Introduction

Russia-Iran ties are complex and do not fit neatly into simplified IR categories. Andrei Kortunov notes that while Russia and Iran share a broad opposition to Western influence in the Middle East, in practice "the balance of common, overlapping and diverging interests between Russia and Iran is far more complex than it appears to those who are fond of simplified geopolitical constructs.”¹ However, analysts have struggled to describe it other than by placing it somewhere in between these very “constructs.” Kortunov himself suggests that claims of a strategic partnership are far too strong and that, at best, ties between Moscow and Teheran can be characterized as closer to a "tactical alliance between countries with diverging foreign policy aspirations and ambitions."² Nicole Grajewski argues that "Russia-Iran relations are best understood as a tenuous partnership that oscillates between ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ cooperation on common security issues despite long-lasting mistrust, unmet expectations and weak economic ties."³

Apart from military cooperation after the Russians invaded Ukraine in 2022, which the Iranians tend to minimize or deny altogether, bilateral ties have always been limited, with limited cultural and social links and little success in boosting economic links.⁴ Russia and Iran do have a track record of effective cooperation in regional diplomacy, such as on the Caspian Sea and the two countries' overlapping reactions to major conflicts in the greater Middle East, including the Tajik civil war in the 1990s and Afghanistan from the 1990s onward.

This paper looks at the political and diplomatic relationship between Russia and Iran in the wake of the Syrian civil war, treating it as a litmus test of the nature of the relationship. The Syrian war offers plenty of material for such a study, given its preeminence for 13 years and the fact that Iran’s and Russia’s strong presence on the ground there offered unique opportunities for directly interviewing some of their officials involved. This article provides new empirical data from interviews with key participants to provide more detailed data on how the Russia-Iran relationship evolved on the ground in the conflict during 2016-19.

This paper therefore seeks to answer two main questions:

a) What drove the divergence between Iran and Russia;
b) How did Russia and Iran seek to manage their diverging aims?

The paper is organized into three main sections. The first outlines the state of Russia-Iran relations before Russia’s intervention in Syria and in the early months of it. The second section identifies and discusses each of the drivers of the Russia-Iran divergence, while the third looks at how Russia and Iran sought to manage them.

Methodology

Researching this topic has required a number of methodological compromises, given that conducting primary research in Syria was extremely difficult until 2024. There are other obvious limitations to the research methodology adopted, with the research, by necessity, mostly limited to oral sources, with support from the literature and news reports but without access to primary written sources: the body of data collected is inevitably incomplete, gaps abound, and following up on specific themes was often impossible. The analysis contained in the paper inevitably reflects this.

Overall, the oral sources proved to be quite approachable. The risk inherent in this type of research is therefore not obtaining access. There are other risks, however: that interviewees might be affected by a social-desirability bias, resulting in overstating their achievements, capabilities and/or resources; or by reverse causation, leading sources to provide prejudiced information about rival organizations. Mitigation measures are discussed below. The research methodology was a hybrid of investigative journalism and ethnographic interviews. The questionnaires were adapted to each interviewee; there were, in fact, as many different questionnaires as there were interviews. The questions evolved as knowledge of ongoing trends and developments expanded.

All the researchers have a background in journalism and/or research, had participated in previous research projects with a similar typology of interviewees and have been trained to undertake research with a similar methodology. The interviews were commissioned to local researchers.

The risk that respondents might use the interviews to influence external observers or misrepresent the facts was assumed from the start. It was mitigated by using different types of interviewees – such as government officials and military officers, Iranian and Russian officers and diplomats, members of militias – who represented contrasting points of view; by interviewing individuals separately and without their being aware of other interviews taking place; and by inserting questions to which the answer was already known, in order to verify responses. It proved particularly helpful to present interviewees with information gathered from other sources. Public-domain sources, such as media reports and analytical studies, were also used, where available, to check the credibility of interviewees. Researchers were chosen who did not know each other to avoid the risk of researcher collusion to manipulate the content of interviews, for example, by inventing content to produce whatever they might have believed the project team wanted to hear. This is always a risk when interviews are carried out by field researchers in a project that is being managed remotely. The field researchers were informed that the purpose of the effort was simply to ascertain facts and that there was no premium placed on specific findings.

The interviewees were told that their answers would be used in an open-access publication, the type of which was not specified. The interviews were in part carried out face-to-face and in part over the phone – some interviewees were in locations that were difficult to access. All the interviews have been anonymized and all data that could lead to the identification of interviewees has been removed.

The 38 interviews were held in 2016-24 with senior Syrian government officials (11), armed forces and intelligence officers (8), mid-ranking members of militias (4), Iranian diplomats and IRGC and Iranian army officers (13), and Russian diplomats (2). Cooperation of those contacted for interviews was surprisingly forthcoming as most interviewees were keen to reflect on our questions in detail, even when they touched on highly contentious themes. We cross-checked, contextualized and supplemented interviews inside Syria through a number of interviews with Russian analysts, as well as media reporting and work by colleagues in academia and think tanks.

From tactical to strategic alliance?

^{Grajewski argues that the transactional relationship between Russia and Iran mutated into a much deeper relationship because of the Syrian war.5 That indeed seemed to be the case in early 2016. This section shows what took the countries’ leaderships to that point.}

Russia-Iran relations before the Syrian civil war

Scholars and analysts of Russia-Iran relations can be broadly divided into three groups. One group tends to argue that the strategic relationship between Iran and Russia has been getting closer. The Russian version of this view is that Russia and Iran are natural strategic partners.⁶ Another group argues that the two countries are essentially rivals in disguise.⁷ A third contends that Russia has a tactical, transactional relationship with Iran, with an overarching strategic strand in the relationship that can be characterized as alignment. Russia-Iran ties, in the third view, are therefore best understood as a form of “competitive alignment,” in which an overarching framework of relations managed by political leaders on both sides contain numerous competitive dynamics that work themselves out on the ground inside areas of conflict, such as Syria.⁸

As early as the late 1980s, Iran started looking at better relations with the Soviet Union and Russia as a way to counterbalance US hostility.⁹ Iran showed its understanding for Moscow’s war in Chechnya and cooperated with Russia in finding a solution to the Tajik civil war.¹⁰ Long before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was to drive an intensification of military sales and military/technological cooperation between the two countries,¹¹ in the 1990s Russian arms sales to Iran had started picking up, and Russia even sold a nuclear power station to Iran.¹² This led some US officials to speak of a “a full-fledged defense partnership.”¹³

At the same time, the two countries competed in the Caspian Sea,¹⁴ and in 1995-2000 Russia agreed with the US to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran.¹⁵ Later, Russia agreed to freeze the sale of advanced weaponry to Iran. Russia’s cooperation with OPEC countries to manipulate oil prices, to Iran’s detriment, was another contentious point that emerged regularly.¹⁶ Typical Iranian complaints about the Russians include criticism of Moscow’s sense of superiority.¹⁷ Russian shifts in relations with Iran, which continued until 2016, raised substantial doubts in Teheran that the Russians were using Iran as a bargaining chip with the Americans.¹⁸ More broadly, within the Iranian leadership concerns existed about the risk of becoming too dependent on Russia.¹⁹

The Russians, on the other hand, were often frustrated by Iranian intransigence while negotiating over their nuclear program.²⁰ However, especially after the failure of President Mohammad Khatami to break the ice with Washington,

Although Tehran is far from placing absolute trust in Moscow, […] the precedent of relative continuity in their relations has left powerful factions within Iran’s security establishment with the impression that Russia is more predictable than the West.²¹

Nonetheless, once Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power as president in Iran in 2005, relations gradually improved. Under his presidency, Russia was not worried that Iran would drift toward the West.²² Fluctuations in the relationship continued to occur. When Russia remained isolated from the West following its annexation of Crimea and Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the Obama administration, it seemed that the tables might be about to turn and that Iran would gravitate toward the West.²³ However, in the end under Hassan Rouhani, Russia and Iran remained close, not least because of the start of the war in Syria.²⁴

Russia’s and Iran’s investment in Syria

It did not take long after its start in 2011 for the Syrian civil war to emerge as a very serious challenge, initially for Iran but soon for Russia as well. Cooperation between the two countries on Syria started getting closer in 2012, as Russia, opposed to regime change and worried about its Tartus naval base, lent diplomatic support to Iran and Syria, especially in the wake of Syria’s alleged use of chemical weapons in 2013. The Russians also started sharing intelligence.²⁵ By 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was calling Iran a “natural ally.””²⁶

The loss of Idlib in spring 2015 raised the fear that the opposition could overwhelm even Latakia and the coastal region, including Russia’s base in Tartus, and neither the Iranians nor their allies believed they were in a position to prevent that. (Intensifying Turkish support for opposition groups was in part responsible for this development.) At the same time, the rise of ISIS increased the pressure on the Assad regime in parts of western and eastern Syria, while also dragging the US into the conflict and resulting in the creation of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This prompted the Iranians to seek Russia’s direct intervention.²⁷ For Russia too, intervention in Syria made more and more sense, not just to protect its own interests there, but also as a way to tie Iran more closely to itself and prevent any westward drift by Teheran, like the one that occurred in 2012.²⁸

While it is not possible here to describe in any detail the enormous challenges faced by the Assad regime after 2011, the degree to which Iran and Russia considered the situation extremely serious is well borne out by the amount of financial and human resources that they committed to supporting the regime.

