How Trump’s Peacemaking Rhetoric Is Shaping Perceptions of the Peace Process in Russia and Ukraine
Elena Koneva
December 23, 2025
Academic Policy Paper Series, no. 17, December 2025
Introduction
Even before taking office, Donald Trump actively presented himself as a mediator capable of stopping the war between Russia and Ukraine. He spoke of ending the conflict “overnight,” of a fundamentally new format for negotiations, and of his ability to pressure both sides and secure a lasting peace. However, the war has now been going on for four years, and the peacemaking reputation of the U.S. president, in the eyes of the two warring countries whose interests he claims to represent, has failed to materialize.
Data from sociological research, as well as public opinion surveys on Trump’s role, points to a paradoxical outcome: his intervention in the conflict-resolution process has radicalized sentiment, calcified intransigence and damaged trust in peace efforts among both Russians and Ukrainians.
Part of the explanation for these attitudes and perceptions lies not only in the words and actions of the U.S. president. It also lies in the way the “peace process” has been presented to the Russian public in state media, which indicates no intention on the part of the Kremlin to end the war.
Trump delivers hope for peace
Trump’s emergence as a would-be peacemaker during his election campaign, against the backdrop of intense public demand for an end to the war, sparked a surge of hope in both warring countries for a swift peace deal. In early 2025, 61% of respondents in Ukraine and 78% in Russia said that achieving peace largely depended on Trump.
Even before taking office, Donald Trump actively presented himself as a mediator capable of stopping the war between Russia and Ukraine. He spoke of ending the conflict “overnight,” of a fundamentally new format for negotiations, and of his ability to pressure both sides and secure a lasting peace. However, the war has now been going on for four years, and the peacemaking reputation of the U.S. president, in the eyes of the two warring countries whose interests he claims to represent, has failed to materialize.
Data from sociological research, as well as public opinion surveys on Trump’s role, points to a paradoxical outcome: his intervention in the conflict-resolution process has radicalized sentiment, calcified intransigence and damaged trust in peace efforts among both Russians and Ukrainians.
Part of the explanation for these attitudes and perceptions lies not only in the words and actions of the U.S. president. It also lies in the way the “peace process” has been presented to the Russian public in state media, which indicates no intention on the part of the Kremlin to end the war.
Trump delivers hope for peace
Trump’s emergence as a would-be peacemaker during his election campaign, against the backdrop of intense public demand for an end to the war, sparked a surge of hope in both warring countries for a swift peace deal. In early 2025, 61% of respondents in Ukraine and 78% in Russia said that achieving peace largely depended on Trump.
Fig. 1. Perceived influence of world leaders on resolving the Russia–Ukraine conflict
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
Meanwhile, Putin’s figures as a leader resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict were 67% in Ukraine and nearly 100% in Russia. This reflects the understanding among both Russians and Ukrainians that it is Putin who initiated the war (“special military operation”) and that it is thus Putin who, more than anyone else, can call a stop to it.
Putin has spoken of his desire for peace throughout almost the entire war, accusing Ukraine of sabotaging the peace process. Still, no one believes Putin is ready to make peace. In 2024 and 2025, 63% of Russians expressed a desire for a peace agreement with Ukraine “with mutual concessions,” yet only 36% expected that to materialize.
It was Trump’s “peace campaign,” featuring loud declarations, that revived hopes for a quick end to the war. This was reflected in a rapid rise in January-February 2025 in the share of respondents who expected the “special military operation” to end within a few months (up to six months).
Fig. 2. Russians’ expectations regarding the duration of the “special military operation”
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
For the first months of the war, at least 35% of Russians believed the war would end soon, yet by summer 2022 those hopes had diminished sharply. Then, for more than two years – from autumn 2022 through early 2025 – only a little over 20% believed the war would end within a few months. At the beginning of February 2025, after Trump’s first speeches as president, the share of optimists reached 30%, and by the end of what was an event-rich February, it had risen to 43%.
This was the Trump effect. But as events circled back to fall into familiar patterns, hopes again receded: the figure fell to 30% in March, before retreating to a typical 24% in September.
Russian public opinion: ‘One last push’
Throughout 2024 and into early 2025, there was a certain equilibrium in Russia between supporters and opponents of ceasing hostilities. According to the research, until February 2025 about half of Russians supported withdrawing Russian troops and negotiating a resolution to the conflict, even though the stated objectives of the “special military operation” have not been achieved.
