotiating levels of tariffs. But what else, much more than that?

Randi Levinas: There's technical standards which are the key things. I mean, everybody can line up to lower their tariff barriers. But you can say: I'm not going to let your widget into the market, because it doesn't meet the standards of our market. We did a huge amount of work, not only just in the context of the WTO, but with this Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) that went on for a while, that the U.S.–Russia Business Council was very involved in organizing.

Daniel Satinsky: This is the Gore – Chernomyrdin?

Randi Levinas: No, Gore-Chernomyrdin was prior to my time. We started the BPC, and I'd have to go back and look at the years. Maybe it was 2009. I think we started when Obama went to Russia. We started a U.S.–Russia bilateral Presidential Commission, and I think the head of it was Joe Biden. On the Russian side, I'm trying to remember who the head was. There was science and technology, there was innovation, healthcare. We had business development and economic relations; it was all different areas. In technical standards, for example, we tried to explain to the Russians how our system worked, which was voluntary compliance. You set the standards. It's not that you can’t have technical standards different from ours, but they have to be in a way, according to WTO rules, that they are not a barrier to trade. There has to be a scientific reason, or has to be based on science, the reason for your technical standards. Those are huge barriers. Technical barriers to trade are a huge impediment in trade relations, and we did have many of those with Russia, and later we were working very closely on these issues after WTO accession with the Eurasian Economic Union which Russia started, in 2012.

Daniel Satinsky: Back again to the negotiations and the approval. You came to a tentative agreement with the Russians, and there was a set of agreements, and then you had to sell that to the Congress to get the approval.

Randi Levinas: Yeah. You have an agreement, based on many different sectoral areas, and then we had to sell it to the Hill.

Daniel Satinsky: And this was important to American business, because they saw the importance of the Russian market. It wasn't humanitarian aid or anything. This was pure market opportunity, market driven.

Randi Levinas: Absolutely. I just want to make a really important point. In the U.S.–Russia Business Council — I was the head of the Secretariat that we had — we built out a structure. And when I came on board that was one of the first things I did was build out a strategy as to how we were going to do this. I knew it was a big challenge. I'd been involved in other Free Trade agreement approvals with the Hill, and I knew that this was something that little tiny U.S.–Russia Business Council was not going to be able to do it on its own.

We had fabulous participation across sectors from our members. I was working with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, which is the organization of CEOs, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Farm Bureau, the Information Technology Council. All these different organizations, sectoral organizations, the Coalition of Service Industries, all of us came together under one umbrella. We called it the Coalition for U.S.–Russia Trade and we would meet regularly, I would lead strategy sessions. In the very end, we hired lobbyists when we knew we were getting close to a vote. We're all lobbyists doing lobbying, but people who were just exclusively doing this for the vote to pass this. I always say: you can't get anything done in Washington by yourself. You have to work with others, and I think PNTR for Russia was a testament to that. Everybody came together, we had one sandbox, and these are all organizations that can bump up against each other, and everybody has their own turf. But we came together, and everybody worked well, like one well-oiled machine. We had more than 500 business organizations, at the national, the local and the state level come together in support of this.

Daniel Satinsky: This coalition was something that you sort of brought together through the Council, correct?

Randi Levinas: Yes. Also, I should point out that initially we worked with the National Council for Soviet Jewry, which is now the National Coalition Supporting Eurasian Jewry. They were a very important partner very early on, and they stayed with us throughout, which was the Jewish community that wanted this lifted. There was a recognition that Russia was in compliance with the rules, and with the law, and there was no need for this to stay on the books. They were a partner, and a strong partner through to the end.

Daniel Satinsky: I'm glad you added that, that's important. And how long did this whole process take?

Randi Levinas: I presented the strategy in early 2006, and we got PNTR in December 2012.

Daniel Satinsky: Six years.