In 2014, Russia provided at least €240 million to Syria, but this was just the beginning.²⁹ By 2017, Russia was reportedly contributing $200 million a month in support of the regime, or half of the $400 million per month that a Syrian government official estimated in 2017 the war was costing Syria. By spring 2017, according to a Syrian government source, Russia had already paid $7.2 billion to Syria, to which £3 billion of grants for weapon purchases should be added.³⁰ At the peak of the war, in 2016-17, Russia was reportedly spending around $2.5 billion per year to support the Syrian regime.³¹ In 2022-23, Russia still provided a total of $3 billion in financial support.³² It is unclear to what extent economic aid and financial support was in the form of grants or of loans. The latter appear to be more likely. We do know that in 2015, the regime obtained a $3 billion loan from Russia.³³ Other loans followed later.³⁴ Moreover, Syria is believed to owe between $30 billion and $50 billion to Iran and Russia together as of 2025, which suggests that it was receiving mostly loans.³⁵ Even before the regime collapse in December 2024, these loans were clearly at risk of never being paid back (also taking into account Syria’s past record of failing to repay debts), so the Russians might well have lumped loans and grants together as “support.”

Iran, by contrast, had provided $4.4 billion in aid by May 2017, on top of the $6-8 billion it was directly spending in Syria annually.³⁶ The following year, Ali Akbar Velayati, senior foreign affairs advisor to the supreme leader, stated that Teheran was providing $8 billion a year to ensure the Syrian regime’s survival.³⁷An Iranian MP claimed that Syria owed Iran around $30 billion at the end of 2024, suggesting that the overall financial commitment of Iran was even higher than Russia’s.³⁸

With regard to human resources, on the eve of Russia’s intervention, in October 2015, external sources estimated IRGC forces in Syria at 7,000.³⁹ This is close to what Iranian sources also reported. As of January 2016, the IRGC reportedly had 6,500 men in Syria, according to an Iranian army officer.⁴⁰ A month later, an IRGC source put the number at 9,000, noting that the number was increasing, because the “Syrian army is not good at fighting.”⁴¹ In April 2018, however, another IRGC source mentioned that after the April 2018 missile strikes against Syria, plans were being drafted to increase the number of IRGC personnel to 7,000 and that of the Iranian army in Syria, until then quite low, to 20,000.⁴² The 9,000 figure may therefore have included Iranian army forces, which were present in relatively modest numbers. Interestingly, Israeli intelligence estimates were more modest, at 2,500 IRGC and army personnel in late 2015 and declining afterward, to reach 1,000 in spring 2017.⁴³ By 2019, an Iranian source put at 2,300 the overall number of Iranian servicemen who had lost their lives in Syria.⁴⁴

The exact numbers of Russian forces deployed in Syria for military operations have never been made public. Russia already had a presence in Tartus at its naval base and had to send several hundred air force personnel to fly and service the combat planes it deployed. Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky estimated the number of ground troops at 3,000.⁴⁵ As of July 2017, according to a Syrian official, Russia had 671 advisers in Syria, 326 more than a year earlier.⁴⁶ Their numbers reportedly kept increasing afterward, and they even started being deployed to the front line.⁴⁷  Military contractors took the brunt of frontline operations and correspondingly took heavier casualties. Total losses were reported to be up to 197 servicemen and 346 military contractors.⁴⁸

Iran’s and Russia’s apparent honeymoon in Syria

There is no question, therefore, that the Syrian civil war shaped up as a crucial test of the relationship between Russia and Iran. For the first time, they confronted a major challenge to a key ally together.

Russia and Iran started getting closer in 2014, and in October 2014 they signed a memorandum of understanding on fighting terrorism.

Nikolai Patrushev, the head of [the] National Security Council and a close aide of Putin, stated that “Iran has been one of Russia’s key partners in the region, and it will remain so in future” after meeting with his counterpart Ali Shamkhani.⁴⁹

According to a Hezbollah newspaper, the first agreement featuring battlefield cooperation between Russia, Iran and Iraq was reached around September 2014. Reportedly, the first Russian military delegation arrived in Syria at this point, to assess the military needs.⁵⁰ On September 30, 2015, Russia finally deployed military forces on the Syrian battlefield, primarily its air force, supported by protection units, some special forces units, trainers and advisors, and military contractors tasked, among other things, with supporting Syrian units on the front line.⁵¹

Initially, the Russian intervention seemed on the surface to be welcome by both Teheran and Damascus. Nobody within the Assad regime denied that the Russian intervention and especially the Russian air campaign dramatically boosted the Assad regime’s fortunes. The same largely applies to the Iranians too, be it support from the IRGC or army.⁵² An IRGC colonel commented that “The Russian air strikes helped a lot in the current political situation.”⁵³ An Iranian army general commented in early 2016 that the Russian airstrikes “are matching our targets 100%, there are no contrast or differences.” “It was Russian air strikes that are making the opposition start peace negotiations,” he said. It is worth noting that, at that time, the Iranian general did not seem to view negotiations with the opposition as something negative, but as an achievement.⁵⁴ Around the same time, an IRGC commander assessed that “Rebel groups like Al Nusra, Al Sham are ready to start peace talks with Bashar al-Assad’s government.”⁵⁵ In sum, as external observers commented, in Syria the alignment of Russian and Iranian interests was “unprecedented.”⁵⁶ The Syrian crisis undoubtedly allowed Russia and Iran to make a qualitative upgrade of their relations toward a military partnership.⁵⁷

Soon, however, it started becoming clear that the alignment was far from complete. There were lingering doubts over Russia’s long-term aims. Another Iranian fear was that Russia’s intervention in Syria could be “a way of controlling Iran’s links to Europe, helping the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom to continue its dominance of European energy supplies.”⁵⁸ There were also serious shorter-term diverging interests.

Russia-Iran divergence in Syria

Under the surface, Iran’s and Russia’s aims in Syria diverged from the start, even if the respective leaderships thought that differences would be manageable. From the beginning of Russia’s direct involvement, according to Dmitri Trenin, Russia felt “uncomfortable with this alliance with Shiite power.”⁵⁹ Yezid Sayegh similarly pointed out that some degree of competition between Russia and Iran existed in Syria from the start, although it never reached the stage of a “comprehensive competition.”⁶⁰ Off the record, two IRGC sources in early 2016 did not hide that they rejected any prospect of a ceasefire and talks with the opposition until the war was essentially won, and the armed opposition reduced to a marginal role.⁶¹ This was in clear opposition to Russia’s aim of granting a significant share of power to elements of the opposition (see Reconciliation and peace talks below).