Once Trump started making lots of comments – with the media spotlight firmly turned to his peace efforts – the equilibrium shifted: the share of supporters of a peaceful resolution declined a little, while the share of opponents of negotiations surged from 32% to 42%. Thus, jingoistic sentiment in Russia, in favor of continuing the conflict, unexpectedly intensified.
Fig. 3. Attitudes of Russians toward peace negotiations without achieving the objectives of the “special military operation”.
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
Note that this shift occurred against the backdrop of war fatigue: half of Russians say the war negatively affects their daily lives.
Still, the information environment in early 2025, which portrayed Trump as a politician who “understands Russia” and is ready to look out for its interests, reinforced the sense of Moscow’s military and political advantage over Kyiv. Some Russians saw supporting a continuation of the war as an opportunity to push the front line farther westward and as a last chance to make money in the army.
The surge in mentions of Trump was also reflected in attitudes toward the “special military operation” overall: support for the war, which stood at 50-52% from January to September 2024, jumped to 57% in February 2025 – before sliding back to 50% in September 2025.
The US president’s softer rhetoric toward Russia’s war lent a degree of legitimacy to the actions of the country that had started the war, especially against an otherwise solid backdrop of Western condemnation and sanctions. Trump’s involvement in the peace process has generated optimistic expectations, creating hope for a favorable outcome of the conflict for Russia – meaning without major concessions by Moscow – and this encouraged a willingness to support “one last push” in the war.
Ukrainian public opinion: Radicalization after Zelensky-Trump meeting
Whereas in Russia attitudes shifted gradually, in Ukraine the turning point after the initial surge was abrupt and took place after a specific event – the meeting between Zelensky and Trump at the White House on February 28, 2025, which was perceived as an attack not only on Zelensky but also on Ukraine as a whole.
Before the White House meeting, 40% of Ukrainians were not against suspending offensive operations for the sake of peace; after the meeting, the share fell to 33%. In addition, Ukrainians in favor of the complete liberation of all territories climbed from 49% to 57%.
The perception of Trump as a politician putting pressure on Ukraine and steering it toward pro-Russia positions led to distrust toward his peace efforts. Ukrainian public opinion is not inclined to make concessions under pressure from an external actor whom it sees as biased. The Zelensky-Trump meeting also gave rise to distrust toward any peace efforts associated with the US, which has only deepened as this year has gone on.
Trump’s pro-Russia bias: Perception and consequences
Studies confirm an almost identical perception of Trump both in Ukraine and in Russia: a large share of Russians and the majority of Ukrainians believe he is on Russia’s side. In early 2025, 72% of surveyed Ukrainians and 43% of Russians held this view. In September, the latter percentage dropped to 32%. Meanwhile, trust in Trump remains extremely low in each country: only 12% of Ukrainians trust him, and 20% of Russians.
Most Russians (75%) view Trump as cunning and sly. In terms of decision-making, 50% believe he is guided by emotions, while only 19% believe he weighs the arguments. Fifty-four percent of respondents think Putin does not trust Trump, and according to 56%, Trump does not trust Putin either. In September 2025, only 31% of Russians believed that Trump was interested in a peace, versus 75% who say Putin is interested in one. Overall, only 18% of Russians had a positive view of the US president in October, while 42% viewed him negatively and 40% could not state their position.
Meanwhile, Ukrainians are increasingly skeptical of whether Trump’s peace efforts are good for Ukraine: in an October 2025 poll, 52% said they believed Trump was pushing Ukraine toward territorial concessions in favor of Russia.
Overall, the mistrust of the warring sides toward the main mediator makes mediation impossible: any initiative is perceived by Russians as flimsy and by Ukrainians as a diktat, which translates into gridlock.
Ukrainians see Trump as a threat to their sovereignty and fear an unfair agreement. Russians view him as unpredictable, ideologically conflicted and driven by US interests. Even among those who believe Trump acts in Russia’s interests, 60% do not trust him.
Paradoxes of Trump
Trump, as the head of the most powerful state in the world, can exert maximal influence over global events, and from the first days of his current term, he has touted himself as a peacemaker. Yet this high level of influence, when combined with low trust, produces a demoralizing paradox: Trump has proven capable only of generating expectations; he has been unable to mediate effectively. His involvement, after a brief period of hope for millions of Russians and Ukrainians, has given way to disappointment, increasing rather than reducing tensions.