Randi Levinas: And it was difficult. Because on The Hill there's a lot of staff turnover. Like I said, people aren't focused on issues. But we had to start. We had to start socializing people around these issues. And we had to build up a base of knowledge. I mean, sometimes there was more turnover in some places than in others, but we needed people to understand what was going on in Russia and what the opportunities were. Unfortunately, it took longer than we wanted, but we got it.

Daniel Satinsky: You had to win over the staff of people in these Congressional offices. Did you have to visit them individually? Did you run programs for them? What did you do?

Randi Levinas: Hundreds and hundreds of meetings. I had two titles. I was Executive Director of the Coalition while I was still EVP of the Council, but my work at the Council became this, because it was the single most important issue for the Council during those years. And I think it's recognized as the Council's signature achievement. And it was an achievement, and I'm proud of it. It was a very important thing to do. We were working with officials in Russia who were liberal minded, I mean liberal in the traditional sense: the right to private property, the right to equality. These were the people that were calling the shots in Russia at the time. They were supporting these changes in Russia. It was an important thing to do! And my work and our companies were exclusively focused on this. Of course, we had other issues that would come up. But 90% of my time was really spent on this.

Daniel Satinsky: And at the time I assume you felt you were participating in a historic process. You understood that?

Randi Levinas: It was obvious. People tended to think it was the Soviet Union still. This was our way of saying: this is a different country. We looked at all the different Congressional committees, and the key committees, there was obviously a vote back from by every single member. But we really organized ourselves around the key committees and key members and did a massive lobbying operation. Hundreds of meetings and briefings, staff, both Chambers. It was a huge time commitment.

Daniel Satinsky: What did it feel like when you got it? When it matters?

Randi Levinas: We were over the moon. We were so happy because we didn't want U.S. business to be left behind. This was an opportunity.

Daniel Satinsky: Okay, you were over the moon with all this, right?

Randi Levinas: Everybody was. We were thrilled that it had finally come into place. Russia had officially entered the WTO. I believe it was August of that year so we were running against the clock in terms of U.S. competitiveness in the Russian market.

Daniel Satinsky: What year say it again?

Randi Levinas: 2012. We were feeling at a deficit and concerned about what that meant for U.S. competitiveness globally, because this is the thing, too. Russia was a part of the world market, a global market. We were talking about getting them integrated. But they were integrated into the global market. Being at a competitive disadvantage at that time was nerve wracking that we just needed to get this done. And it didn't happen until that December. But we took it. We were happy. Everybody was thrilled.

Daniel Satinsky: It was December of 2012. Were the Russians similarly happy?

Randi Levinas: [Russia was not overtly interested in the PNTR battle on the Hill. Russia felt slighted by the United States that Jackson-Vanik was still on the books 30+ years after their compliance with those migration issues and I think they saw Jackson-Vanik’s existence as insulting as it applied to them. So, while they were pleased to have access to U.S. goods and services, they felt Jackson-Vanik was the U.S.’ problem since they held that it should have been repealed years earlier.]

Of course, Russia was thrilled to be in the WTO. They used to know that was a stature thing for them to be a part of the global community, the rules-based community. And they embraced that at the time. But this was the thing, too, is that they wanted U.S. goods. Sure, they wanted European goods, too, but in many cases because of the quality they were interested in having access to our goods and having them on those terms was attractive to them.

And we were interested, frankly, in their talent. We worked together on the Innovation Working Group. Their scientific talent was fabulous, and we had great collaborations going, and we did that in that Innovation Working Group. When I look back, I see the talent that came out of Russia too.

Why were we there? This was an important thing. We would talk to people about having U.S. companies present in the Russian market was good, not only for Russia and for U.S. companies. It was really what we were trying to achieve was to make Russia adhere to international trade rules, a rules-based system. But it was also about transparency and accountability and good corporate governance and those things that U.S. companies and U.S. personnel, that were in Russia, modeled. And then, years later, it was so interesting for me to see how you'd have top leadership from U.S. companies. They were posted to Russia to really bring that business along. And then, years later, you would see, like the top people at U.S. companies in Russia led by Russians, and then moved out of Russia into other parts of the company, getting promoted through the structure of the companies because they were good. They were great people. They had wonderful human capital. So, it really was a partnership in so many ways.