A common attitude in Moscow seemed to be characterizing the relationship with Teheran more as marriage of convenience than a strategic alliance, with “a high level of suspicion and mistrust between the two sides.”⁶²Some observers, however, still believed that Moscow saw Iran as a useful partner and a stable actor, a functioning state that could advance Russian interests on the ground in Syria.⁶³

Even in the early stages of Russia’s intervention in Syria, some incidents revealed to external observers tension beneath the surface. A case in point was Iran’s granting access to its Shahid Nojeh air base to Russia to facilitate an air bridge to Syria – that lasted one week before Iran annulled the agreement because Russia had publicized the fact in public statements. The Iranians felt that Russia’s use of the air base undermined Iran’s image of independence.⁶⁴

Tensions intensify starting in 2017

Already by the end of 2016, an IRGC colonel acknowledged that cooperation with Russia was in decline.⁶⁵ In March 2017, an Iranian diplomat too noted the same trend:

Before, Iran and Russia were consulting each other before taking action, but now, unfortunately, they are not consulting with us, and Russia is taking actions without informing us. Russia distanced itself from us when they established relations with Türkiye and the new Trump administration.[…] We told them if you do anything, you should consult with us.⁶⁶

By 2018, signs of divergence and disagreement started intensifying. As the Syrian armed opposition was marginalized, the Russians and Iranians started needing each other much less, and competition between them increased.⁶⁷ The competition for influence aside, it became increasingly clear that Iran’s and Russia’s strategic aims were different. Opinion among external observers remained nonetheless divided about how serious the Russia-Iran divergence was from 2018 onward.⁶⁸ For its part, the Syrian regime openly complained about the two allies pushing it in opposite directions.⁶⁹

We can group the major points of diplomatic divergence between Iran and Russia into two main issues:

1. The approach toward a political solution (including with the Kurds) and the fact that the Russians did not see the need to keep Assad in power at all costs; and
2. Iran’s determination to consolidate its long-term military and political presence in Syria, especially within the context of its ongoing confrontation with Israel.⁷⁰

Let’s look at each of these points of divergence in detail.

Reconciliation and peace talks

Iran’s initial endorsement

The Russians were already trying to promote reconciliation before they intervened in Syria at the end of 2015. After the situation in the Ukrainian Donbas stabilized, the Russians organized meetings between opposition groups and regime representatives in January and April 2015. At the same time, efforts by the Gulf monarchies to persuade Moscow to dump Assad were going on. Although formally Damascus and Teheran endorsed the Russian diplomatic efforts, there were reports that both capitals were concerned about the possibility of Moscow making a deal behind their back.⁷¹ Before intervening directly in Syria, Putin invited Assad to Moscow, reportedly to make sure that he would buy into Moscow’s idea of a political settlement, which involved making the regime more inclusive. Perhaps to gain leverage, the Russians also publicly signaled that keeping Assad in power was not essential to them, to the chagrin of the Iranians.⁷²

Clearly, as the Iranians were encouraging Moscow to intervene, they initially had to endorse the Russian approach of negotiations. At the top of the Islamic Republic there was a strong majority in favor of Russian intervention. Velayati, with the full endorsement of Khamenei, expressed support for Russia’s views on a negotiated settlement of the Syrian conflict in November 2015. Parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani was then speaking of Russia as a priority partner.⁷³

Nonetheless, even in those early stages, the actual Russian intervention ended up irritating “the traditional supporters of Tehran’s active role in the Syrian crisis – Iranian radical conservatives and IRGC members.”⁷⁴These tensions were reflected in Iran’s media, which started expressing the fear that Russian air power could make the Syrian regime forget about all Iran had done for the survival of the regime, hence compromising Iran’s long-term position in Syria. The fear that the Russians might make a deal with the Gulf monarchies in exchange for investments by them was also clearly expressed in the media.⁷⁵ According to Nikolay Kozhanov,

These people believe that [the] immense military efforts made by Tehran in support of the Assad regime bought the Iranian authorities the right to decide the destiny of Syria. Indeed, Iran deployed its military advisors and special forces in Syria long before Putin’s decision to send Russian troops to Syria. Tehran’s proxies (such as Lebanese Hizbollah and Shia militia) were the first to come to the aid of Assad, as well.⁷⁶

The IRGC’s approach: Negotiations only after military victory

Aside from the abovementioned jealousy toward Russia’s growing influence in Syria, the real driver especially of IRGC opposition to Russia’s plans for negotiations was the objection to incorporating opposition groups into power to any substantial degree, which would have been the case if agreements had been signed before those groups were defeated militarily. The Russians wanted to concentrate the military effort against Daesh and Al Nusra, but the Iranians insisted on the need of destroying all opposition groups.⁷⁷ For the Iranians, a political solution was possible only if the sponsors of the opposition (especially Saudi Arabia and the US) stopped supporting it,⁷⁸ implying that they were ready to deal only with a dramatically weakened opposition, starved of resources. While Moscow positioned itself as a “third side” in the conflict and was “flirting” with the moderate opposition, the Iranians positioned themselves as the staunchly loyal ally of the regime.⁷⁹ The IRGC position was summed up well by an IRGC colonel:

[We] are telling them that if we solve the problems by fighting, this will solve them permanently, but if the problems are solved through negotiations, they will start again.⁸⁰

There were also tensions among different Iranian state agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was closer to Russia’s position.⁸¹ According to an Iranian diplomat, Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif was a genuine advocate of a peace settlement and was supported by President Rouhani, also because Zarif was trying to maintain or improve Iran’s relations with Türkiye and Russia.⁸² By early 2017, the Iranians were looking to be able to achieve complete victory in Syria within 2-3 years, thanks in part to the collapse of IS in Iraq. In the view of Zarif, according to an Iranian diplomat, that would allow Syria to return to the status quo ante of 2011, except that Assad would leave power, to be replaced by another Ba’athist, and the government would become more representative of the population, incorporating more Sunni Arabs and some Kurds.⁸³ This was quite close to Russia’s view.

However, Zarif’s participation in the 2015 Vienna talks was criticized by the IRGC, which argued for a military victory as the only solution to the conflict. Four IRGC sources stated bluntly that the IRGC was able to veto anything Zarif might want to agree to.⁸⁴ IRGC and the Iranian MoD believed instead in a complete military solution. The diplomat admitted that the IRGC would always prevail over the MoFA.⁸⁵ The dominance of the IRGC (endorsed by Khamenei, who actually controlled the entire Syrian portfolio) was highlighted in early 2019, when during Assad’s visit to Teheran, Zarif was left out of the process and did not take part in any meeting. Zarif resigned, but Rouhani refused to accept his resignation. Clearly, Khamenei meant to snub Zarif.⁸⁶

Moreover, even within the usually more moderate Iranian MoFA there were different views: one diplomat viewed the prospects of peace in terms similar to the IRGC, rejecting negotiations and arguing that Iran had not sacrificed so much for just peace talks.⁸⁷ According to a senior official in Damascus, even the Iranian ambassador to Syria, Jawad Turk Abadi, was close to the IRGC and reportedly answered to IRGC head Mohammad Jafari more than to the MoFA.⁸⁸

Ceasefires were seen by the IRGC merely as opportunities for the opposition to recover and reorganize.⁸⁹When Assad, with the support of Ali Mamlouk, nonetheless tasked General Qais Al Farwah of the Republican Guard to pursue reconciliation with opposition groups in the Damascus area, the Iranians started spreading rumors that the general was distributing weapons to the opposition, trying to discredit him.⁹⁰

Russia’s military combined counterinsurgency operations with local truces and talks to persuade opponents to change sides or to evacuate strategic areas.⁹¹ The IRGC, however, opposed even local reconciliation deals, where small commanders either gave up fighting or agreed to fight on the government’s side, arguing that these commanders reconciled only because they had issues with their leaders or because they were cut off from supplies, meaning they could not be trusted in the long term. Moreover, the number of small commanders reconciling would never be such as to have a significant impact on the conflict.⁹² A commander of the Iran-trained and -funded Fatimiyun militia acknowledged that the first ceasefire agreed between Russia and Türkiye was more effective than previous ones, because Türkiye played a role in enforcing it among opposition groups. However, this commander opposed ceasefires on the ground, arguing that the Turks only wanted their proxies in Syria to recover strength after the defeat in Aleppo.⁹³

A senior official in Damascus confirmed that in 2017, the Iranians were bringing heavy pressure on the Syrian government to violate the Russia-sponsored ceasefires with opposition groups, including with chemical attacks.