Ukrainians see Trump as an actor imposing on Ukraine the Kremlin’s conditions, as told to him by Putin during their contacts; Russians see him as a player who lacks a firm, independent position. Against this backdrop, any statements by Trump act not as a stabilizing force but as a destabilizing one, introducing uncertainty and provoking additional fluctuations in public opinion.
Trump’s attempt to construct the image of an effective peacemaker failed. First, for various reasons, his involvement led to a general outcome – the radicalization of mass sentiment in both countries. Second, the widespread perception of Trump as a pro-Russia politician undermined the image of a balanced mediator. Third, the initially low level of trust in him in both Russia and Ukraine weakened his effectiveness.
Yet these factors stemmed not only from Trump’s words and actions. Behind his public image stood a broad Russian media campaign concerning the ceasefire and Trump himself.
Peace negotiations in Russian media
In 2025, largely under US pressure, several rounds of negotiations kicked off: a meeting of Russian and US delegations in Saudi Arabia (February), three rounds of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul (May-July) and a meeting between Putin and Trump in Alaska (August).
Content analysis of the 130 most influential Russian Telegram channels, including state news outlets, political bloggers and voenkory, provides an accurate reflection of the real attitudes and intentions inside the Kremlin. The content of bloggers and voenkory is more emotional, but they generally work within the Kremlin’s narratives and are effectively part of the propaganda ecosystem.
Even in the optimistic first months of interaction between the Kremlin and the new White House, the balance of negative and positive content on a peace tilted against negotiations.
In early March 2025, as the US administration ramped up its peacemaking efforts, and in the wake of the US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia, only 7% of the analyzed Russian Telegram posts expressed even minimal support for negotiations or a ceasefire. Since then, the situation has barely changed.
As of early November, the same 7% of posts expressed support for negotiations, while 30% offered negative assessments. Negotiations were portrayed as useless and even harmful; a sign of weakness; a mistake by Russia; and effectively a defeat.
Still, the information environment in early 2025, which portrayed Trump as a politician who “understands Russia” and is ready to look out for its interests, reinforced the sense of Moscow’s military and political advantage over Kyiv. Some Russians saw supporting a continuation of the war as an opportunity to push the front line farther westward and as a last chance to make money in the army.
The surge in mentions of Trump was also reflected in attitudes toward the “special military operation” overall: support for the war, which stood at 50-52% from January to September 2024, jumped to 57% in February 2025 – before sliding back to 50% in September 2025.
The US president’s softer rhetoric toward Russia’s war lent a degree of legitimacy to the actions of the country that had started the war, especially against an otherwise solid backdrop of Western condemnation and sanctions. Trump’s involvement in the peace process has generated optimistic expectations, creating hope for a favorable outcome of the conflict for Russia – meaning without major concessions by Moscow – and this encouraged a willingness to support “one last push” in the war.
Ukrainian public opinion: Radicalization after Zelensky-Trump meeting
Whereas in Russia attitudes shifted gradually, in Ukraine the turning point after the initial surge was abrupt and took place after a specific event – the meeting between Zelensky and Trump at the White House on February 28, 2025, which was perceived as an attack not only on Zelensky but also on Ukraine as a whole.
Before the White House meeting, 40% of Ukrainians were not against suspending offensive operations for the sake of peace; after the meeting, the share fell to 33%. In addition, Ukrainians in favor of the complete liberation of all territories climbed from 49% to 57%.
The perception of Trump as a politician putting pressure on Ukraine and steering it toward pro-Russia positions led to distrust toward his peace efforts. Ukrainian public opinion is not inclined to make concessions under pressure from an external actor whom it sees as biased. The Zelensky-Trump meeting also gave rise to distrust toward any peace efforts associated with the US, which has only deepened as this year has gone on.
Trump’s pro-Russia bias: Perception and consequences
Studies confirm an almost identical perception of Trump both in Ukraine and in Russia: a large share of Russians and the majority of Ukrainians believe he is on Russia’s side. In early 2025, 72% of surveyed Ukrainians and 43% of Russians held this view. In September, the latter percentage dropped to 32%. Meanwhile, trust in Trump remains extremely low in each country: only 12% of Ukrainians trust him, and 20% of Russians.