Daniel Satinsky: It's just so striking: the integration that was taking place throughout that whole period, and as you say best on each side, if you will. I think this is probably a pretty obvious question, but I think those of us who were active in that time thought that this change was irreversible, that it had happened, and that this was a nodal point,
that was of a fundamental nature going forward. I assume that you also felt that.

Randi Levinas: I wasn't an expert in Russia by any means. I certainly knew, I could always see who was in charge and I could see who was calling the shots at different points in time, based on the issues I was working on. I would say that in 2013 things started to change.
It was based on some information. It was based on technology issues that I was working on. I could see where my discussions with top Russian officials became. They weren't moving forward; they weren't getting anywhere. Some of them would just be very honest with me and transparent. They'd say: “this isn't my decision.” So you could see that things were shifting more towards the security side.

One of the things that I thought we'd do right after we did Permanent Normal Trade Relations. [PNTR].. I would like to go back, there’s one thing I want to say about PNTR. We wouldn't have been able to get it because the Congress wasn't comfortable. They weren't comfortable with what Russia was. They weren't fully there. And again, they thought that this was a gift to Russia. This was the general consensus. People who understood it knew that it wasn't. But the general consensus was “why we're going to give this to Russia,” and our talking point was, “we're not giving it to Russia.” As I said before, PNTR was for us, the US. And at the same time, they wanted to punish Russia. The Congress didn't feel like it could just give PNTR to Russia. They couldn't let them off the hook. And we had a very, very tragic situation with Sergei Magnitsky.

Magnitsky was, as you know, an attorney for Hermitage Capital. It was a British company owned by a U.S. citizen. He discovered this tremendous tax fraud and made it be known and was put into jail and tragically died in jail. In Russia, as we know with the recent prisoner swaps, you're put in jail and there's no presumption of innocence. And like him there are thousands of people who are put in jail in Russia for business crimes. You know, he was alleged to have committed a business crime for exposing this fraud. He died, and Congress wanted to do something about that. I think Bill Browder did a fabulous job in terms of honoring Sergei Magnitsky, and they put that Act into place at the same time. So Congress couldn't just pass PNTR. They had to do something against Russia, and so the Sergei Magnitsky bill allowed them to develop a structure to put asset freezes and visa restrictions on Russian officials for human rights violations, which his death was. There was that dynamic. I think it's important to point out that we wouldn't have gotten PNTR without some sort of statement or action against Russia, and it took the form, tragically, of the Sergei Magnitsky act.

Daniel Satinsky: What was the reaction of the Russians when that happened?

Randi Levinas: Oh, they hated it!

Daniel Satinsky: But it didn't interfere with the WTO process.

Randi Levinas: Russia was entering the WTO regardless of what happened with Jackson Vanik and PNTR. In the United States, there were two channels on Russia’s WTO accession. We in the business community didn't talk about Magnitsky. We didn't talk about human rights. That wasn't our channel. The U.S. Government, human rights groups — they handled that channel and had those discussions and answered all those questions. We stayed in our lane. We didn't have the expertise to talk about human rights in Russia. We talked about what we knew, which was what the business situation was, what we saw happening in terms of business liberalization, in terms of market opening, in terms of opportunity. I think people would have liked to say that this would bring greater liberalization to Russia. Maybe we'd see more openings in other areas, maybe greater democracy. But, no. We didn't talk about that. We couldn't over promise. We just sold what we knew, which was this would open markets, this would create opportunities, this would help Russians to see that you could have a transparent business operation, that you receive your salary, not in an envelope of cash, but a deposit in your bank account. That the rules were transparent. So that's what we were talking about.

Daniel Satinsky: And as people at that time would always say that Russia would become a “normal country.” I mean, that's what everyone said: “we wanted to be a normal country”. And I think all of us felt that this integration was a binding together, that would change the flow of people and goods and everything between Russia and the rest of the world?