The chemical attack that took place in Idlib was done because of Iran bringing pressure on General Issam Hallaq to perform it.⁹⁴

According to a Syrian official, the Russians complained about the gas attacks by Syrian forces, fully aware that these were going to seriously hurt Russian efforts to make progress in reconciliation talks.⁹⁵

Assad’s future

Moscow was skeptical of Assad from the start.⁹⁶ Moscow criticized the initial repression of the protests in 2011-12 and, in June 2013, Putin openly criticized Assad for not having undertaken any reforms before the revolt.⁹⁷ Putin clearly said that he was worried about Assad doing the “Sadat turn of alliances.”⁹⁸ Some interpreted these comments as a nod to Arab countries, as removing Assad from power was a major red line for them.⁹⁹

By 2017, it was painfully clear to all in Damascus and to the Iranians that the Russians were quite serious about looking for a replacement for Assad.¹⁰⁰  The rumors were that Rami Makhlouf, Hassan Abdullah Noori (a candidate in the 2014 election), Maher al Assad and former foreign minister and vice president Farouk al Sharaa were being considered as alternatives. The Iranians opposed all these options, according to a senior Syrian source, but reportedly indicated that they could tolerate somebody like Abdullah al Ahmar (a senior Ba’ath politician) in the job.¹⁰¹

Toward the end of 2017, the Russians made quite an effort sponsoring Farouk al Sharaa as a replacement for Assad, to be the head of a transitional government. The transitional government was meant to allow for reconciliation talks and eventually for elections within three years. Born in 1938, al Sharaa was an elderly Syrian diplomat of Sunni background, former deputy foreign minister, former minister of information and former vice president who had fallen out with Assad. He was also reportedly supported by Bashar’s brother, Maher al Assad, and by dignitaries of the regime such as Ali Mamluk, Ali Turkmani, foreign minister Walid Muallen and several others. Maher al Assad supported al Sharaa due to his own poor relations with his brother and to his own good relationship with Russia. Al Sharaa’s supporters in Syria and in Russia believed that he would be acceptable to the Kurds, as well as to many Sunni Arabs, including at least some opposition groups. Because al Sharaa had fled to Jordan, he was also seen positively in Jordan itself and in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Türkiye and Europe, and possibly the US too. Bashir al Assad of course bitterly opposed the plan. The Syrian military by and large was also opposed.¹⁰² Russia’s approach was bound to meet Iranian opposition, and indeed it ended up going nowhere (see How to keep Assad in power below). Iran’s opposition was so obvious that one wonders whether the Russians really expected their proposal to succeed, or whether they were just posturing to strengthen their credibility with their Arab interlocutors.

Russia’s exploration of a settlement with the Kurds

Fostering reconciliation between Damascus and the Syrian Kurds was part of Moscow’s plans, which included some form of Kurdish autonomy.¹⁰³ The Iranians, on the issue of Kurdish autonomy, were instead aligned with the Turks, who bitterly opposed it. According to an IRGC adviser, the Turkish authorities did engage with the Iranians once to get them to lobby the Russians to drop their support for the Kurds.¹⁰⁴ The Iranians also complained to the Russians for their own reasons and even clashed with Kurdish forces, but they met a stern Russian reply:¹⁰⁵

Russia told Iran, “You must not do such things because they are against Daesh.” They said that “If you do such things, we will stop support with you.” We are not supporting you to engage in tribal fighting, we are helping you here to finish off Al Nusra. Leave them alone because they are helping us to finish off Daesh.¹⁰⁶

The Iranians sometimes went as far as to deny that the Kurds had played a useful role against Daesh, as an army general interviewed in January 2016 claimed, and were highlighting the risk of weakening Syria’s central government with any concession of autonomy to the Kurds, despite their own demands for devolution to the Shi’as.¹⁰⁷ An IRGC source, while acknowledging the role of the Kurds against Daesh, openly stated that Iran would support a Syrian armed campaign against them if they eventually refused to fully accept Assad’s authority.¹⁰⁸

In 2018, the Russians were nonetheless decreasing their support for the Kurdish militias, although they did not suspend funding altogether. Reportedly, this reduction was a result of an agreement with the Turkish government according to which Türkiye would stop supporting some anti-Assad groups and Russia would stop supporting Kurdish groups. Before reaching their agreement with the Turks over Idlib in 2017, the Russians were lobbying the Syrian Kurdish militias to accept Russian protection and negotiate a power-sharing deal with the Assad regime.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the Kurdish issue lost importance as a bone of contention between Russia and Iran.

Russia’s and Iran’s regional diplomacies


Arab ambitions

In the short and medium term, Russia’s strategy of using the leverage gained with its direct intervention to gain diplomatic traction seemed to work:

Moscow was able to draw the U.S. and the UN into multiple ceasefire deals, each ostensibly a building block toward implementing UNSCR 2254, without demonstrating any serious ability to force Assad to uphold them. The U.S. and Europe repeatedly accepted these superficial attempts to reduce the violence in Syria.¹¹⁰

The Russians aimed at establishing themselves as the leading powerbroker and mediator in the region on the basis of successful management of the Syrian crisis. Hence Russia’s efforts to reintegrate the Assad regime into the Arab fold. The agreement with Jordan and the US for a ceasefire in southern Syria (July 2017), which excluded Iran and Hezbollah from the area, “helped legitimize Russia’s role as mediator and guarantor in Syria.”¹¹¹

The Russians always remained keen to have other partners in the Middle East, aside from Iran.¹¹² That became even more of a necessity as the war in Syria wore on:

In order to make its military and economic presence in the country an asset and not a burden, Moscow needs a stable government with working institutions which will prevent the country from sliding back into chaos. That is only possible if the government, military/security apparatus go through certain changes, if U.S. sanctions are lifted and economic reconstruction is launched with the involvement of international donors.¹¹³

Whereas Iran’s priority was buying time to entrench itself further in Syria, the Russians wanted to use negotiations about Syria to establish closer relations with a number of Arab states, even through coordination with the Americans.¹¹⁴ Russian efforts were helped by changes in the strategic views of some of the Arabs. In particular, the UAE was strongly opposed to the Assad government in the early years of the civil war, but around 2015 its position started shifting, and the UAE authorities supported Russia’s intervention, due to the growing role of Türkiye among the opposition groups and the growing role of Islamist groups. Eventually the UAE restored diplomatic relations with Syria in 2018.¹¹⁵ The UAE saw the relationship with Russia and with Assad as a way to limit or reduce Iran’s influence in Syria. Russia appears to have hoped to get the UAE and other Gulf states to fund part of the reconstruction of Syria, although some observers saw an UAE intent to sabotage the Russia-Türkiye entente as well.¹¹⁶ More generally, the Russians saw the opportunity for a general improvement of relations with the UAE.¹¹⁷

Iran’s fear of Arab influence over Assad

In Assad’s future above, it was shown how the Iranians opposed Moscow’s idea of sacrificing Assad in the name of regional reconciliation. Iran’s resistance to Russian efforts to edge closer to the Gulf Arabs continued in later years.¹¹⁸ Eventually, however, Iran’s own approach to the Gulf Arabs evolved amid Chinese mediation, leading to an Iran-Saudi agreement on March 10, 2023. Thus, in April 2023 the Iranians viewed the fact that Saudi ministers were visiting Syria and vice versa as a positive achievement. They also expressed satisfaction that Syria might rejoin the Arab League.¹¹⁹ The actual decision to readmit Syria into the Arab League on May 7, 2023, came two months after the Iran-Saudi deal. Sources within Iranian diplomacy argued they were in favor of the shift. Officially, Iran congratulated Syria on its readmission. Likely Iran appreciated the legitimizing impact for the Assad regime.