Most Russians (75%) view Trump as cunning and sly. In terms of decision-making, 50% believe he is guided by emotions, while only 19% believe he weighs the arguments. Fifty-four percent of respondents think Putin does not trust Trump, and according to 56%, Trump does not trust Putin either. In September 2025, only 31% of Russians believed that Trump was interested in a peace, versus 75% who say Putin is interested in one. Overall, only 18% of Russians had a positive view of the US president in October, while 42% viewed him negatively and 40% could not state their position.
Meanwhile, Ukrainians are increasingly skeptical of whether Trump’s peace efforts are good for Ukraine: in an October 2025 poll, 52% said they believed Trump was pushing Ukraine toward territorial concessions in favor of Russia.
Overall, the mistrust of the warring sides toward the main mediator makes mediation impossible: any initiative is perceived by Russians as flimsy and by Ukrainians as a diktat, which translates into gridlock.
Ukrainians see Trump as a threat to their sovereignty and fear an unfair agreement. Russians view him as unpredictable, ideologically conflicted and driven by US interests. Even among those who believe Trump acts in Russia’s interests, 60% do not trust him.
Paradoxes of Trump
Trump, as the head of the most powerful state in the world, can exert maximal influence over global events, and from the first days of his current term, he has touted himself as a peacemaker. Yet this high level of influence, when combined with low trust, produces a demoralizing paradox: Trump has proven capable only of generating expectations; he has been unable to mediate effectively. His involvement, after a brief period of hope for millions of Russians and Ukrainians, has given way to disappointment, increasing rather than reducing tensions.
Ukrainians see Trump as an actor imposing on Ukraine the Kremlin’s conditions, as told to him by Putin during their contacts; Russians see him as a player who lacks a firm, independent position. Against this backdrop, any statements by Trump act not as a stabilizing force but as a destabilizing one, introducing uncertainty and provoking additional fluctuations in public opinion.
Trump’s attempt to construct the image of an effective peacemaker failed. First, for various reasons, his involvement led to a general outcome – the radicalization of mass sentiment in both countries. Second, the widespread perception of Trump as a pro-Russia politician undermined the image of a balanced mediator. Third, the initially low level of trust in him in both Russia and Ukraine weakened his effectiveness.
Yet these factors stemmed not only from Trump’s words and actions. Behind his public image stood a broad Russian media campaign concerning the ceasefire and Trump himself.
Peace negotiations in Russian media
In 2025, largely under US pressure, several rounds of negotiations kicked off: a meeting of Russian and US delegations in Saudi Arabia (February), three rounds of negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Istanbul (May-July) and a meeting between Putin and Trump in Alaska (August).
Content analysis of the 130 most influential Russian Telegram channels, including state news outlets, political bloggers and voenkory, provides an accurate reflection of the real attitudes and intentions inside the Kremlin. The content of bloggers and voenkory is more emotional, but they generally work within the Kremlin’s narratives and are effectively part of the propaganda ecosystem.
Even in the optimistic first months of interaction between the Kremlin and the new White House, the balance of negative and positive content on a peace tilted against negotiations.
In early March 2025, as the US administration ramped up its peacemaking efforts, and in the wake of the US-Russia talks in Saudi Arabia, only 7% of the analyzed Russian Telegram posts expressed even minimal support for negotiations or a ceasefire. Since then, the situation has barely changed.
As of early November, the same 7% of posts expressed support for negotiations, while 30% offered negative assessments. Negotiations were portrayed as useless and even harmful; a sign of weakness; a mistake by Russia; and effectively a defeat.
Fig. 4. Daily Sentiment Balance in Russian Media. Positive Minus Negative Mentions About Truce
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
Positive assessments of negotiations exceeded negative ones only twice, and only for a brief time: on August 1, after Putin’s remarks following a meeting with Alexander Lukashenko, where the Russian president said that “[talks] are always relevant and important, especially if their goal is to bring about peace”; and on August 16, after the Alaska summit.
Russian media have broadly maintained a more neutral tone throughout the past year. When emotional assessments appeared, however, negative ones outweighed positive ones by a factor of two. Voenkory and pro-Kremlin political bloggers, meanwhile, are far less restrained. In emotionally charged posts, they regularly express skepticism or open criticism toward the prospect of negotiations with Ukraine. On average, positive posts accounted for 7-8% of their total, and negative posts for 32% among political bloggers and 39% among voenkory.