Randi Levinas: We had hopes that this would be something that would continue to develop. As I was saying earlier, after doing PNTR, we thought we could get a bilateral investment treaty going with the Russians. That was sort of the next thing that I was going to work on — it was a bilateral investment. I actually had some initial meetings with some Russian Government officials on this and the U.S. Government, and we talked about it. But then we got Edward Snowden and a variety of other things, and then Crimea and it did not happen.

Daniel Satinsky: So, the actual impact of the WTO ascension was only for a couple of years before it got overtaken by the sanctions regimes after 2014, correct?

Randi Levinas: Well, the rules were still in place. They didn't roll back. But the problem was: how do you address Russia's aggression? And sanctions became the operative tool because it's not a military response, it's a measured response. After 2014, our task shifted. We were no longer focusing on market opening and talking about trade liberalization. We were trying to protect what we had achieved in the market — both in Russia and with the U.S. Government by working through and talking with them about sanctions and countersanctions.

As sanctions proposals emerged, they became e much more aggressive over time. Certainly, there was a framework that was laid out by the Administration, but actual actions were much more severe in proposed legislation on the Hill. That's where we had to ramp up a lot of energy and focus again towards the Hill, some towards the administration, but much more so towards the Hill. What is the impact of this? You want to hurt Russia but let me explain to you what you're saying with X, Y and Z is not going to hurt Russia. You're only going to just block U.S. companies from the market. And is that really what you want to do? Some of them would have said: “Yes, that is what I want to do,” and others would say: “No, actually, I don't want to do that.” That's how the conversation progressed after that, where we became much more focused on sanctions and then ultimately on export controls and eventually market exits.

Daniel Satinsky: And then market exits became sort of the last chapter of this, right? I'm not sure where else we can go with this, because it's such an important story of the
the changes that took place in Russia in this whole period, and how it became a market economy. And then it's integration into the world. And now it's separation. It's a whole set of historical epochs that we've lived through.

Randi Levinas: Let's be careful, it's separation from where? Russia still has active trade
with some countries. It became a separation from the West.

Daniel Satinsky: I agree with you. That's really important to make that distinction. My opinion is that many of those changes in their economy, becoming a market economy, a lot of that still remains. It is a market economy with a heavy state influence, but it is a market economy.

Randi Levinas: A very increasing and very heavy state influence, obviously it's the state and the military industry that's driving the economy now. But it is still a market economy. Sure, they roll back different things over time, but essentially, I agree with you.

Daniel Satinsky: We're constantly trying to catch up in our understanding of this country. I'm hopeful that this archive and this conversation that we've had today will be a contribution to that, maybe not a warning, but an impetus to look at things in detail as they are and act accordingly. You lived that and that interface between what business was trying to accomplish, and what politicians thought about it, and what the potential was at that moment is profoundly important.

Randi Levinas: It was a very unique and exciting time, I mean it. It was a time of great hope. For the relationship, for what we could do, where we could go. The space cooperation was just the constant always, but there were so many aspects that were so exciting and interesting, and felt like a real partnership in some ways.

Daniel Satinsky: I don't want to ask any names, but do you still remain in contact with some of the Russians that you worked with during that period? It's pretty much all broken. Well, those are also costs that were paid. Is there things that you wanted to say that I've missed
in asking you?

Randi Levinas: I think we've covered it.

Daniel Satinsky: The Council is officially disbanded, correct?

Randi Levinas: Correct.

Daniel Satinsky: When was that.

Randi Levinas: December 31, 2023.

Daniel Satinsky: Just for the sake of the record. It is now disbanded.

Randi Levinas: Correct, no longer in operation.

Daniel Satinsky: I want to thank you for your time. And for sharing your experience.

Randi Levinas: Thank you. I hope that others will gain some knowledge and understanding of that time period, because I think it was a unique time in our history and in U.S.–Russia relations.

Daniel Satinsky: Yeah, very unique one.