Soon, however, the readiness of the UAE to spend billions of dollars in supporting Syria and its armed forces, along with an Arab request that the Iranian presence be scaled down, reawakened fears in Teheran that its influence there would be eroded quickly.¹²⁰ The Iranians were perfectly aware that the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the Emiratis and the Egyptians were all against Syria’s close relationship with Iran and demanded that Damascus curtail it.¹²¹

During 2024, the Iranians were therefore putting renewed pressure on the Syrian government to stay away from the Arab states, especially the Gulf ones.¹²² Some Syrian officials were aligned with Iran and rejected countries like Qatar and the Saudis gaining influence, after they had supported radical opposition groups.¹²³

The Syrian tilt toward the Gulf proved too strong, however. The UAE played a pivotal role in linking Syria back to the other Arab states. By 2024 and probably earlier, some Syrian officials were describing the UAE as “one of Syria’s allies” and a likely source of financial support in the future, including for the Syrian armed forces. There reportedly were explicit promises in this regard. The Arabs’ worries about the extent of Iranian influence within Syria was shared by many within the Assad regime as well.¹²⁴

Russia seeks a deal with Türkiye

Iran’s and Russia’s attitude toward Türkiye fluctuated over time. The Iranians supported engagement with Ankara from 2012 until 2017,¹²⁵ seeking to counterbalance US pressure.¹²⁶ In 2017, Russia and Iran swapped positions, and it was the Russians who were insisting on involving the Turks: “Russia is moving on peace talks with Türkiye and opposition groups, but this is not acceptable for us.”¹²⁷ By 2019, the two sides had swapped positions again, and now Iran wanted Damascus to improve relations with Türkiye.¹²⁸

Russia’s relations with Türkiye over Syria were initially tense, not least because of Türkiye’s shooting-down of a Russian Su-24 bomber over the Syrian border on November 24, 2015. As Russia kept working at its diplomatic strategy in Syria, however, it sought to engage Ankara too, perhaps with the intent of building on the thaw in relations following Russia’s help against the plotters of the July 16, 2016, coup. The Astana talks, launched in January 2017, were cosponsored by Russia, Türkiye and Iran, but Russia was clearly the prime mover. Indeed, a common assessment is that the Astana Process

proved a success for Russia’s wider goal to gain diplomatic stature through its role in Syria. Russia used the framework of the talks to start a successful long-term effort to co-opt Turkey, away from NATO towards an alignment with Russia and to gain disproportionate influence within international efforts to implement UNSCR 2254. The UN released a statement in late January 2017 praising the Astana Talks as an “important step towards the resumption of intra-Syrian negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations.”<sup>129

The initial Iranian support for the Astana Process abated once it became clear that the talks produced a de facto temporary partition of Syria, with the Idlib pocket and the northern areas becoming a de facto Turkish protectorate. This irritated Assad and his regime.</sup> 

Initially, the Syrian government clearly communicated its intentions to the Turkish government, but afterward the Russians interfered and allowed the Turkish government to enter northern Syria.¹³⁰

The Russians had to calm Assad down, reassuring him that the Turks would withdraw once their clearing operation was completed and warning him that Russia would not support Syria in an open conflict with Türkiye. The Russians might also have seen the Turkish operation as a chance to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the PKK and PYD, which had been refusing to reduce their links with the Americans. The Iranians, by contrast, sided with Assad and lodged a complaint with the Turkish authorities.¹³¹ The Iranians even helped Assad to deploy militias to the area in the early days of the crisis.¹³² Despite having cosponsored the Astana talks, Iran soon developed strong reservations. By February 2017, following the steady collapse of IS control in northwestern Syria, Iran and Türkiye were in direct competition for filling the vacuum.¹³³ Even before Türkiye entered Syria, the Iranians were irritated by Russia’s efforts to negotiate with the Turks and agree a ceasefire in the Idlib area. According to an Iranian diplomat,

The relationship with Türkiye is becoming a matter of disagreement between Russia and Iran, and it is causing problems to take place between Russia and us. […] Now, the ceasefire will just allow Türkiye to support these opposition groups financially and logistically and send them volunteers and stand them back on their feet to fight against Assad’s government. The IRGC did not want a ceasefire, but due to Russia pressure they accepted it. […] Russia is saying that if we have a relationship with Türkiye, peace will come to Syria, but this is a big mistake by Russia; Türkiye is playing a trick here.¹³⁴

The source confirmed that there was some suspicion in Iran that Russia and Türkiye might agree to a de facto partition of Syria for the foreseeable future, a plan that Iran would strongly resist,¹³⁵ especially if it was left out.

The Russians were clearly very keen on developing a constructive relationship with the Turks, and they seemed confident that this was achievable through thick and thin. Despite what seemed like extreme tension between Russian and Türkiye in February 2020 following the killing of 33 Turkish soldiers in an airstrike, Russian analysts were more worried by the evolution of their relationship with Iran. Finding a settlement of the Syrian crisis in collaboration with the Iranians was seen as deeply problematic.¹³⁶

Iran’s attitude to Türkiye’s role in Syria improved again in 2023. In the immediate aftermath of the start of the Gaza crisis, Erdogan and the Iranian president seemed to be coordinating well, and Erdogan seemed open to revisiting his approach to the Assad regime.¹³⁷ When Syria-Türkiye contacts were resumed in 2024 with Russian encouragement, the Iranians officially approved of this, responding to the Turkish media’s portrayal of the talks as an example of Iran-Russia divergence. However, the Iranians felt that Erdogan wanted to exclude them from the talks when he suggested a one-on-one meeting with Assad in Moscow, which was sponsored by Russia as well. Assad raised the issue of Turkish forces on Syrian territory and the meeting never happened.¹³⁸ A Russian diplomat was by then treating Türkiye as an ally of Russia on almost a par with Iran, describing Ankara as ready to help maintain stability. The Russians seemed confident that they had the final say in Syria and that the Iranians were isolated, because even the Assad regime wanted to reach an understanding with other regional powers, meaning the Arabs and the Turks.¹³⁹

Russia between Israel and Iran

Iran’s strategic deterrence

Iran aimed “to forge a new layer of deterrence in its asymmetrical regional security structure by using Syria as a forward base to balance against Israel. This is what has come to be known as Iran’s policy of ‘strategic depth’ — that is, to take the fight as close to enemy territory as possible.”¹⁴⁰ Iran’s forward deterrence was described as

… strengthen[ing] its influence and consolidation in Syria and [deepening] the grip of its proxies in the country by means of profound and multi-faceted penetration of the Syrian systems – defense, economy, education, society, culture, and religion – while gaining control of critical infrastructure, supporting pro-Iranian militias, engaging in Syrian military buildup, and promoting an ideological and demographic transformation.¹⁴¹

A Syrian intelligence source agreed that the IRGC also intended to use its presence in the south, in the event of a war with Israel, as a launchpad for attacks. Indeed, the source confirmed that the IRGC was moving to the south a large number of rockets and missiles, which were no use against the opposition.¹⁴² The Iranians were also busy assembling and gathering rockets and missiles in Syria for transfer to Lebanon.¹⁴³ This presence was meant to be permanent. In the words of an IRGC commander:

It is our right to get a permanent base in Syria, as we sacrificed a lot and took part in the long war in Syria, so we deserve to have a permanent base in Syria. The Syrians at the beginning were not happy, and currently they are saying nothing about it, so it seems to be OK.¹⁴⁴

The diverging attitude of Russia and Iran vis-à-vis Israel is easily observable. While the Russians were keen to maintain good relations with Israel, the Iranians were widely believed to be aiming to turning Syria into a base for operations against Israel to enhance their ability to retaliate against Israel should need be.¹⁴⁵ This divergence led Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov to deny that Russia and Iran were “allies.”¹⁴⁶ Especially from May 2018 onward, the Russians themselves were clearly worried about Iran’s efforts to establish a strong presence near the Israeli border and at the same time started being more tolerant toward Israel’s “containment policy.”¹⁴⁷ Said an analyst in July 2018:

Russian leaders, who once described Iran’s future presence as legitimate, are now asserting the need for the forces of Iran and Hezbollah to leave Syria following the end of the civil war.¹⁴⁸

The Iranians came under “huge pressure” not only from Russia, but from the Assad regime as well, to withhold retaliation against Israel after it started striking their positions in southern Syria. The Iranians kept threatening massive retaliation if the attacks continued; however, they never took action. Syrian intelligence sources argued that what the Israelis were seeking was exactly an Iranian reaction, which would be used to invoke Western intervention, and claimed that the Russians fully agreed with such analysis. For the Assad regime, IRGC help in the south had been sought to achieve Damascus’ priority aim, which was taking control of the southern border in order to prevent infiltration into Syria.¹⁴⁹ Being dragged into a war with Israel was the last thing they wanted:

We will never let anybody put our country in a multisided war with regional countries, because it will weaken our country in this critical time, since we already face threats from international terrorism and the hostile actions of regional countries.¹⁵⁰

Russia’s deal with Israel

Already in late 2015-early 2016, the Israelis were worried about growing Iran-Russia cooperation.¹⁵¹ As the Israelis continued airstrikes in Syria, despite the establishment of a Russian air defense network there, they likely intended to remind the Russians of Israeli unwillingness to tolerate the status quo in Syria, which did not factor in Israeli security needs.¹⁵² The Russians sought to adapt to Israel’s posture and eventually seemed to have reached an agreement with Israel, probably in early 2018, committing to prevent the Iranians and allied organizations from getting close to the Israeli border.¹⁵³ The Russians even established an ad hoc Syrian army unit (8^th Brigade) under their direct control to the south to help keep the Iranians out.¹⁵⁴ The implementation of the agreement was somewhat problematic, but by and large the Assad regime seem to have sided with the Russians on this matter. The Russians allowed the Israelis to carry out attacks on Syrian territory, as long as the Syrian armed forces and government were not targeted.  The Iranians made clear that they would not leave Syria just because Russia asked them to do so.¹⁵⁵ Hence the Russians had little choice but to allow the Israelis to take direct action. In Michel Duclos’ words,

The final purpose of this laissez-faire policy from Moscow regarding Israeli strikes in Syria is that Iranian leaders will one day realize themselves what is the “tolerable” level of Iranian presence in Syria from the Israeli point of view. […] The Russian gamble is that the dialectical relationship between Iranian expansion and Israeli strikes will resolve itself in a kind of self-regulation mechanism.¹⁵⁶

The Iranians pulled out their own forces from southern Syria, relying instead on a range of local proxies and on Hezbollah.¹⁵⁷ The Russians and Israelis also increasingly converged on the preservation of the Assad regime, with which Israel hoped to reconfirm the de facto pre-civil war agreement on the stability of the border. A stronger central power in Syrian, so runs the argument, is more likely to be in a position to get the Iranians out, or at least to limit their activities.¹⁵⁸

According to Igor Delanoë, the Russians gained points with the Israelis for seemingly having the upper hand in the partnership with Iran in Syria, despite the prevailing belief in the US that Iran’s closeness to Assad gave Teheran the advantage.¹⁵⁹ The Russians benefited from Israeli airstrikes in that they also served the purpose of warning Assad of the risk involved in letting Iran establish itself in Syria.¹⁶⁰

Despite Iranian efforts to flout the restraints imposed by the Russians, as of early 2021 Lavrov was still saying that Russia will not allow Syria to be used as an “arena of confrontation” between Iran and Israel.¹⁶¹ At that time, there were even press reports that the Assad regime was negotiating with Israel about a deal to expel the Iranians in exchange for Israel’s acceptance of the status quo in Syria.¹⁶²

The Russia-Israel deal under stress

After Russia invaded Ukraine, some Iranian actors in Syria appeared to be firmly convinced that the Russians would become more sympathetic toward Iran’s plight vis-à-vis Israel, due to Israel assisting Ukraine.¹⁶³ In reality, the Russians never had any intention of siding with Israel altogether, but rather tried to maintain a balancing role between the Israelis and the Iranians, a view also shared by some in Iran.¹⁶⁴

It was only after the start of the Gaza crisis, however, that even the Russians started showing concerns that Israel’s actions might destabilize Syria. A Syrian army source reported that Russian advisers were involved alongside IRGC ones in preparations for the contingency of a crisis with Israel.¹⁶⁵ At the same time, Putin had to intervene with Khamenei to make sure that the Iranians’ retaliation after the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran would be “restrained.” As Reuters mentioned on August 6, 2024, citing two senior Iranian sources, Putin advised Khamenei not to attack Israeli civilians through a message delivered on August 5 by Sergey Shoigu, the former defense minister and now secretary of the Russian Security Council, during meetings with senior Iranian officials. Iran was still considering its response to the assassination.¹⁶⁶

In the meantime, after reducing its commitment to Syria in the wake of the war in Ukraine, Russia increasingly struggled to keep Iran out of the Syrian south entirely. The Iranians still had a presence in 2023.¹⁶⁷ According to a source, as of 2024 there were 49 positions of Iranian and allied forces in the south.¹⁶⁸ Moscow’s determination to pursue close relations with Israel was always at odds with Iran’s determination to use the conflict with Israel to legitimize its quest for hegemony in the Middle East. Maintaining the right balance proved challenging, and Moscow struggled to deliver on its pledges to Israel.¹⁶⁹ The Russians remained committed to keeping the Iranians and their proxies away from at least the Golan. Even delivering this was problematic, as Netanyahu himself alleged. But the Israelis continue to see the Russians as the only possible interlocutor.¹⁷⁰

How Russia and Iran sought to manage their divergence

Russia’s dilemma: Managing a marriage of convenience with Iran

Signaling Russia’s unhappiness

Unquestionably Russia and Iran were “mutually dependent on the ground”:

Iran cannot conduct an effective ground campaign without the cover of Russian airstrikes; and for Russia to be effective in bolstering Assad’s hold on power, it needs ground troops from Syria and Iran.¹⁷¹

The original Russian understanding appears to have been that by delivering useful goods to the Iranians through their intervention in Syria, they would gain enough leverage to get the Iranians to agree with their plans. Undoubtedly, initially, “the Russian diplomatic umbrella particularly emboldened the Iranians.”¹⁷² Iran benefited from Russia’s readiness to assist Iran’s military leadership in Syria, introducing Iran and its proxies to “signature Russian campaign-design concepts such as cauldron battles, multiple simultaneous and successive operations, and frontal aviation in Syria.”¹⁷³ Later Russia also gained leverage by using its military police as an interposing force on the Turkish border, relieving Iran from the unpleasant task of having to deploy its own forces there.¹⁷⁴

In reality, none of this sufficed. The Russians appear to have felt that the Iranians were not taking Russian demands seriously enough. From 2016 onward, the Russians sought to signal their dissatisfaction to the Iranians. Early signs of Russia-Iran tension included Russia’s failure in 2016 to provide air support for pro-Iran forces in Aleppo, as well as an alleged disagreement over Russian attempts to get the Syrian army to intensify operations in eastern Syria against IS.  However, Russia subsequently increased air support for IRGC operations in Aleppo, presumably considering that the message had been delivered.¹⁷⁵ In the end, the battle of Aleppo came to be seen as a success of the collaboration between “Iran, Syria, Russia and Lebanon’s Hezbollah.”¹⁷⁶ During the Aleppo crisis, the Russians were still strongly motivated to stick close to the Iranians, perhaps because they too felt that the Assad regime was too weak for negotiations to work:

During the Aleppo crisis, John Kerry, Obama’s secretary of state, tried to negotiate a settlement which would have involved the moderate opposition. However, Sergei Lavrov, his Russian counterpart, strongly rejected a compromise, siding with Tehran which vehemently rejected any dealing with the opposition.¹⁷⁷

The Russians had not given up on asserting their views, however. They involved the Iranians in the Astana Process, as we have seen. This was seen by some see as an indication of an “understanding between the two countries about the future of Syria.”¹⁷⁸ In reality, the Iranians were soon dissatisfied with the main outcome of those talks, namely the de facto Turkish protectorate of Idlib. The Astana Process itself could therefore be seen as yet another Russian attempt to manage the “marriage of convenience” – by pursuing Moscow’s interests while trying to keep the Iranians on board. The partial Russian military withdrawal announced in December 2017 was seen as improving Russia’s leverage vis-à-vis Iran as well, signaling that Russia’s demands had to be taken more seriously.¹⁷⁹

This signaling continued thereafter. The muted Russian comments over Qasem Soleimani’s killing can be interpreted in the same way:

Though Moscow certainly does not rejoice over Soleimani’s death, it is not felt to be a problem in itself. In fact, it is rather to its advantage insofar as the Iranian general was implementing on the ground Tehran’s diehard policy for Syria.¹⁸⁰

Denying Russia’s most treasured asset: Air defense

How the Russians managed Iranian and Syrian requests for protection from airstrikes and Israeli requests to hit certain types of targets on the ground in Syria is a good example of Russia’s approach to its dilemma: they were the only ones able to provide air defense, and this gave them leverage, but at the same time Russia would not intervene in Israeli raids in order to safeguard its relationship with Jerusalem and gain additional leverage with the Israelis. 