Russian media have broadly maintained a more neutral tone throughout the past year. When emotional assessments appeared, however, negative ones outweighed positive ones by a factor of two. Voenkory and pro-Kremlin political bloggers, meanwhile, are far less restrained. In emotionally charged posts, they regularly express skepticism or open criticism toward the prospect of negotiations with Ukraine. On average, positive posts accounted for 7-8% of their total, and negative posts for 32% among political bloggers and 39% among voenkory.
Fig. 5. Positive vs Negative Mentions About Truce in Russian Media
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
Trump in Russian media
The portrayal of Trump in Russian Telegram channels closely mirrored the Kremlin narrative surrounding negotiations. Over the first 10 months of 2025, more than 100,000 mentions of Trump were recorded across the 130 analyzed channels. He is the most prominent foreign figure in the Russian information space.
At first, the tone was nearly balanced: 15,535 positive versus 15,324 negative posts. Positive posts included praise, expressions of support for Trump policies and depictions of him as a strong leader. Negative posts included criticism, accusations of being weak and claims of misguided decisions.
In the first half of the year, Trump was generally presented as a pragmatic leader and a potential dealmaker. In the second half, negative assessments have predominated, apart from the brief period following the Alaska summit with Putin.
When Trump’s rhetoric aligned with Moscow’s agenda, coverage was positive; as soon as it diverged, the tone shifted sharply, going in the opposite direction.
Trump’s image in Russian media went through a full cycle: from “our guy” to “clown.” From January to April, coverage of Trump was largely positive. His clashes with Zelensky, alongside his early contacts with Russia, translated into Russian media portraying Trump as a strong and far-sighted politician. A widely shared post quoted Trump as saying the war in Ukraine is NATO waging war against Russia.
Even during this period, political commentators and voenkory warned of the dangers of “naive pro-Trump enthusiasm,” with many posts arguing that Trump cannot be trusted, that he acts solely in his own interests and that he seeks to exploit Russia’s natural resources.
The portrayal of Trump in Russian Telegram channels closely mirrored the Kremlin narrative surrounding negotiations. Over the first 10 months of 2025, more than 100,000 mentions of Trump were recorded across the 130 analyzed channels. He is the most prominent foreign figure in the Russian information space.
At first, the tone was nearly balanced: 15,535 positive versus 15,324 negative posts. Positive posts included praise, expressions of support for Trump policies and depictions of him as a strong leader. Negative posts included criticism, accusations of being weak and claims of misguided decisions.
In the first half of the year, Trump was generally presented as a pragmatic leader and a potential dealmaker. In the second half, negative assessments have predominated, apart from the brief period following the Alaska summit with Putin.
When Trump’s rhetoric aligned with Moscow’s agenda, coverage was positive; as soon as it diverged, the tone shifted sharply, going in the opposite direction.
Trump’s image in Russian media went through a full cycle: from “our guy” to “clown.” From January to April, coverage of Trump was largely positive. His clashes with Zelensky, alongside his early contacts with Russia, translated into Russian media portraying Trump as a strong and far-sighted politician. A widely shared post quoted Trump as saying the war in Ukraine is NATO waging war against Russia.
Even during this period, political commentators and voenkory warned of the dangers of “naive pro-Trump enthusiasm,” with many posts arguing that Trump cannot be trusted, that he acts solely in his own interests and that he seeks to exploit Russia’s natural resources.
Fig. 6. Daily Sentiment Balance in Russian Media. Positive Minus Negative Mentions About Trump
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
By the end of May, the tone of Russian media had become predominantly negative, especially against the backdrop of the Istanbul talks and Trump’s statements in support of Ukraine. Caustic remarks began to appear: “Trump the peacemaker is over – now the war in Ukraine is Trump’s war”; “this time it is not Trump financing Ukraine – it is Ukraine financing the hyperactive redheaded old man.”
The Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska in August triggered a brief surge of positive coverage. But after Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly on September 24, where he criticized Russia, it soured again: “Trump changes his tune as he goes,” the channels wrote.
In October, there was another brief period of optimism, sparked by a Trump-Putin call and discussions of a possible meeting in Budapest. But a week later, everything fell apart: “crazy Trump canceled the meeting with Putin.”