Due to the lack of Iranian air defense capabilities in Syria, Iranian and Hezbollah forces there were heavily dependent on Russian and Syrian air defense. Russian and Iranian analysts are cautious on Russia’s alleged complicity with Israel in allowing airstrikes against Iranian and proxy targets in Syria.¹⁸¹ Nonetheless, there is no question that the Iranians resented the Russian decision of not activating their air defenses in response to Israeli raids.¹⁸²

After the Russians clearly showed they were unwilling to commit to defending Iranian forces from Israeli airstrikes, the Iranians upped pressure for the modernization and rehabilitation of Syrian air defense. The Russians only partially obliged, by starting to overhaul existing Syrian assets, while withholding new technology, despite repeated promises.¹⁸³ When Israeli airstrikes extended to Jabal Azzan and Deir ez Zor in spring 2018, Iranian and Hezbollah irritation only grew.¹⁸⁴ The attacks on the T-4 air base saw Iranian targets being hit in close proximity to Russian aircraft. The lack of Russian reactions suggests that the Russians had been warned about the strikes.¹⁸⁵

Regarding the Israeli air strike on April 9 on the air base, according to some secret-source information, then Israel had already shared their air strike information with the Russians, and as a result they had already evacuated the airfield, if not, it was not hard for the Russians to shoot down the Israeli missiles, but the problem was that they never wanted to intercept the missiles...¹⁸⁶

Initial Russian reassurances were accepted by the Iranians. An IRGC officer expressed the view that the Russians were serious about helping Syria close the air defense gap and that they would make good on their overhaul of Syria’s air defenses with new equipment.¹⁸⁷

The Russians have clearly stated that they will protect the Syrian forces from possible air strikes, whether by Israel, the US or any other Western powers. […] They have also told us that they have warned Israel to avoid targeting Syrian territory in the future and if it happened again they would respond.¹⁸⁸

Gradually, however, it became clear that the Russians kept colluding with the Israelis in allowing them to target Iranian assets with impunity. Aside from complaining about Russian failures to prevent Israeli airstrikes, the Iranians reacted by deploying their own air defense systems to Syria, such as Bavar, Sayyad and others. The Iranian authorities decided not to deploy their most advanced systems (the Russian-made S-300s) to Syria, preferring to keep them in Iran. As all these Iranian systems were found to be completely ineffective against F-35s and not very effective against any Israeli planes, the Iranians had no alternative but to go back to the Russians and enlist whatever help they could get to improve coverage of the Syrian airspace and to obtain technology transfers that could improve the capabilities of their air defense systems. To this end, Russian and even Chinese specialists deployed to Syria. In practice, however, as the source had to acknowledge, at the time of his interview no Russian technology transfers aimed at improving performance against stealth aircraft had taken place.¹⁸⁹

The Russian approach could only work in the short term, however. Russian reassurances and Iranian hopes in the end proved not to be enough to prevent Russia-Iran relations being damaged by Russia’s persistent “collusion” with Israel and by its refusal to share cutting-edge technology.¹⁹⁰

A solution that did not work: Spheres of influence

The Russians must have realized that managing the “marriage of convenience” by sending signals to the Iranians and playing tricks on them was hardly sustainable. Longer-term solutions were needed. Mona Yacoubian believes that the Russians, in response to the constraints they faced, aimed to create spheres of influence in Syria, with a Russian zone of control in the west, a Turkish one in the north and a US one in the east.¹⁹¹ The Russians even proposed a federal solution in Syria, which was reflected in its 2016 draft text of a new Syrian constitution. The Russians did not push this agenda hard, aware that neither Assad, nor Iran, nor Türkiye, nor Baghdad approved of it.¹⁹²

Yacoubian believed that Iran was not in a position to establish its own sphere of influence because it did “not exert control over a specific territorial sphere of influence, given the more covert nature of its power in Syria. Instead, Iran and its proxies will project influence in strategic areas under regime/Russian control.”¹⁹³ In reality, while the Russians could not raise the issue of an Iranian sphere of influence at the diplomatic level without condemning their plan to rejection, Iranian influence was pervasive in central and even parts of western and southern Syria.¹⁹⁴ Iranian influence was so strong that the Russians were left with the need to carve out their own niches not just in coastal Syria, but also in the south. The arrangements made by the Russians in the south, with the formation of the 5^th Corps’ 8^th Brigade out of former opposition members and their intent of keeping Assad’s own security forces and the Iranians with their militias out, also looked like another “sphere of influence” being created, around a center of power represented by former southern rebels. In practice, the Russians failed to stop Syrian intelligence and 4^th Division from reentering the area and undermining Russia’s deals with former opposition groups.¹⁹⁵ The Iranians were upset by the creation of the 8^th Brigade, which they accused of being Salafis and of having links to the Turks and the Arabs.¹⁹⁶ Russia eventually renounced establishing its own sphere of influence on the southern border after it got entangled in Ukraine from 2022 onward.¹⁹⁷

Iran’s dilemma: How to keep the Russians in, without losing too much 

How to keep Assad in power, despite Russia’s plans

Even before Russia’s direct intervention, some in Iran were worried about a Russian-Saudi rapprochement, especially the IRGC, and were unhappy about Russia’s preference for saving the Syrian state as opposed to saving Assad. Only Russia’s annexation of Crimea changed the predicament of the Iranians, as Putin sought to add pressure on the Americans and edged closer and closer to intervention.¹⁹⁸

In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s intervention, the Iranians were adamant that they wanted Assad to remain in power, although three Iranian sources admitted that if keeping Assad turned out not to be possible, they could consider seeing him replaced by another Ba’athist, such as senior politicians Hilal Hilal or Mohammad Saeed Bakhtawani.¹⁹⁹ Even a replacement from within the ranks of the Baath was not a consensus opinion, however. An IRGC commander in early 2016 rejected this option, on the grounds that

Bashar al-Assad is trustworthy for us, and he always kept a good relationship with Iran, but if another person comes instead of him by the choice of Russia and America, then we do not know how that president will be, whether he will be honest with Iran and the IRGC.²⁰⁰

Indeed, Iran showed strong opposition to the individual who emerged as Russia’s favorite in 2017, Al Sharaa, as president of a transitional government. Allegedly the Iranians did not want a Sunni president and even more so one with good relations with opposition groups and Gulf countries. The Iranians reportedly even threatened an insurrection of their proxies if Al Sharaa replaced Assad.²⁰¹ Summing up Iran’s official position, Daniel Brumberg assessed that

Iran’s leaders are united in their conviction that no effort to rebuild Syria will work without Assad (and by implication, his readiness to use force). Thus, Tehran believes that whatever political process emerges, it must include Assad and his allies.²⁰²

However, in a frank November 2017 interview, an IRGC commander commented that, for Iran, the purpose was not making Syria strong – quite the contrary, Syria under Assad would never recover its former strength, but that would suit Iran’s aim to bring Syria into its sphere of influence:

… our purpose is that the government of Syria must be weak, and we want to reach our purpose in Syria, like in Lebanon. Syria is at the heart of Iran‘s strategy to create a Shiite crescent across the region.²⁰³

The source insisted that this aim was important enough for Iran that it could possibly lead to serious damage in the relationship with Russia.²⁰⁴ Iranian resistance was effective so that by April 2018 the Russians had abandoned their push for a transitional government in Syria and seemed resigned to keeping Assad in power. Tensions with Iran eased as a result.²⁰⁵
How to keep Russia engaged and concede as little as possible

Brunberg summed up the Iranian dilemma in Syria as follows:

Moreover, given the nearly existential role that the Syrian-Iranian alliance plays in its security policy, Tehran wants to retain as much of a political and military footprint in Syria as the region (and Moscow) will bear.²⁰⁶