In early November, debates in the US about resuming nuclear tests gave Russian channels a new pretext to mock Trump as: a man detached from reality; a “brilliant” diplomat, an ageing peacemaker who cannot control his hawks, a red-haired madman, an insane grandpa; a clown; and a wheeler-dealer.
Russian media react to every word Trump says with striking predictability: when he says something favourable for the Kremlin’s cause, they praise him; when he does not, they ridicule and demonize him.
The Trump-Putin meeting in Alaska in August triggered a brief surge of positive coverage. But after Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly on September 24, where he criticized Russia, it soured again: “Trump changes his tune as he goes,” the channels wrote.
In October, there was another brief period of optimism, sparked by a Trump-Putin call and discussions of a possible meeting in Budapest. But a week later, everything fell apart: “crazy Trump canceled the meeting with Putin.”
In early November, debates in the US about resuming nuclear tests gave Russian channels a new pretext to mock Trump as: a man detached from reality; a “brilliant” diplomat, an ageing peacemaker who cannot control his hawks, a red-haired madman, an insane grandpa; a clown; and a wheeler-dealer.
Russian media react to every word Trump says with striking predictability: when he says something favourable for the Kremlin’s cause, they praise him; when he does not, they ridicule and demonize him.
Fig. 7. Positive vs Negative Mentions About Truce in Russian Media
Source: Chronicles, ExtremeScan
Overall, the Kremlin’s shaping of attitudes toward the peace process and toward Trump demonstrates a stable pattern: the Kremlin views diplomacy with Trump not as a path to resolving the conflict or achieving a peace, but rather as a way to buy time and exploit a propaganda opportunity.
Support for Trump emerges only briefly and only when events can be presented as a Russian success; otherwise, as soon as he deviates from the Kremlin’s line, all participants in talks, including Trump, are ridiculed or discredited, or both, by Russian media.
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that anti-US sentiment in Russia, having softened somewhat thanks to Trump, has not disappeared; that Russians’ attitudes toward negotiating a peace, despite war fatigue and a desire to end the war, remain skeptical and hostile; and that Trump continues to evoke contradictory and adverse reactions among Russians, even though he seems to be more on Russia’s side.
‘Containment Strategy’: How the Kremlin Neutralizes Popular Demand for an End to the War in Media
In Russia’s authoritarian system, public opinion is not ignored. The regime monitors it daily through state institutions, as it is interested in stability, legitimacy and minimizing the risk of political protests.
Any political decision goes through propaganda framing and sociological testing – not for substance, which the Kremlin determines, but in terms of how to rationalise it and present it through media, preparing the country to support it or at least not resist it.
The war in Ukraine was preceded by years of anti-Western, anti-US and anti-NATO rhetoric, by the construction of an image of the enemy in the Ukrainian population and by rising tolerance for war as an acceptable means of pursuing strategic objectives. Now, with the war seemingly winding down, the Russian population has not been primed for a rapid peace process.
The media flow during Trump’s presidency and peace initiatives shows no signs of any intention to end the war. Research from all sources demonstrates the Russian population’s desire for peace, its lack of enthusiasm for sacrificing for territorial gains in Ukraine, and its lack of understanding of the objectives of the “special military operation” for the state and for people’s well-being.
The Kremlin’s narrative functions as an antidote to this desire for peace, portraying a “premature” deal as an affront to national dignity, a concession to external pressure and a betrayal of the lofty aims of the “special military operation.” Meanwhile, because there is no guarantee Moscow’s conditions will be accepted by Trump, a slight but systematic devaluation of his authority is being carried out across Russian media, in case he firmly shifts to the enemy’s side.
‘Two Peaces’: How Negativity Around Direct Talks with Ukraine and Positivity Around US-Russia Talks Fuse
Analysis of pro-Kremlin Russian media reveals no contradiction between the negative narrative surrounding “negotiations with Ukraine” and the optimistic tone around proposals such as the “28-point plan” and others discussed in the US-Russia format. These two lines do not conflict; they complement each other. They describe two “peaces” that are usually kept separate in media discourse.