The Syrian conflict was also inevitably affected by geopolitical developments elsewhere, resulting in fluctuations in Iranian perceptions of the Russian commitment to Syria. A commonly held fear among Iranian policymakers and analysts in 2016 was that Moscow’s ultimate goal could be to “change the global geopolitical balance and increase its influence on the international stage,” using Syria “as a bargaining chip to resolve the Ukraine question, at the expense of Iran’s localized interests in Syria.”²⁰⁷

In 2015-16, the Iranians at least had no reason to fear a sudden Russian divergence from their immediate war aims. The election of Donald Trump in November 2016 threw even that into question for some months. The Iranians were worried that the Russians might dump the Assad regime in exchange for Trump’s recognition of Russian sovereignty over Crimea, despite Russian denials that this might be in the realm of possibilities.²⁰⁸One IRGC colonel indicated that

According to our intelligence information, if Trump recognizes the annexation of Crimea, maybe Russia will move away from Syria.²⁰⁹

By March 2017, at least the Iranians were reassured that the feared blossoming of relations between Putin and Trump did not appear to be taking place, according to an official at their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²¹⁰

However, other factors were pushing Iran and Russia apart over Syria, as discussed in Russia-Iran divergenceabove. By 2018, it was clear that there were strong enough tensions between Russia and Iran to raise Teheran’s suspicions concerning Russia’s long-term goals.

Perhaps Russia’s strategy in Syria was part of its push for a “multipolar world,” trying to counterbalance American power by allying with like-minded powers, as Eugene Rumer would put it.²¹¹ However, there were a range of other, less benign possibilities too. Russia eventually abandoning Iran for another partner in Syria was only the most extreme one.²¹² If the Americans were not going to be that partner, the Gulf Arabs plausibly could have been. Even concerning the US, it was still conceivable that Russia might use Iran as a bargaining chip for easing American sanctions against Russia.²¹³ In between these extreme interpretations, various others were plausible. Delanoë believed that Gulf tensions allowed Russia to step into the role of mediator between Iran and the Arab powers. Russia therefore was not planning to dump Iran, but its aspiration to act as a mediator would inevitably reinforce the asymmetry in the partnership.²¹⁴ It was also conceivable that Russia would obtain international recognition for Basha al Assad as the legitimate ruler of Syria in exchange for reducing Iran’s footprint in Syria.²¹⁵ The Iranians, in any case, could not be sure of what the Russians were really up to.

Unsure about the Russians’ future behavior, the Iranians could not afford to lose them or even to see them seriously reduce their commitment to Syria, meaning they needed to accommodate the Russians to some extent. For example, toward the end of 2018, Russia-Iran tensions over deployments of IRGC and Hezbollah forces in the south were defused as the Iranians agreed to suspend these deployments. Reportedly relations between Iran and Russia improved as a result.²¹⁶ In reality, during 2018 the IRGC was developing a covert presence in the south (Rif Dameshq, Quneitra and Daraa regions), with new buildings designed to look like civilian ones but destined to be used as military bases and training centers. The IRGC was therefore playing tricks on the Russians, like the Russians were playing tricks on them. The IRGC was selling this presence to Damascus as necessary in order to control cross-border infiltration by opposition groups. The settlement of Shi’a fighters in these areas was to serve the same purpose.²¹⁷ The pace of Iranian entrenchment could be modulated, but ultimately the aim remained the same, boosted by a strong sense of entitlement:

We do not care whether Russia is getting stronger or weaker; it is not between Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran; it is between Syria and Iran, and we did a lot for the people of Syria and for the Syrian government, so we do not care about the Russians; building bases is our goal, and we will build them at any cost.²¹⁸

Another major risk of Russian disengagement emerged after Russia got entangled in Ukraine in 2022. During 2024, it became increasingly clear that the Iranians had failed to keep the Russian engaged. As the regime’s crisis deepened during 2024 due to a reduced Russian financial commitment (which was mostly Russian retaliation against Assad’s efforts to shrink Russian influence with the Syrian armed forces),²¹⁹ a Syrian army officer summed up the Iranian dilemma, arguing that Iran was facing a choice of either taking up the burden or losing influence.²²⁰ Iran, as we now know, was unable or unwilling to take up the burden, with the end result being the collapse of the Assad regime.

This highlights a dimension that is often lacking in existing analysis of Russia-Iran relations in Syria – the costs of sustaining intervention there (see Russia’s and Iran’s investment in Syria above). Iran needed Russia not just because of its air power but also because of its greater financial resources. The Assad regime was largely living off Iranian and Russian support.

Conclusion

The late 2015 alignment of Russia and Iran on Syria was only superficial. The two sides were aware of major divergences between themselves, but they assessed that these needed not hamper cooperation in the short term. Iran and Russia managed to keep cooperating because Iran viewed the Syrian regime as a key strategic asset in their “line of defense,” and at the same time it realized that without Russia the war might be unwinnable. Russia too saw that it stood to benefit from a decisive intervention in Syria. The two sides accepted that the only way they could achieve their minimal aims in Syria was working together, leaving controversial issues for later. The question of the future of the Assad presidency was shelved in 2015, as were Iran’s plans to establish a permanent presence in Syria. The Russians maintained their diplomatic efforts with the Gulf countries throughout the conflict and had no interest in embracing Iran too closely, lest their relations with the Arabs be disrupted. Similarly, the Iranians sought to maintain good relations with Ankara, even when tension between Türkiye and Russia peaked in 2015-16.

These issues were bound to reemerge with force as soon as the battlefield situation eased. In fact, 2017 saw the issue of Assad’s replacement explode again, as the Russians felt that the situation on the ground had improved enough to provide strong leverage in negotiations with the opposition and its foreign sponsors. The Russians were aware that Assad was an obstacle to smooth negotiations, but their real purpose was to mediate a settlement to secure not only their own position in Syria but also their regional influence. At that time, the Iranians were still bent on teaching a lesson to their Gulf Arab rivals and were also worried that Russia might distance itself from Iran if its relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia improved too fast. As the military strength of the Syria-Iran-Russia alliance grew, the regime started taking over the south. That raised Israeli concerns, adding another rather intractable driver of divergence between Russia and Iran.

Arguably, therefore, the problem with the partnership established in 2015 was that it was bound to be undone by its very success. By 2018, the initial consensus was in tatters, and the two uneasy partners had to figure out how to keep pursuing their own aims, while keeping the other on board for the short and medium term. They worked out a “cooperative competition,” in which cooperation was the best course of action as long as they had more to gain from it than by going their separate ways.²²¹

The techniques utilized for enabling cooperation included aggressively signaling unhappiness by withholding protection or participation (the Russian indulged in this), trying to work out spheres of influence, outright cheating (that is, making promises with no intention of fulfilling them) and, more generally, constantly assessing how far to push for one’s own interest without completely alienating the other side, sometimes going as far as engaging in brinkmanship. Given the persistence of distrust between the two partners, assessing exactly how far it was feasible to push was always going to be problematic, and the partnership remained unstable.

In the new geopolitical environment created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russians were presented with two options, wrote Igor Matveev and Yeghia Tashjian at that time: no longer constraining the expansion of Iranian military influence and a major role for Tehran in Syria’s post-conflict economic reconstruction (as long as Moscow’s strategic interests in maintaining control over the Mediterranean ports of Latakia and Tartus were observed); or trying to coordinate more closely with Türkiye in the north and Israel in the south to contain the Iranian expansion.²²² In fact, the Russians pursued both options at the same time, possibly also because they were aware that Iran was not in a position to expand its commitment dramatically.

In the end, throughout nine years of coexistence on the Syrian battleground, Russia and Iran succeeded in continuing to cooperate, yet the quality of their cooperation was certainly suboptimal.²²³ Their diplomatic and political divergence considerably disrupted their respective aims and efforts. Russia failed to negotiate a political settlement that would stabilize Syria and entrench Russian influence among the Gulf Arabs, nor did Iran manage to really entrench itself in Syria as it would have liked. By 2019, it seemed that the war was essentially won and that the Assad regime was not under any immediate threat, but the vetoes imposed by Russia and Iran on each other’s policies prevented any political consolidation of the battlefield gains, paving the way for the ultimate collapse of the Assad regime.