On the one hand, there is the “bad, fragile peace” – this is about direct talks with Kyiv. This frame is invariably negative: negotiations with Ukraine mean compromises, concessions, risks and instability. Ukraine is presented here as an equal subject, which makes the format ideologically unacceptable. The perceived “unpredictability” of Trump and other Western actors also belongs in this category: when peace depends on the behaviour of erratic leaders, it is viewed as fragile and dangerous.
On the other hand, Russian media make it seem that a “fair, durable peace” will come not from Russia and Ukraine negotiating directly, but from two “truly responsible” actors, Russia and the US, deciding the fate of a Ukraine denied agency in the matter. Constructiveness, rationality, long-term solutions and an “architecture of peace” appear only in the context of the bilateral, Moscow-Washington track.
It is from this standpoint that the 28-point plan looks favourable: it is not a dialogue with Ukraine, but a sweeping deal between two powers supposedly capable of ensuring stability, imposing rules and guaranteeing results.
Thus, the negativity surrounding “negotiations with Ukraine” does not temper the positivity around the 28-point plan – on the contrary, they form a single, internally coherent media construct. A bad peace is one in which Ukraine is a subject. A good peace is one in which Ukraine is an object.
A quantitative analysis of 100 publications over the past week shows: approximately 70-75% of posts reinforce Ukraine as an object, while 15-20% mention its agency, but almost always for the sake of criticism or to demonstrate the futility of direct negotiations.
Overall, negotiations with Ukraine are immediately dismissed as unstable, conflict-prone, and indicative of weakness, while US-Russia negotiations are presented as a constructive pathway to peace. There is no contradiction between the two models: the negative and the positive form a unified discourse that discredits Ukrainian agency and legitimises a format in which Ukraine’s fate can be decided without its participation.
Conclusion
The results of the study show that Donald Trump’s involvement in the peace process did not lead to de-escalation or to increased public support for compromise in either Russia or Ukraine. On the contrary, his engagement was accompanied by growing polarization, rising distrust toward mediation, and the consolidation of hardline positions on both sides. Initially, Trump’s appearance generated a sharp rise in public expectations of peace, but this optimism quickly gave way to pessimism, leaving behind a landscape defined by scepticism, disappointment, and a lack of trust.
These effects cannot be explained solely by Trump’s rhetoric or diplomatic style. In Russia, a significant role was played by the Kremlin’s information strategy. Analysis of Russian state and pro-Kremlin media shows that negotiations were consistently framed as undesirable, premature, or harmful to Russia’s interests, regardless of the formal launch of peace initiatives or external pressure to support them.
Under these conditions, Trump’s image was used in a situational and instrumental manner. Positive assessments emerged only when his actions could be interpreted as beneficial to the Russian side; in other cases, his reliability and significance as a mediator were systematically questioned. This suggests that dialogue with the United States was viewed not as a pathway to conflict resolution, but as a tactical resource.
As a result, Trump’s peacemaking initiatives failed to generate sustained support for peace. In Russia, they reinforced expectations of a favourable outcome without concessions, contributing to continued public support for military action. In Ukraine, by contrast, they strengthened perceptions of mediator bias and further weakened trust in externally driven peace initiatives.
Support for Trump emerges only briefly and only when events can be presented as a Russian success; otherwise, as soon as he deviates from the Kremlin’s line, all participants in talks, including Trump, are ridiculed or discredited, or both, by Russian media.
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that anti-US sentiment in Russia, having softened somewhat thanks to Trump, has not disappeared; that Russians’ attitudes toward negotiating a peace, despite war fatigue and a desire to end the war, remain skeptical and hostile; and that Trump continues to evoke contradictory and adverse reactions among Russians, even though he seems to be more on Russia’s side.
‘Containment Strategy’: How the Kremlin Neutralizes Popular Demand for an End to the War in Media
In Russia’s authoritarian system, public opinion is not ignored. The regime monitors it daily through state institutions, as it is interested in stability, legitimacy and minimizing the risk of political protests.
Any political decision goes through propaganda framing and sociological testing – not for substance, which the Kremlin determines, but in terms of how to rationalise it and present it through media, preparing the country to support it or at least not resist it.
The war in Ukraine was preceded by years of anti-Western, anti-US and anti-NATO rhetoric, by the construction of an image of the enemy in the Ukrainian population and by rising tolerance for war as an acceptable means of pursuing strategic objectives. Now, with the war seemingly winding down, the Russian population has not been primed for a rapid peace process.
The media flow during Trump’s presidency and peace initiatives shows no signs of any intention to end the war. Research from all sources demonstrates the Russian population’s desire for peace, its lack of enthusiasm for sacrificing for territorial gains in Ukraine, and its lack of understanding of the objectives of the “special military operation” for the state and for people’s well-being.
The Kremlin’s narrative functions as an antidote to this desire for peace, portraying a “premature” deal as an affront to national dignity, a concession to external pressure and a betrayal of the lofty aims of the “special military operation.” Meanwhile, because there is no guarantee Moscow’s conditions will be accepted by Trump, a slight but systematic devaluation of his authority is being carried out across Russian media, in case he firmly shifts to the enemy’s side.
‘Two Peaces’: How Negativity Around Direct Talks with Ukraine and Positivity Around US-Russia Talks Fuse
Analysis of pro-Kremlin Russian media reveals no contradiction between the negative narrative surrounding “negotiations with Ukraine” and the optimistic tone around proposals such as the “28-point plan” and others discussed in the US-Russia format. These two lines do not conflict; they complement each other. They describe two “peaces” that are usually kept separate in media discourse.
On the one hand, there is the “bad, fragile peace” – this is about direct talks with Kyiv. This frame is invariably negative: negotiations with Ukraine mean compromises, concessions, risks and instability. Ukraine is presented here as an equal subject, which makes the format ideologically unacceptable. The perceived “unpredictability” of Trump and other Western actors also belongs in this category: when peace depends on the behaviour of erratic leaders, it is viewed as fragile and dangerous.
On the other hand, Russian media make it seem that a “fair, durable peace” will come not from Russia and Ukraine negotiating directly, but from two “truly responsible” actors, Russia and the US, deciding the fate of a Ukraine denied agency in the matter. Constructiveness, rationality, long-term solutions and an “architecture of peace” appear only in the context of the bilateral, Moscow-Washington track.
It is from this standpoint that the 28-point plan looks favourable: it is not a dialogue with Ukraine, but a sweeping deal between two powers supposedly capable of ensuring stability, imposing rules and guaranteeing results.
Thus, the negativity surrounding “negotiations with Ukraine” does not temper the positivity around the 28-point plan – on the contrary, they form a single, internally coherent media construct. A bad peace is one in which Ukraine is a subject. A good peace is one in which Ukraine is an object.
A quantitative analysis of 100 publications over the past week shows: approximately 70-75% of posts reinforce Ukraine as an object, while 15-20% mention its agency, but almost always for the sake of criticism or to demonstrate the futility of direct negotiations.
Overall, negotiations with Ukraine are immediately dismissed as unstable, conflict-prone, and indicative of weakness, while US-Russia negotiations are presented as a constructive pathway to peace. There is no contradiction between the two models: the negative and the positive form a unified discourse that discredits Ukrainian agency and legitimises a format in which Ukraine’s fate can be decided without its participation.
Conclusion
The results of the study show that Donald Trump’s involvement in the peace process did not lead to de-escalation or to increased public support for compromise in either Russia or Ukraine. On the contrary, his engagement was accompanied by growing polarization, rising distrust toward mediation, and the consolidation of hardline positions on both sides. Initially, Trump’s appearance generated a sharp rise in public expectations of peace, but this optimism quickly gave way to pessimism, leaving behind a landscape defined by scepticism, disappointment, and a lack of trust.
These effects cannot be explained solely by Trump’s rhetoric or diplomatic style. In Russia, a significant role was played by the Kremlin’s information strategy. Analysis of Russian state and pro-Kremlin media shows that negotiations were consistently framed as undesirable, premature, or harmful to Russia’s interests, regardless of the formal launch of peace initiatives or external pressure to support them.
Under these conditions, Trump’s image was used in a situational and instrumental manner. Positive assessments emerged only when his actions could be interpreted as beneficial to the Russian side; in other cases, his reliability and significance as a mediator were systematically questioned. This suggests that dialogue with the United States was viewed not as a pathway to conflict resolution, but as a tactical resource.
As a result, Trump’s peacemaking initiatives failed to generate sustained support for peace. In Russia, they reinforced expectations of a favourable outcome without concessions, contributing to continued public support for military action. In Ukraine, by contrast, they strengthened perceptions of mediator bias and further weakened trust in externally driven peace initiatives.